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Abstract 
 
This  thesis  argues  that  Max  Weber‟s  peculiar  political  logic  consists  of  three 
modes of thought: a civil philosophy of politics and nationalism; a reduction of 
politics  to  sovereign  power;  and  a  control  of  society‟s  role  in  politics.  To 
demonstrate these  modes of  thought, the thesis compares  Weber  with the civil 
philosopher Christian Thomasius and finds strong similarities in their respective 
uses of political and civil ethics. It compares Weber with the legal philosopher 
Carl  Schmitt  and  argues  that  both  thinkers  based  their  politics  on  a  sovereign 
power that is at once exceptional, extra-legal, extra-moral and extra-sociological. 
 
The  thesis  appeals  to  contemporary  context  by  summarising  and  dividing  the 
Weber  scholarship  into  three  categories.  In  doing  so,  it  avoids  the  trend  in 
secondary literature of conflating Weber‟s political logic with his social theory 
and sociological methodology, and instead argues that his political logic must be 
assessed in terms of its own merits as well as the ideas of other political thinkers. 
  
The  thesis  encourages  more  assessment  of  Weber‟s  political  logic  along  these 
lines  by  summarising  Weber‟s  various  responses  to  the  „social  question‟. 
Ultimately, the thesis provides a new understanding of Weber‟s analysis of the 
social and its role in politics.  
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Introduction 
 
This thesis identifies and delineates three different types of political logic in the 
writings  of Max Weber (1864-1920): a civil  philosophy  of political  ethics and 
national  duty;  an  advocacy  of  sovereign  power  based  upon  pragmatic  use  of 
liberal political mechanisms; and a restriction of the social as a topic of scholarly 
enquiry, including a delimitation of society as a source of political authority. By 
comparing Weber‟s writings on academic freedom with the civil philosophy of 
the early-modern political and social reformer, Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), 
the thesis provides an alternative reading of Weber, revealing similar logic in their 
respective  uses  of  ethics  to  train  political  leaders  and  civil  servants,  and  their 
respective uses of these same ethics to invoke allegiance to the nation-state and to 
the  absolute-state.  Further,  by  comparing  Weber‟s  writings  on  bureaucracy, 
parliamentarism  and  democracy  with  Carl  Schmitt‟s  (1888-1985)  legal  and 
political  philosophy,  the  thesis  establishes  that  Weber,  before  Schmitt, 
acknowledged that the sources of political authority were exceptional, extra-legal, 
extra-moral  and  extra-sociological.  The  thesis  argues  that,  like  his  use  of 
democracy and parliamentarism, Weber‟s nationalism was ultimately pragmatic in 
the sense that he understood the nation to be the stronghold of political pluralism, 
sovereign  power,  and  difference  and  opposition.  These  were  the  values  that 
national politics represented for Weber.  
 
Following  the  identification  and  delineation  of  Weber‟s  civil  philosophy, 
sovereignty  and  pragmatism,  the  thesis  summarises  and  divides  the  Weber  
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scholarship into three  categories. It draws these  categories  from the disciplines 
and histories of sociology, political economy and political theory, and argues that 
these uses have, until now, tended to maintain that Weber promoted democracy as 
a goal in itself or as a means to the ends of individual autonomy. By placing these 
uses in their own historical context, the thesis contends that they are based upon 
an  inadequate  methodological  understanding  of  Weber  as,  primarily,  a 
methodological individualist who attempted to conceptualise all spheres of life, 
including political reality, from the viewpoint of social or economic action. To 
reveal a different side of Weber, one that has not been adequately captured in the 
Weber  scholarship  to  date,  the  thesis  inspects  some  of  Weber‟s  alternative 
conceptualisations  of  the  social,  particularly  those  found  in  his  substantive 
encounters with the „social question‟. The „alternative Weber‟ that is uncovered 
through this process is a political thinker committed to: the pursuit of historical 
accuracy; the substantive restriction of society to the sociological role of moral 
idea  (and  the  subsequent  methodological  delineation  of  society  as  a  topic  of 
scholarly  enquiry);  and  the  delimitation  of  society  as  a  source  of  political 
authority.  Reading  Weber‟s  restriction  of  the  social  in  this  way  forbids  the 
overuse  of  his  sociological  and  political-economic  method  as  a  source  for 
explaining his political logic, which offers a more adequate reading of his political 
judgements,  including  his  rejection  of  the  liberal-social  mechanisms  of  civil 
society and democracy as sources of political authority and ordering. 
  
  3 
The superficial treatment of Weber’s political logic 
 
There are a number of factors contributing to the secondary literature‟s superficial 
treatment of Weber‟s political logic. The first of these is the tendency to label 
Weber as either a social or political theorist. The second, which has developed in 
response to the inadequacies of the theoretical approach, is the method of focusing 
on  Weber‟s  social  and  political  concept-formation  and  its  intellectual  context. 
This approach was first applied to Weber by Wolfgang Mommsen in Max Weber 
and  German  Politics  1890-1920  (1984)  and  Wilhelm  Hennis  in  Max  Weber: 
Essays in Reconstruction (1988). This approach contributes to one understanding 
of Weber‟s political thought  but this understanding is restricted to the  concept 
formation  and  intellectual  context  contemporary  to  Weber.  Unfortunately,  this 
also limits our explanations of the peculiar political logic that he developed in his 
writings on political ethics, national duty, parliamentarism and democracy to this 
contemporary context. 
 
Stephen Turner and Regis Factor argue that Weber was „an enemy of the project 
of social theory itself‟ because he „repudiated social theory in its contemporary 
form‟ rejecting „all the standard explanatory devices of nineteenth-century social 
theory‟  including  „the  idea  of  collectivities,  social  forces,  human  nature  and  a 
common human telos‟ (Turner and Factor 1994: 1; 10). Turner and Factor contend 
that Weber built his concepts not from a contemporary tradition of social theory 
but from traditional ideas in the philosophy of law. They (Turner and Factor 1994: 
8)  argue  that  „neither  in  the  case  of  “social  theory”  nor  for  the  bulk  of  his  
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“methodology” has the direct link to a well-developed tradition of social thought 
been  established‟.  The  lack  of  a  contextual  basis  for  Weber‟s  so-called  social 
theory and his methodology has, according to Turner and Factor, permitted the 
secondary  literature  to  construct  all  kinds  of  erroneous  interpretations  and 
sometimes  deliberate  misinterpretations  of  Weber‟s  social  thought.  Turner  and 
Factor offer their solution in the form of a contextual approach that provides the 
conceptual context of Weber‟s ideas; specifically, their approach establishes that 
Weber  developed  his  social  thought  from  the  „well-developed  intellectual 
tradition‟  of  the  „philosophy  of  law‟  (Turner  and  Factor  1994:  8).  Turner  and 
Factor argue that Weber drew heavily from Rudolf Jhering‟s philosophy of law in 
formulating his famous concept of the state as the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of violence. The novelty of Weber‟s approach, according to Turner and Factor, 
was that he took the concepts and precepts of one discipline and applied them 
with revolutionary results to another.  
 
The  contextual  approach  of  Turner  and  Factor  (1994)  is  the  contemporary 
standard  for  Weber  scholars,  but  it  is  not  without  its  pitfalls.  Restricting  our 
readings of Weber to the historical context of the debates, their central tenets and 
concepts  contemporary  to  Weber,  this  approach  forgoes  opportunities  to  draw 
similarities between Weber‟s political logic and the logic of others developed in 
different milieus. For instance, restricting our understanding of Weber‟s concept 
of the modern state to the philosophy of law during the late-nineteenth century 
prevents our appreciation of Weber‟s portrayal of the role of the state as a peculiar  
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form  of  logic  to  be  considered  in  its  own  right.  Applications  of  both  the 
theoretical  and  contextual  methods  to  understanding  Weber,  performed  in  the 
discipline of political theory, have led to similar inadequate results.  
 
Today political theorists speak of the key themes of political theory as being the 
analysis of power, particularly the legitimacy and authority of different forms of 
government  and  the  relationship  between  politics  and  social  life  (The  Concise 
Oxford  Dictionary  of  Politics  2003).  Using  these  key  themes,  Bellamy  et  al 
(2004) portray both social and political aspects of Weber‟s work as contributions 
to political theory. Bellamy et al argue that political theory in Germany at the end 
of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries was largely concerned 
with „the nation-state, national identity, the nature of democracy, liberalism, and 
the rule of law‟ (Bellamy et al 2004: 395). In Bellamy et al‟s account, German 
political  theorists  discussed  these  themes  within  the  context  of  a  general 
pessimism about the culture of modernity. These theorists, especially before the 
unification  of  Germany,  were  divided  by  their  allegiance  to  either  Roman  or 
Greek  ideas  about  politics  (Bellamy  et  al  2004:  396).  The  Roman  political 
theorists „emphasised politics in terms of relations of power‟, whereas the Greek 
political  theorists  emphasised  politics  „as  a  component  of  a  cultural  ideal‟ 
(Bellamy  et  al  2004:  396).  Following  this  polarisation,  political  theorists  in 
Germany  tended  to  either  identify  politics  with  „the  state,  power,  and  the 
apparatus  of  ruling  (Herrschaft  and  Macht)‟  or  with  the  „aim  of  creating  or 
presupposing an ideal polity of universal reason and culture‟ (Bellamy et al 2004:  
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396). According to Bellamy et al, Weber subscribed to the Roman idea of politics 
as  relations  of  power,  but  he  combined  this  idea  with  some  of  the  themes 
developed by Georg Jellinek (1851-1911) – who argued that the state and society 
were no longer distinct entities – replacing the state with the „association‟ as his 
„central political concept‟ (Bellamy et al 2004: 396). Using the Roman association 
as his central political concept, Weber portrayed the state as „no more or less than 
an association of the rule of human beings over human beings‟ (Bellamy et al 
2004: 397). 
 
In placing Weber‟s analysis of associations at the centre of their political theory, 
Bellamy et al offer two possible readings of Weber, both of which relativise his 
conceptualisation  of  social  and  political  relations.  The  first  reading  portrays 
Weber as  essentially a social theorist  who  conceptualised all  political relations 
fundamentally as social relations; where social relations are defined as struggles 
amongst  individuals  or  associations  for  a  variety  of  forms  of  power  including 
cultural,  economic,  and  political.  The  second  reading  portrays  Weber  as 
essentially a political thinker who conceptualised all relations – social, economic 
and political – as, fundamentally, political relations of power. The problem with 
both  of  these  readings  is  that  they  relativise  Weber‟s  portrayal  of  social  and 
political relations as relations of power, which diminishes any distinction that he 
may have provided between these types of relations and, worse still, weakens his 
concept of power. 
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In avoiding the theoretical approach to Weber, Peter Lassman has pointed out the 
„theme of the distinctiveness of the political domain‟ and the „autonomy of the 
political domain‟ in the work of Weber (Lassman 2000: 88; 98). Lassman distils 
this theme solely from Weber‟s conceptual work in Economy and Society (1968). 
He  argues  that  what  makes  the  political  domain  distinct  from  the  social,  in 
Weber‟s basic concepts in Economy and Society (1968), is its use of, and threat 
of,  force  (in  Lassman  2000:  88).  The  basic  concepts  in  Economy  and  Society 
(1968)  suggest  that  both  social  and  political  associations  are  based  upon  the 
power and struggle of rule among men. In these concepts, the ultimate political 
association – the modern state – contains no moral supremacy to rule over other 
associations, only the power of force to govern all associations existing within its 
territories.  Lassman‟s  reading  does  much  to  highlight  Weber‟s  distinction 
between social and political relations, and associations, but it is not representative 
of Weber‟s entire political thought. Restricted to the basic concepts, Lassman‟s 
reading does little to reveal the political that emerges in Weber‟s writings on the 
ethics of political leadership and his writings on parliamentarism and democracy, 
and it also does little to reveal Weber‟s attempts to delineate the social as a topic 
of  scholarly  enquiry  and  his  attempts  to  delimit  society  as  a  source  of  moral 
authority. 
 
Weber’s peculiar distinction between the political and the social 
 
The  thesis  avoids  the  relativisation  of  Weber‟s  political  and  social  thought. 
Instead,  it  treats  Weber‟s  political  logic  as  a  peculiar  form  of  logic  to  be  
  8 
considered in its own right. In so doing, it attempts to draw a distinction between 
Weber‟s  political,  social  and  economic  thought.  These  three  areas  of  thought 
regularly  come  into  contact  with  one  another  in  the  work  of  Weber,  and  the 
overlaps  must  be  acknowledged,  but  the  three  areas  also  operate  in  their  own 
unique ways, each of which can be understood as having its own peculiar logic. 
The thesis uses both contextual and long-range comparative approaches to draw 
out three peculiarities in Weber‟s political logic: one, a civil philosophy; two, a 
concept of politics as national relations of difference and opposition; and three, a 
delineation of society as a moral idea devoid of political authority. In the case of 
misinterpreted  aspects  of  Weber‟s  work,  such  as  his  ethics  of  leadership  and 
nationalism, this style of long-range comparison is very useful. 
 
There  is  nothing  novel  in  applying  the  long-range  comparative  approach  to 
understanding  Weber‟s  ethics.  Wolfgang  Schluchter,  for  instance,  argues  that, 
whilst  Weber  based  his  ethics  of  leadership  on  Immanuel  Kant‟s  (1724-1804) 
„formal  ethic  of  conviction‟,  the  results  Weber  achieved  differed  greatly  from 
those  of Kant (1996: 86). According to Schluchter,  Kant  developed the  formal 
ethic of conviction as an ethic for the individual to live harmoniously with other 
human beings through a commitment to reason (Schluchter 1996: 89). In Kant‟s 
ethic, the commitment to reason requires the individual to uncover the universal 
laws  of living  harmoniously through  metaphysical reasoning  or  philosophy. In 
taking this approach, Kant removed the need for empirical knowledge of context-
specific  cultural  values  and  replaced  it  with  the  conviction  of  universal  duty.  
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According to Schluchter, Weber, by contrast „reopened several of the channels of 
sanction closed by Kant‟  by removing Kant‟s universal duty and reintroducing 
requirements  for  empirical  knowledge  of  cultural  values.  The  element  of 
empirical  understanding  in  Weber‟s  ethic  allows  the  individual  to  use  cultural 
values  as  a  guide  to  responsible  conduct.  In  highlighting  differences  between 
Weber and Kant, Schluchter draws attention to an important element of Weber‟s 
ethics: the need for practical knowledge of contemporary values. But Schluchter 
gives  Weber‟s  political  ethic  the  social  or  cultural  role  of  emancipating 
individuals  from  the  value  pluralism  of  modernity,  which  fails  to  account  for 
Weber‟s political logic and his restriction of leadership ethics to specific political 
functions and outcomes. 
 
Chapter  one  of  the  thesis  combines  a  contextual  approach  with  a  long-range 
comparative  approach  to  provide  a  new  appreciation  of  the  logic  of  Weber‟s 
ethics of political leadership and nationalism. It compares Weber‟s ethics with the 
civil philosophy of Christian Thomasius by placing the works of both thinkers in 
their respective political and intellectual contexts before drawing out similarities 
in the logic of those works. Combining these approaches, chapter one provides a 
new reading of Weber‟s ethics of political leadership and nationalism as a civil 
philosophy  of  cultivating  responsible  political  leaders  through  historical-
experiential learning. 
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Thomasius  developed  his  civil  philosophy  in  response  to  the  carnage  of  the 
European confessional conflicts of the seventeenth century (Hunter, 2001: 89). At 
a time when his contemporaries were busy promoting religious unification and 
confessional states as solutions to the violence, Thomasius was urging princes to 
consider a more neutral approach to governance. Civil philosophy, for Thomasius, 
promoted historical awareness, practical learning and a distinction between moral 
and  civil  domains.  To  accompany  his  distinction  between  moral  and  civil 
domains, Thomasius promoted separate roles for individuals: one role for private 
morality and one for civil service. For Thomasius, the civil domain can only be 
understood through experience and not through any metaphysical speculation. His 
ethics of decorum give instructions on how the individual can learn about the civil 
domain through practical experience.  
 
Chapter  one  argues  that  Weber  approached  the  political  domain  with  a  civil 
philosophy similar to that of Thomasius. Like Thomasius‟s ethics, Weber‟s ethics 
of leadership and his nationalism portray the political as extra-moral and they also 
similarly call for a practical-experiential understanding of the political. The main 
difference  between  Thomasius  and  Weber‟s  ethics  is  that  whilst  Thomasius 
concentrates on the civil and moral domains, Weber adds the political domain and 
gives it priority over both the civil and the moral. 
 
Chapter  two  extends  the  reading  of  Weber‟s  peculiar  political  logic  into  his 
arguments  about  the  political  mechanisms  of  authority,  democracy,  parliament  
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and nationalism. To achieve this, it provides a comparison between Weber‟s and 
Carl Schmitt‟s ideas about these mechanisms. By looking at the similarities and 
differences between the two, this chapter offers a uniquely political reading of 
Weber‟s ideas and, in the process, avoids relativising the social and the political in 
his work. The chapter argues that Schmitt appropriated Weber‟s political logic to 
form his explicit concept of politics. By showing this, the chapter stresses that 
Weber‟s political domain is not the functional domain of a battle with the paradox 
of modernity, or of an opposition to bureaucracy alone, as some Weber scholars 
would  have  us  believe,  but  rather  a  domain  of  the  specific  ends  of  political 
pluralism, difference, opposition and sovereign power. 
 
In his Concept of the Political (1996), Schmitt delineated the domain of politics as 
friend-enemy relations and he demarcated the nation and its international relations 
as  the  prime  arena  in  which  these  friend-enemy  relations  occurred.  Schmitt‟s 
originality stems from his reworking Weber‟s implicit logic into his own political 
thought. Schmitt reworked Weber‟s ideas into his own friend-enemy distinction 
and  he  emphasised  Weber‟s  demarcation  of  the  nation  as  the  true  domain  of 
politics. Weber did not explicitly state that the nation was the foremost domain of 
politics. However, the manner in which he ruled out any emancipative role for the 
nation,  and  the  manner  in  which  he  pragmatically  restricted  domestic-political 
mechanisms such as democracy and parliament to the role of educating citizens 
about the importance of the nation and providing a degree of participation that 
would allow all citizens to realise the importance of nationalism, suggests that he  
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did, before Schmitt, perceive the nation to be primarily an entity of friend-enemy 
relations. In thinking of the nation as the primary political domain in this way, 
Weber distinguished the political domain  from the  civil  domain,  going beyond 
Thomasius‟s civil philosophy. While we can appreciate this distinction through 
examining Weber‟s concepts  of  political authority and bureaucracy,  we  cannot 
appreciate the role of practical-experiential learning in Weber‟s demarcation of 
the political if we restrict our reading to these concepts. The comparison of Weber 
and Schmitt highlights how Weber used domestic political mechanisms, such as 
democracy, as mechanisms of practical-experiential learning to give citizens an 
opportunity  to  discover  both  the  importance  of  the  nation  and  its  role  as  the 
primary political domain.  
 
The tendency of the Weber scholarship to treat Weber‟s peculiar political logic 
superficially  is  in  part  due  to  its  persistence  with  inadequate  readings  of  his 
concepts of the social and the political. In these readings, the social subsumes the 
political and reduces the themes of conflict, struggle and power to teleological or 
emancipative  roles  in  the  work  of  Weber.  Chapter  three  introduces  three 
categories of uses of Weber: theoretical, contextual and emancipative. It argues 
that each category promotes the abovementioned inadequate readings of Weber‟s 
distinction between social and political domains.  
 
Peter Baehr has divided Weber scholars into two „modalities‟: historicists who are 
„concerned  with  exegesis‟  and  presentists  who  are  concerned  with  „reworking  
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Weber‟s ideas  for the  modern conjuncture‟ (Baehr 2008: 189). The historicists 
focus on historical reconstructions of Weber‟s milieu and ways in which they can 
understand  his  work  within  the  context  of  the  intellectual,  social  and  political 
problems of his time. The presentists use contemporary theory to focus only on 
those  aspects  of  Weber‟s  work  that  have  something  relevant  to  say  about 
contemporary intellectual, social and political issues. Chapter three adds a third 
category  to  Baehr‟s  schema  of  Weber  scholarship:  the  „emancipative  uses  of 
Weber‟. The chapter uses the term emancipative to refer to those uses of Weber 
that combine both theoretical and contextual approaches. 
 
Chapter  three  argues  that  the  theoretical  uses  made  by  Talcott  Parsons  (1968 
[1937]),  Reinhard  Bendix  (1966)  and  Anthony  Giddens  (1971)  turn  Weber‟s 
concepts  of  social  action  into  structural-functionalist,  status-group  conflict  and 
action-modes conflict respectively. These three theories of society each contain 
the universal laws of social action. The contextual uses made by Mommsen (1984 
[1959]) and Hennis (2000 [1988]) remove any pretence to a theoretical Weber, 
with  Mommsen  introducing  the  political-economic  analysis  of  power  as  self-
realisation, albeit in a liberal-nationalist and imperialist conviction, and  Hennis 
the central theme of the personality of modern man and the peculiar problems of 
life  in  the  modern  world.  The  chapter  contends  that  despite  their  historical 
accuracy and detail,  both of  the  contextual uses unintentionally make Weber‟s 
work  primarily  relevant  to  social  concerns.  The  emancipative  uses  made  by 
Lepenies (1988), Goldman (1992), Kim (2004), Jenkins (2000), Nafissi (2000),  
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Palonen (1999; 2004) and  Schroeder (2001) combine  the  contextual  with their 
own theoretical concerns to exaggerate the theme of social problems in the work 
of Weber. These authors stress themes such as the aesthetic role of power, the 
existential philosophy of power, democracy and „soulcraft‟ (Kim 2004: 189), and 
the  liberal  concern  with  freedom  of  choice  and  individual  autonomy,  or 
democracy and individuality, as being central to both Weber‟s social and political 
thought.  
 
To  begin  the  process  of  correcting  the  balance  in  favour  of  a  non-theoretical-
emancipative reading of Weber, and to reinforce the reading of Weber‟s peculiar 
political  logic  provided  in  chapter  one  and  two,  chapter  four  adds  a  non-
individualist reading  of  Weber‟s  themes  of  society and  voluntary associational 
life.  It  examines  these  themes  in  light  of  debates  that  surrounded  the  social 
question  in  Germany.  The  social  question  refers  to  the  public  and  intellectual 
debates  on  the  problems  and  potential  solutions  associated  with  economic 
downturn,  immigration  and  industrialisation  occurring  after  Germany‟s 
unification in 1871. This chapter argues that Weber‟s ongoing involvement in the 
social  question  throughout  his  career  reveals  the  following  agendas:  the 
conceptual restriction of the social to voluntary associations; the delimitation of 
society to the role of moral idea; the restriction of democratic and civil society to 
North America and England; and a commitment to study the role of the press in 
promoting  moral  ideas  about  society.  The  chapter  contends  that  Weber‟s 
involvement  in  debates  about  the  social  question  was  not  the  product  of  his  
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concern  with the  material and psychological  well-being  of the  working  classes 
(although this cannot be ruled out as a concern of his), but rather it was the result 
of his concern with the actual separation of the social and the political. Reading 
Weber‟s concept of the social in this way shows that he did not place much stock 
in individual autonomy as a social phenomenon. Reading Weber in this way also 
emphasises his restriction of the social as both a topic of scholarly enquiry and as 
a source of political authority. 
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Chapter  1:  Civil  and  Political  Duty:  Christian 
Thomasius’s Ethics of Decorum and Max Weber’s Ethics 
of Responsibility 
 
This chapter introduces the civil philosophy of Christian Thomasius (1655-1728), 
examines his legacy and discusses its implications for our understanding of Max 
Weber (1864-1920). Thomasius was a great reformer of German intellectual life 
in  the  early  modern  period.  He  contributed  to  a  general  move  away  from 
theology-based philosophies toward secular, practical sciences of economics and 
agriculture  (Lindenfeld  1997:  21).  He  contributed  to  the  heterodox  Lutheran 
Pietist movement with fellow students August Hermann Francke and Paul Anton 
at the University of Leipzig (Ahnert 2003: 267).  He made philosophy and science 
more accessible by publishing the first journal to appear in the vernacular, the 
Monatsgespräche, in 1688. Thomasius and Weber were kindred spirits. Although 
separated by some 200 years, both intellectuals engaged in lifelong projects of 
public  scholarship.  Thomasius  helped  to  forge  the  secular  public  domains 
necessary  for  practical  science  and  civil  service  whilst  Weber  contributed 
substantively  to  the  disciplines  Thomasius  helped  to  create,  such  as  political 
economy, as well as contributing to ongoing public debates about the importance 
of public scholarship and  national  politics.  Where Thomasius  strove  for public 
scholarship  in  the  service  of  the  absolute  state,  Weber  strove  for  public 
scholarship in the service of the nation-state. Both intellectuals harnessed a strong 
historical awareness, using historical examples to justify their ethical standards. 
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The public spheres that Thomasius helped to create, to free the absolute state from 
the tyranny of the church, were eventually turned against this type of state in the 
struggle for social autonomy (Habermas 1989: 25). In the hands of the „reason‟ 
scholar, these  spheres  became the bastion of reason. Public intellectuals  began 
demanding the  same  standards  of rational discourse  from the  state as they  did 
from themselves. Immanuel Kant made the greatest contribution to this movement 
with his publication of The Critique of Pure Reason (2003) demanding that all 
men, subjects and rulers alike, lead their lives according to the universal duty of 
pure  reason.  In  effect,  he  helped  establish  „bourgeois  public  spheres‟  with 
authority over the state. This chapter argues that Weber, as a public intellectual, 
attempted to redress this balance back towards that which Thomasius achieved, in 
favour of the authority of the nation-state.  
 
Thomasius lived in an era where confessional conflict crippled the economic and 
cultural development of the Germanic states. Many scholars promoted religious 
unification  and  control  of  the  states  by  unified  religion  as  a  solution  but 
Thomasius, following his mentor Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-94), thought that 
history had proven the shortcomings of the confessional state. Through his civil 
philosophy, Thomasius taught complete subservience to the neutral state. In fact, 
he  developed  a  means  of  training  civil  servants  in  the  art  of  subservience. 
Following  Pufendorf, Thomasius taught the art  of  compartmentalising life into 
separate personae. Each persona corresponded to a particular office with specific  
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duties.  This,  Thomasius  thought,  would  keep  religious  life  separate  from  the 
duties of civil service. 
 
Weber‟s encounter was similar in structure, but it occurred at the other end of the 
enlightenment and thus the institutions and actors were quite different. He lived in 
an  era  where  entrepreneurs  and  political  parties  exercised  great  influence  on 
bureaucracy and the system of higher education in Germany. He complained that 
this was no better than the systems of rule under the confessional states of the late 
Middle  Ages  (Weber  in  Josephson  2004:  213).  His  solution  was  to  teach  the 
capacity  for  sober  thought  and  an  ethic  of  political  responsibility  to  political 
economists and future political leaders. 
 
Contemporary  debates  about  the  role  of  academics  as  public  intellectuals, 
particularly sociologists as public intellectuals, all but neglect the type of state-
based, nation-focused intellectual represented here by Thomasius and Weber (the 
exceptions include Pels 1991, 1998, 2001; Wagner 1994;  Wickham 2007). For 
instance,  Michael  Burawoy‟s  2004  Presidential  Address  to  the  American 
Sociological  Association  presents  four  types  of  sociology:  policy,  public, 
professional and critical (Burawoy 2005: 266-69), but  not  once  does  Burawoy 
mention the need for a state-based sociology. The reason for this is that Burawoy 
envisages sociology as a public discipline with the one theme of defending „civil 
society‟ against the „encroachment of markets and states‟ (Burawoy 2005: 259). 
Burawoy  claims that the viewpoints of  sociology are predominantly shaped  by  
  19 
public  issues  and  extra-state  associations,  such  as  the  „civil  rights  movement‟, 
which  informs  a  „sociologist's  understanding  of  politics‟,  or  the  „feminist 
movement‟,  which  gives  „new  direction  to  so  many  spheres  of  sociology‟ 
(Burawoy 2005: 275). In the debate that followed Burawoy‟s address, published 
in a  series of articles in the  British Journal  of  Sociology, not  one author pays 
credence to the type of sociological research oriented towards the interests of the 
nation-state.  Lauder,  Brown  and  Halsey  (2004:  3),  for  instance,  speak  of 
sociology  „holding  governments  to  account‟.  Johnson  (2004:  24)  discusses  the 
role of social scientists in making governments aware of social problems such as 
child  poverty.  Wiles  (2004:  34),  despite  concerns  for  the  practical  abilities  of 
sociology, also calls for the discipline to help „citizens so that they can effectively 
hold  government  accountable‟.  Davies  (2004:  447)  also  discusses  sociology 
„challenging government policies and holding them to account‟. There are only 
two  authors  who  deviate,  subtly,  from  the  theme  of  holding  governments  to 
account:  Hammersley  (2004)  and  Kalleberg  (2005).  Hammersley  (2004:  444) 
notes the inescapability of „political orientation‟, but he stops short of suggesting 
any alternative orientations. Kalleberg (2005: 388) widens the lexicon to include 
scope for political orientations of the state through his „sociology as teaching‟, but 
his emphasis is in favour of the kind of public spheres envisaged by Kant; that is, 
social spheres with autonomy from the state. This chapter brings a new dimension 
to this open debate by re-examining some of the hitherto neglected, more nation-
centred philosophies and sociological research. 
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The first section of this chapter discusses Thomasius‟s civil philosophy and its 
wider context in the early enlightenment. This section focuses on his instructional 
essay, „How a Young Man is to be Educated‟ (Thomasius 1994) („Wie ein junger 
Mensch zu informieren sei‟ – originally published in 1689). Through this essay, 
Thomasius sought to instruct students of jurisprudence and future statesmen in the 
art of decorum. The  second  section  discusses Weber‟s academic  standards and 
political ethics, and their context in Imperial Germany. This section focuses on his 
essays  „The  Power  of  the  State  and  the  Dignity  of  the  Academic  Calling  in 
Imperial Germany‟ (Weber 1973), and „The Profession and Vocation of Politics‟ 
(Weber 1994) – the essay more famously known as „Politics as a Vocation‟. With 
these  essays,  Weber  sought  to  teach  the  „sobriety  of  judgment‟  required  for 
political  responsibility  to  both  academics  in  the  humanities  and  students  of 
political economy (in Hennis 2000: 117-124). It is important to note that there is 
no reason to believe that Weber was familiar with the work of Thomasius. As a 
student  of  the  legal  historian  Otto  von  Gierke  (1841-1921),  Weber  may  have 
encountered Thomasius in a superficial light, but there is no reason to believe that 
Weber was familiar with Thomasius‟s ethics of decorum; Weber certainly makes 
no  reference  to  Thomasius  in  any  of  his  published  works.  Nevertheless,  this 
chapter  contends  that  both  Thomasius  and  Weber,  in  their  capacity  as  public 
intellectuals,  encouraged  similar  styles  of  practical  learning  in  their  respective 
attempts to cultivate civil and political personalities. 
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The Civil Philosophy and Decorum of Christian Thomasius 
 
One of the concerns of Christian Thomasius was legitimating the early-modern 
secular state and, as a scholar living in Saxony and Prussia in the late seventeenth 
and  early  eighteenth  centuries,  he  was  very  much  involved  in  the  German 
enlightenment.  Like  other  scholars of  the  period,  much  of  what  he had  to  say 
involved deliberation over the relationship between human reason and will, and 
the  need  for  authoritarian  forms  of  governance.  His  ethics  are  therefore  best 
understood within the context of the political, religious and intellectual conflicts 
of the early modern period in Germany and its neighbouring states.  
 
The ongoing resistance of the German princes to central forms of authority, on the 
one  hand, and  the  development  of  competing Catholic, Lutheran and  Calvinist 
confessions in the sixteenth century, on the other, led to a century and a half of 
particularly destructive wars, which reached their most devastating impact during 
the Thirty Years War (Holborn 1964: 3-5). These confessional conflicts prompted 
new  legal  reforms,  such  as  the  1555  Peace  Treaty  of  Augsburg  and  the  1648 
Peace Treaty of Westphalia, which represented attempts to separate the powers of 
the church and the state to achieve peace and order (Hunter 2001: 13). During this 
period a number of intellectuals rejected established philosophical traditions in 
search  of  new  ethical  doctrines  that  were  capable  of  teaching  peaceful  civil 
conduct  according  to  its  own  merits:  Justus  Lipsius  (1547-1606)  rejected 
Athenian philosophies in favour of Roman Stoicism, and Samuel von Pufendorf 
and  Christian  Thomasius  embraced  Epicureanism  in  place  of  Aristotelianism  
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(Oestreich  1982:  5-6;  Hunter,  Grunert,  and  Ahnert  2007).  In  a  more  practical 
sense,  the  English  common-law  defender  and  practitioner,  Sir  Matthew  Hale 
(1609-76),  epitomised  the  type  of  conduct  that  these  intellectuals  aimed  for 
(Saunders 1997: 87). One  common theme unites  the  ethical doctrines  of these 
intellectuals: the conduct of life in separate spheres or personae, which amounts to 
the separation of civil conduct – the duties of office – from the pursuit of salvation 
and moral perfection. 
 
Lipsius,  the  Dutch  philologist,  provided  an  early,  albeit  primitive,  ethics  of 
conducting one's life in separate personae. He witnessed the carnage of religious 
conflict in the form of the Dutch revolt against Spain and, becoming frustrated 
with  Greek  philosophy  for  its  lack  of  practicality,  he  turned  to  the  Roman 
Stoicism  of  Seneca  and  Epictetus  to  provide  a  secular  ethics  of  conduct  for 
Holland's civil servants, merchants and military officers (Oestreich 1982: 5-9, 14-
15,  and  31).  The  idea,  according  to  Lipsius,  was  to  unite  the  conflicting 
confessions  using  an  ethic  of  active  yet  undogmatic  faith,  one  suited  to  both 
Catholicism and Calvinism, and a type of rational impartiality. He achieved this 
through a combination  of humanistic piety and the reason of Roman Stoicism, 
giving birth to early modern neo-Stoicism, which he presented in the ethical triad 
„steadfastness,  patience  and  firmness  (constantia,  patientia  and  firmitas)‟ 
(Oestreich 1975: 182). According to this triad, modern man must be 'secure in the 
doctrines of the Roman Stoa', meaning he must be patient and endure the 'ills of 
the world'. When combined with humanist piety, the Stoic ethic of steadfastness  
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gave Lipsius the perfect philosophy for separating inner values from the external 
world, which, in practice, provided a method for leading an active religious life 
without engaging in dogmatic confessional conflict (Oestreich 1982: 33). 
  
David  Saunders  suggests  that  Lipsius's  ethics  were  designed  to  give  men  „a 
capacity to set aside their religious beliefs in order to perform official functions 
for the state‟ (Saunders 1997: 87). According to Saunders, although there are no 
direct links between the two figures, the lifestyle led by the English common-law 
defender Sir Matthew Hale provides a perfect example of the performance of the 
„official  functions  for  the  state‟  in  the  neo-Stoic  manner  (Saunders  1997:  41). 
Above  all  else,  Hale  „was  a  great  practitioner  of  the  common  law‟;  he 
demonstrated a similar neo-Stoic ethic to that of Lipsius through his own civil 
conduct. A brief recount of Hale's life-conduct may help our understanding of the 
neo-Stoic ethic and the separation of life into different personae. The common-
law  way  of life  was,  for Hale, „a  specific  mode of  practical reason‟ learnt not 
through  abstract  philosophies  but  through  „habituation‟  (Saunders  1997:  42). 
Through „habituation‟, Hale successfully separated „his religious convictions from 
his legal work‟ (Saunders 1997: 55). He was a Puritan in an era of confessional 
conflict  and  civil  war  but  his  practical  neo-Stoic  reasoning  afforded  him  an 
„“extreme centrist” disposition‟ in civic affairs, evinced by neither sanction nor 
denunciation of religious dogma. Through a „code of judicial conduct‟ for his civil 
life and a code of Puritanism for his personal life, Hale managed to prevent his 
religious convictions from encroaching on his civil duties.  
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Pufendorf and Thomasius were perhaps the first of the early modern thinkers to 
turn the idea of conducting one's life in separate personae into an explicit ethical 
doctrine. A brief word about the intellectual context of their work in general may 
help to clarify the aims of their ethics. It is not uncommon for historians of moral 
philosophy,  particularly  those  representatives  of  „post-Kantian  dialectical 
historiography‟, such as Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann and Werner Schneiders, to 
view  Pufendorf  and  Thomasius  as  early  modern  contributors  to  the  liberal 
enlightenment project of free will, reason and self-legislation (Hunter 2001: 16-
19; Hunter 2005: 114). By this view, Pufendorf and Thomasius are placed in the 
same category as Leibniz (1646-1716) and Wolff (1679-1754), as predecessors to 
Kant (1724-1804), who  features as the  great intellectual figure  who  makes the 
ultimate  breakthrough  with  his  discovery  of  „the  transcendental  conditions  of 
subjectivity‟. But according to Ian Hunter, these intellectuals belong to two rival 
groups  of  enlightenment  thought:  Leibniz,  Wolff  and  Kant  form  the 
„Schulmetaphysik‟  or  „university  metaphysics‟  camp,  and  Pufendorf  and 
Thomasius the „civil philosophy‟ camp (2001: 33-34). 
 
Rather than „throwing off‟ their „theological past‟, „the university metaphysicians‟ 
drew upon a tradition of „Protestant Schulmetaphysik‟ containing a neoscholastic 
universal theory of reason. In their view, this theory of reason was capable, with 
modifications,  of  guiding  man  towards  moral  perfection  in  the  eyes  of  God 
(Hunter 2001: 33). The university metaphysicians of course had both political and  
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academic interests in retaining a Protestant theology in their metaphysics. In an 
era of confessional conflict and absolutism, and during a time when the church 
was  gradually  being  excluded  from  the  politics  of  government,  the  university 
metaphysicians wished to reunite or resacralise the church and the state to ensure 
that Lutheran religious morals continued to exert an influence on the government 
of the German people. 
 
Drawing on a „“spiritualist” theology‟, the  civil philosophers  sought to  protect 
state politics from religion and religion from state politics by designating separate 
spheres of life (personae): one for the civil duties of government and one for the 
personal, spiritual pursuit of salvation (Hunter, 2001: 89). The civil philosophers 
in  part  wished  to reflect „the  profound transformation in the relations between 
civil and religious governance that had already been achieved in the domain of 
politics and jurisprudence‟ – exemplified  by the Treaty  of Westphalia  – in the 
university  curricula  of  politics  (Hunter  2001:  88-89;  Lindenfeld  1997:  18-20). 
They also wished to strengthen and prolong the peace gained by the Westphalian 
treaties by preventing monarchs from engaging in confessional conflict. For this 
they extended their doctrines of separate civil and religious personae to the office 
of the prince himself (Hunter 2001: 90). Of particular importance to this chapter is 
the manner in which the civil philosophers‟ ethical doctrines provided a capacity 
for cultivating separate personae. 
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Thomasius was not unlike Lipsius in that both thinkers approached the problem of 
civil conduct in a deconfessionalised state via a triad of ethical categories: Lipsius 
with „steadfastness, patience and firmness‟ (Oestreich 1975: 182) and Thomasius 
with  „honestum,  decorum,  and  justum‟  (Barnard  1971:  236-39).  The  main 
difference is that whilst Lipsius treated his ethic of steadfastness as a neo-Stoic 
type  of  inner-distance,  Thomasius  preferred  to  treat  his  ethic  of  decorum,  or 
„Galanterie‟  (1994:  257),  as  a  practical-experiential  type  of  „rational 
accountability (rechenschaft)‟ (Barnard 1988: 593). Thomasius believed this to be 
a  unique  contribution  to  ethics:  in  the  essay  „How  a  Young  Man  is  to  be 
Educated‟, he stated: 
 
...until now, to the extent of my knowledge, decorum has not 
yet been studied by anyone in formal disciplines or arts, man 
has either neglected to separate it or has commonly mixed it 
with  justum  and  honestum  (Thomasius  1994:  257-58)  [my 
translation]. 
   
The failure of systems of knowledge to recognise an ethic of decorum was, for 
Thomasius, symptomatic of the general failure of philosophy to conceptualise the 
extra-legal and extra-moral characteristics of the civil sphere or political order. He 
addressed this failure in a pedagogical sense with two complimentary ethics, or 
„two  ethics  of  mutuality‟:  an  ethic  of  „intrinsic‟  values  and  an  ethic  of 
„instrumentality‟  (Barnard  1988:  582).  With  these  ethics,  Thomasius  sought  to  
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distinguish  „the  ordering  principle  of  political  life  from  that  of  religious  life‟ 
(Barnard  1988:  582),  or  as  Hunter  puts  it,  to  develop  a  „dual  strategy...  of 
spiritualising  religion  by  secularising  the  visible  church,  and  desacralising  the 
state by establishing its religious neutrality‟ (Hunter 2001: 258). Focusing on the 
instrumental  ethic,  Thomasius  realised  that  by  distinguishing  or  developing 
distinct spheres of conduct, the order of political life was neither based on law nor 
on morals but on a voluntarist ethic of a pluralistic civil order: a civil code of 
conduct requiring citizens to maintain „rational accountability (Rechenschaft)‟ or 
responsibility for acknowledging the plurality of truths and values existing in the 
absolute state (Barnard 1988: 583). To conceptualise and promote this civil ethic 
of  accountability  and  maintain  civil  order,  Thomasius  proposed  the  ethic  of 
decorum:  „a  middle  term  between  positive  law  and  moral  law,  between  the 
enforceable  justum  and  the  unenforceable  honestum,  connoting  a  property  that 
would generate a measure of self-imposed civility‟ (Barnard 1988: 584).  
 
Thomasius‟s  doctrine  of  decorum  is  undoubtedly  a  product  of  his  heterodox 
arguments  with  the  orthodox  Lutheran  church  and  its  theologians.  Thomasius 
supported  the  Pietist  reform  movement  at  the  University  of  Leipzig  and  was 
outspoken against the theological faculty there (Ahnert 2003: 267). Along with 
other Pietists, he was eventually banned from Leipzig for promoting a practical 
form of faith that did not please the University‟s orthodox Lutheran theologians. 
He moved from Saxony to Brandenburg where he was welcomed by the state, 
mainly  because  of  his  support  for  the  Elector‟s  struggle  against  the  orthodox  
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Lutheran church. There Thomasius promoted the idea that faith and piety should 
be based on love of God alone, not on any particular doctrinal beliefs, because 
love of God is innate for all human beings. The orthodox Lutheran church, on the 
other  hand,  promoted a consensus  on doctrine (Ahnert 2003: 268). Thomasius 
believed  that  the  only  reason  for  the  orthodox  Lutheran  church  to  promote  a 
doctrinal consensus was so that the „clergy could define those who did not agree 
to  its  doctrines  as  heretics…  and  persecute  these  dissenters  or  have  them 
persecuted  by  the  secular  authority‟  (Ahnert  2003:  270).  In  other  words,  for 
Thomasius,  the  orthodox  Lutherans  promoted  doctrinal  consensus  to  maintain 
control over their followers. The orthodox Lutherans could achieve their doctrinal 
consensus through a combination of justum and honestum – law and morality – 
alone. In fact, as Ahnert argues, the orthodox Lutherans relied on the threat of 
persecution to  compel their  followers  to adhere  to their universal  morals.  Any 
public associations that posed a threat to the morality of the church could, on the 
basis  of  a  state  which  followed  justum  and  honestum  alone,  be  persecuted. 
Decorum gave subjects of the state an ethical basis to respect secular rule as well 
as engage in practical piety. It could also, theoretically, allow religious as well as 
secular public associations to exist harmoniously under the rule  of an absolute 
state. All that was required, in Thomasius‟s view, was a degree of self restraint. 
 
Self restraint, or „self-imposed civility‟, in Thomasius‟s words, required a type of 
practical reason that combined exercises in „inner-tranquillity‟, „public discourse‟ 
and political mediation (Barnard 1971: 233; Barnard 1988: 586). Reason in this  
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sense  was  not  to  be  confused  with  self-legislation  or  acceding  to  moral  truth 
through  metaphysical  speculation;  Thomasius  discounted  the  use  of  abstract 
knowledge  (Gelehrtheit)  as  a  credible  means  of  understanding  the  order  of 
political  life.  Instead,  he  championed  practical  knowledge  (Gelahrtheit)  as  not 
only  a  means  of  understanding  the  political  life-order  but  also  as  a  means  of 
engaging in public discourse and appreciating the mediating role of politics.  
 
By  contemporary  standards  Thomasius‟s  process  of  practical  learning  seems 
archaic. The first step in the process is to achieve an inner-tranquillity not unlike 
Lipsius‟s  neo-Stoic  steadfastness.  Although  alike,  the  main  difference  is  that 
Lipsius‟s  neo-Stoicism  allows  the  individual  to  disengage  from  passionate 
political involvement, whereas Thomasius‟s inner-tranquillity actively encourages 
engagement in political discourse in a restrained manner. The idea, according to 
Hunter, is to remain calm in „threatening public circumstances‟ so as to penetrate 
the „dissimulations of others‟ who are involved in public discourse (2001: 215). 
Barnard points out that Thomasius‟s ethical exercise in political understanding is 
a reciprocal process whereby the political actor not only attempts to understand 
these  dissimulations  but  also  gives  account  of  his  own  intentions  and  takes 
responsibility for his actions, thus ensuring „accountability (Rechenschaft)‟ (1988: 
587).  
 
Once he had created his system of decorum, Thomasius sought to promote and 
teach it through the University of Halle. To achieve this, he had to determine who  
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met the selection criteria for his new ethic. For this reason, he limited the use of 
his practical learning to a select minority of citizens who had the predisposition 
for decorum (Hunter 2005: 119-120). Thomasius used a typology of foolishness 
to  determine  whether  a  citizen  had  this  predisposition.  With  this  typology,  he 
distinguished three  degrees of  foolishness:  „the greatest  fools,  who allow their 
inner passions to break out in civil disruption‟; the middle fools, who manage to 
achieve  inner-tranquillity  but  do  not  take  the  next  step  towards  rational 
accountability,  and;  the  least  foolish,  who  manage  to  both  calm  their  inner 
passions and develop rational accountability. Thomasius felt that the greatest fools 
would be suitably governed by justum and middle fools by honestum, whereas the 
least foolish could achieve decorum through a special form of practical learning.  
 
It  is  quite  possible  that  Thomasius  was  thinking  of  his  Pietist  friend  August 
Hermann  Francke‟s  (1663-1727)  orphanage,  the  Paedagogium,  when  deciding 
who had the ability to practise decorum and who did not. Francke established the 
Paedagogium to teach orphans „true piety‟, the „necessary sciences‟, and „good 
manners‟ (Ahnert 2006: 17). Thomasius was sceptical of the ability to teach true 
piety to the orphans. He felt that, at best, it would teach them a superficial piety, 
which would lead to an „avarice and ambition‟ that would degrade the decorum of 
secular  life.  He  hoped  that  his  new  ethics  would  be  practised  by  students  of 
jurisprudence and cameral sciences, and by future court officials. In a normative-
sociological sense, he limited his ethics to the civil ordering of court life.  
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As a court official for King Frederick William I – the Elector of Brandenburg – 
Simon Peter Gasser (1676-1745) was the perfect  example  of a cameralist who 
practised  the  art  of  decorum.  The  King  appointed  Gasser  to  the  first  chair  of 
cameralism at the University of Halle, in the year of Thomasius‟ death in 1727 
(Tribe 1988: 38, 42, and 1995: 8-9). Like Pufendorf and Thomasius, Gasser was 
an opponent of Aristotelianism and scholasticism. As an admirer of Thomasius, 
Gasser  was  more  than  capable  of  separating  the  sciences  of  economics  and 
agriculture from the moral philosophy of theology. Following the King‟s policies 
and the civil philosophy of Thomasius, Gasser introduced specialised scientific 
training  to  improve  the  financial  management  of  agriculture  in  the  state  of 
Brandenburg-Prussia (Small 1909: 178-79). His was a purely practical science in 
the service of the state. 
 
The  ethical  teachings  of  Thomasius  were  also  directed  towards  the  university 
metaphysicians.  Whilst  Leibniz,  Wolff  and,  later,  Kant  intended  to  use 
transcendental reason to develop a unified moral community based on consensus, 
Thomasius aimed to use practical reason to prevent moral consensus within the 
civil order (Barnard 1988: 594).  
 
In Thomasius‟s process of practical reason, moral consensus is dismissed as being 
detrimental to decorum for the main reason that it denies the pluralism of political 
society. If pluralism is denied, the process of political discourse is disengaged and 
the  all-important  practise  of  political  accountability  comes  to  an  end.  In  
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Thomasius‟s process, the role of the secular state is to ensure the ongoing process 
of  accountability  and  decorum;  and  the  citizen,  through  engaging  in  the 
experiential  process  of  practical  reason,  or  public  discourse,  realises  the 
legitimacy of decorum and the civil sovereign state. Of course one may ask: to 
what  degree  does  the  recognition  of  sovereignty  represent  a  consensus?  The 
answer,  according  to  Thomasius,  is  that  decorum  and  the  recognition  of 
sovereignty represent a pragmatic political agreement about the instrumentality of 
the state in relation to specific historical contexts and not a universal consensus or 
teleological recognition of its eternal goodness. The context in which a political 
agreement about the sovereignty of the secular civil state may be reached would 
include, as was the case during Pufendorf's time, the Thirty Years War and the 
Peace of Westphalia, or in  Lipsius's time, the Dutch  revolt against Spain. The 
importance  of  this  empirical-historical  justification  of  a  political  agreement, 
especially  for  our  understanding  of  Weber's  ethics,  is  that  it  always  requires 
ongoing reflection and renewal in the light of changing circumstances. 
 
Contemporary sociology is too often concerned with the role of sociology as a 
public discipline that holds governments to account regarding social policy. This 
is  perhaps  due  to  its  tendency  to  trace  the  philosophy  of  institutional  roles  in 
society back to the moral philosophy of Kant. As we have already seen, Habermas 
speaks of the prominent position that Kant held in the promotion of „bourgeois 
public  spheres‟  that  exist  to  promote  the  universal  good  (1989:  25).  Donald 
Levine  also  asserts  that  „In  transforming  the  field  of  moral  philosophy  Kant  
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introduced ideas and themes that inspired a library of seminal works of German 
social science‟ (1995: 181). According to Levine, Kant inspired Weber, who was 
preoccupied  with  „the  constriction  of  individual  voluntarism  by  the  inanimate 
forces of capitalism and the animate mechanisms of bureaucracy‟ (Levine 1995: 
204). In other words, according to Levine, Weber was concerned that bureaucratic 
rationality was taking away the individual‟s ability to choose between and create 
different meanings in life. If we follow Levine‟s point to its logical conclusion we 
must believe that Weber was also preoccupied with the public spheres responsible 
for guaranteeing this individual voluntarism. The chapter suggests  this belief is 
not an accurate depiction of Weber‟s political logic. 
 
The  Capacity  to  Think  Clearly  and  the  Responsible  Politics  of 
Max Weber 
 
The context of Weber‟s work is somewhat different to that of Thomasius. Weber 
did not have to contend with the traditions of religious and scholastic natural law 
as powerful forces in the academic endeavour to produce knowledge. Instead, he 
faced the competing truth claims of value pluralism (Eliaeson 2006: 283). Much 
of  his  intellectual  activity  was  given  over  to  addressing  the  problem  of  value 
pluralism. He consistently presented the postulate „sobriety of judgment‟ (Weber 
in Hennis 2000: 118) as a way of conducting oneself in the scientific and political 
life-orders of his pluralistic nation. Weber utilised the „sobriety of judgment‟ in 
this manner in his speeches and writings on higher education reform to promote 
standards of academic freedom at the 1908 University Teachers‟ Congress in Jena  
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(Josephson 2004: 206). He also enlisted the sobriety of judgment in his famous 
speech on politics as a vocation (cited here as „The Profession and Vocation of 
Politics‟ 1994) to teach the ethics of political leadership and nationalism to his 
students of political economy. He wrote this speech at the end of the Great War, at 
a time when some of Germany‟s highest statesmen had abandoned their country. 
General Ludendorff had, for example, failed to publicly accept responsibility for 
his country‟s defeat. Instead, he had ushered in a system of parliamentary rule, an 
act which, in Weber‟s opinion, burdened that system with the responsibility for 
the defeat (Mommsen 1984: 283; Weber 1988: 651-654). These writings offer an 
insight into Weber‟s political logic and they also provide a solid example of his 
hierarchical structure of nations governing public spheres. 
 
Peter Josephson has provided an excellent summary of the academic context of 
Weber‟s  writings  on  higher  education  reform  in  „Lehrfreiheit,  Lernfreiheit, 
Wertfreiheit: Max Weber and the University Teachers‟ Congress in Jena 1908‟ 
(2004).  By  Josephson‟s  account,  Weber  developed  his  doctrine  of  value-free 
science in response to the particular definitions of academic freedom discussed at 
the 1908 University Teachers‟ Congress in Jena (Josephson 2004: 206). 
 
The  chairman  of  the  congress,  Karl  von  Amira,  restricted  the  discussion  of 
academic freedom to those already holding university positions because he did not 
want  the  congress  to  degenerate  into  an  uncontrollable  fracas.  Amira  declared 
academic  freedom  to  mean  that  all  holders  of  university  positions  should  be  
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allowed by the state to conduct their research unimpeded. His reasoning was such 
that scientific discovery was in the best interests of the state. He even suggested 
that those scientists who made anti-government arguments should be allowed to 
continue  their  research  because  such  research  was  potentially  beneficial  for 
society,  as  in  the  case  of  removing  tyrants  from  rule  (Josephson  2004:  207). 
Weber, along with his brother, Alfred Weber, stated that they could only accept 
Amira‟s  proposals  if  he  included  the  right  for  all  candidates  to  apply  and  be 
considered equally for university positions (Josephson 2004: 208). In one of the 
daily newspapers reporting on the congress, a journalist suggested, in response to 
Weber,  that  the  role  of  the  university  was  to  provide  „well-educated  public 
officials‟ and not provide revolutionaries with the ability to disseminate socialist 
propaganda  (Josephson  2004:  209).  Subsequently,  Weber  was  given  an 
opportunity to publish a piece in the journal  Hochschul-Nachrichten, where he 
expressed his argument to a wider academic audience that the refusal to consider 
candidates with radical political views for university positions could be associated 
with a „comprehensive ideological  standardization‟ (Weber in Josephson 2004: 
212). As it was, academic freedom was reserved for those candidates who were 
willing  to  abstain  from  publicly  criticising  „the  established  political  system‟ 
(Josephson 2004: 212). According to Josephson, Weber ultimately argued that the 
academic  freedom  of  his  time,  whereby  university-appointed  teachers  could 
preach pro-government propaganda, should be restricted to prevent all academics, 
pro- or anti-government, from preaching to their students (Josephson 2004: 215).  
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This, in Weber‟s view, was the only way to ensure rigorous scientific standards 
and equal consideration of all candidates for teaching positions. 
 
Nevertheless,  Weber‟s  desire  to  prevent  a  „comprehensive  ideological 
standardization‟ throughout the faculties of all German universities should not be 
mistaken for a desire to subvert the authority of the nation-state. Weber‟s concern 
with ideological standardisation was a reflection of his general concern that state 
governments,  especially  in  the  Prussian  state,  were  being  taken  over  by 
businessmen who held the interests of private enterprise above those of the nation. 
 
Weber‟s views on academic freedom were also related to the broader context of 
higher education reform in Prussia. The „Althoff system‟ was the system of higher 
education  in  operation  during  Weber's  time,  created  by  and  named  after  the 
Director  of  the  Prussian  Ministry  of  Culture,  Friedrich  Althoff  (1839-1908) 
(Backhaus 1993: 9-15). Althoff, like many other leading public intellectuals of his 
time,  understood  universities  to  be  the  largest  determinant  of  the  economic 
performance of a  country. Consequently,  he  sought to „bureaucratize‟ Prussian 
universities and  make them  more „rational‟ and „consistent‟, thereby extracting 
their  maximum  economic  productivity.  In  fact,  Althoff  succeeded  in 
homogenising  the  Prussian  and,  to  some  extent,  the  German  system  of  higher 
education, gaining a „paternalistic‟ control over its entire complex of institutions 
and running the system as a „multidivisional firm‟ (Backhaus 1993: 9-15). 
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Through  his  writings  on  higher  education,  Weber  argued  that  the  „Althoff 
system‟,  whilst  yielding  a  great  degree  of  short-term  benefit,  was  ultimately 
detrimental  to  the  intellectual  and  long-term  economic  health  of  the  German 
nation. He was convinced that it was the role of the university to „sharpen the 
student‟s capacity to understand the actual conditions of his own exertions‟; to 
„teach  the  capacity to think clearly‟ (Weber 1973: 591)  - to  teach „sobriety of 
judgement‟. The „Althoff  system‟,  Weber  stated, „has  formed  something  like a 
cartel‟ or a unified approach amongst the universities, „which has annulled [the] 
competitive  relationship  [that  might  otherwise  teach  sobriety  of  judgement]‟ 
(Weber 1973: 596). The system, according to Weber, had also allowed the „new 
generation of businessmen‟ to reintroduce the old „form of student life‟ with its 
status-proving activities, such as duelling. This, he felt, had come „at the cost of 
intensive  study‟,  which  might  have  been  beneficial  to  commerce  and  private 
industry in the short term, but would „not be a lasting advantage to [Germany in 
its] economic competition with the great industrial powers of the world‟ (Weber 
1973: 606, 608). 
 
These  comments  on  the  „Althoff  system‟  of  higher  education  in  Germany, 
originally published between 1908 and 1911, give us a relatively early indication 
of  Weber‟s  ethical-pedagogical  intentions,  to  cultivate  the  „capacity  to  think 
clearly‟ not only as a scientific postulate of objectivity – the secondary literature 
has all but exhausted this reading – but also as a political ethic. This suggests that 
Weber was willing to commit science to a particular cause, but what exactly was  
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that cause? Weber was convinced that the German „university teacher‟ had certain 
„civil rights and duties‟ to refrain from „imparting a political tone to university 
teaching‟ or from adopting „a point of view which was “acceptable in the highest 
circles”  of  church  and  state‟  (1973:  589).  Instead  of  adopting  and  teaching 
ultimate values, the university teacher had a duty to „make his chair into a forum 
where the understanding of ultimate standpoints... is fostered‟ (Weber 1973: 592). 
The consequences of not following this rule were evident during Weber's time: 
 
The  fact  that...  [theology]  and  the  related  apologetic  and 
practical  specialties  which  can  only be taught  with dogmatic 
commitment  are  now  taught  by  state-appointed  university 
teachers whose academic freedom is thereby limited, instead of 
being  taught  by  institutions  established  by  free  religious 
communities, does not flow from any necessity of the religious 
life, but rather solely from the desires of governmental bodies 
concerned with the regulation of cultural and religious affairs 
(Weber 1973: 593). 
 
Weber certainly made no secret of the fact that he abhorred the selective teaching 
of extra-scientific curricula at state universities. Time and time again he reiterated 
the  „sobriety  of  judgment‟  or  „value  freedom‟  as  a  standard  for  all  scientific 
teaching  and  research  and  he  remained  consistent  in  these  views  even  when 
teaching his own form of political ethics.  
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Between the time Weber engaged in the debate on academic freedom and the time 
he  delivered  his  1918  lecture  on  the  vocation  of  politics,  the  political 
circumstances  had  changed  dramatically  in  Germany.  Karl  Ludwig-Ay  has 
already suggested that Weber‟s famous statement of the value of national honour, 
made in the 1918 lecture, must be read in the context of the Great War (Ay 2004: 
222, 232-33). This chapter argues that this context can be applied to the entire 
lecture. During the  war, Weber wrote a number of articles  for the  Frankfurter 
Zeitung  on  the  issue  of  parliamentarisation.  In  these  articles,  he  protested, 
amongst  other  things,  the  lack  of  a  „political  education‟  capable  of  producing 
future leaders and statesmen in Germany (Weber in Mommsen 1984: 87). After 
the war, Germany faced some rapid changes in political organisation, including 
the hasty introduction of parliamentary government and the virtually simultaneous 
declaration  of  defeat  and  responsibility  for  the  war  (Mommsen  1984:  283). 
Weber‟s involvement in the Peace Treaty of Versailles and his perception of the 
consequences  of  these  changes  led  him  to  speak  once  again  of  a  political 
leadership crisis in Germany. The crisis, as perceived by Weber, came to a head 
when  General  Ludendorff  hastily  introduced  the  new  system  of  parliamentary 
democracy during the peace negotiations with the allies (Mommsen 1984: 283). 
In  the  1919  written  version  of  the  lecture  on  politics  as  a  vocation,  Weber 
elaborated his ethics of conviction and responsibility, arguing that politicians must 
combine  a  conviction  for  their  values  and  policies  –  charisma  –  with 
responsibility for the outcomes of implementing those policies. It is quite possible  
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that in this lecture Weber modelled the ideal type of the conviction politician on 
Ludendorff;  as  far  as  Weber  was  concerned,  Ludendorff  was  incapable  of 
accepting responsibility for his part in the defeat and, even worse, he was unable 
to see the damage he had done to the German nation (Mommsen 1984: 324-25; 
Weber 1988: 651-654). 
 
In both lecture and published form, „Politics as a Vocation‟ engaged students of 
political economy and academic readers in general with a discussion of the ethics 
of leadership. In the published version, Weber argued that the politician who acts 
according  to  the  „“ethic  of  principled  conviction”‟  is  forever  seeking  moral 
justification for his political actions (Weber 1994: 359, 361). But, he warned his 
audience,  the  political  leader  who  acts  according  to  the  ethic  of  conviction 
„suddenly  turns  into  a  chiliastic  prophet‟,  preaching  „“love  against  force”  one 
minute‟ and issuing „a call to force the next‟, in the name of achieving an eternal 
peace on earth. By way of contrast with the ethic of conviction, Weber stated that 
the politician who acts according to the „“ethic of responsibility”‟ is constantly 
aware  of  the  „diabolical  powers  that  lurk  in  all  violence‟  and  accepts 
responsibility  for  the  „(foreseeable)  consequences‟  of  using  these  „diabolical 
powers‟  (Weber  1994:  360,  366).  Weber  united  the  two  ethics  in  a  curious 
manner.  He  suggested  that  conviction  is  important  if  not  vital  to  all  political 
activity because it gives the politician his charismatic edge, but the politician who 
acts  according  to  conviction  alone  is  bound  to  seesaw  in  a  kind  of  passive-
aggressive  manner  between  perceived  moral  duties  and  political  violence.  The  
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true leader, Weber stated, requires a „trained ability to look at the realities of life 
with an unsparing gaze, to bear these realities and be a match for them inwardly‟ 
(Weber  1994:  367).  In  short,  Weber  required  the  political  leader  to  develop  a 
sober ethic of responsibility. 
 
Following Sung Ho Kim‟s (2004) reading of Weber‟s ethics as a secular kind of 
salvation  for  the  modern  soul  in  a  pluralistic  society,  one  must  assume  that, 
between the time Weber engaged in the debate on academic freedom and the time 
he published his ethics of conviction and responsibility, he drastically altered his 
perspective on value freedom. If we are to follow Kim‟s argument, then we must 
assume that Weber betrayed his own 1908-11 postulate of value freedom.  As we 
have  seen,  much  had  changed  between  1911  and  1918.  The  endurance  of  the 
Great  War  might  have  been  enough  to  alter  Weber‟s  perspective.  But,  if  we 
restrict  our  interpretation  of  the  ethics  of  conviction  and  responsibility  to  the 
circumstances outlined above, namely the Great War and the crisis of leadership, 
we  can  conclude  that  Weber  remained  faithful  to  his  own  definition  of  value 
freedom and that, therefore, Kim may be mistaken. Weber intended his ethics as 
basic training for students of political economy, the wider academic community 
and  future  statesmen,  to  provide  them  with  a  greater  understanding  of  the 
prerequisites  of  political  leadership.  As  noted  by  Mommsen,  Weber  did  not 
develop his lecture into „normative-ethics‟ for universal usage (Mommsen 1984: 
442). As further evidence of Weber‟s intended application, it is worth noting that 
Weber  reiterated  his  1908-11  views  on  academic  freedom  in  his  1919  essay,  
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„Science  as  a  Vocation‟  (1948)  –  the  essay  Weber  presented  to  compliment 
„Politics as a Vocation‟.  
 
This  brings  us  only  a  fraction  closer  to  understanding  how  Weber  thought  he 
could teach an ethics of leadership without promoting ultimate values. For this we 
must turn to his scientific understanding of the political order and its relation to 
the  order  of  voluntary  associations.  According  to  Kim,  Weber  thought  of  the 
political order as a sphere of „contestation, competition, struggle, and... conflict‟ 
between „voluntary associations‟ (Kim 2004: 186). Kim argues that, for Weber, 
the  political  conflict  of  voluntary  associations  could  form  a  civil  society  by 
uniting  disciplined  individuals  with  a  „common  purpose‟.  By  Kim‟s  account, 
Weber conceptualised the political life-order as a united public and private realm, 
where civil duty was bound up with the interests of free communities. But this 
reading does not seem consistent with Weber‟s message in his writings on higher 
education  reform  and  the  „Althoff  system‟;  Weber‟s  attack  on  those 
„governmental  bodies‟  who  were  seeking  to  „regulate  cultural  and  religious 
affairs‟  instead  indicates  that  Weber  thought  of  voluntary  associations  not  as 
groups born of moral consensus but rather as groups with a reciprocal civil duty. 
In „The Profession and Vocation of Politics‟, Weber was quite explicit about the 
sphere of politics: 
 
Anyone seeking to save his own soul and the souls of others 
does not take the path of politics in order to reach his goal, for  
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politics has quite different tasks, namely those which can only 
be achieved by force...  Machiavelli had such situations in mind 
when, in a beautiful passage in his Florentine histories (if my 
memory does not deceive me), he has one of his heroes praise 
those  citizens  who  placed  the  greatness  of  their  native  city 
above the salvation of their souls (Weber 1994: 366). 
 
Weber‟s  thinking  was  far  from  ambiguous.  As  far  as  he  was  concerned,  the 
political sphere was defined by the application of force and was not suited to the 
salvation  of  souls.  What,  then,  are  we  to  make  of  Weber‟s  reference  to  the 
Machiavelli  passage  emphasising  the  importance  of  civil  duties  over  personal 
values? Kim may read this as a moral consensus arrived at via the higher purpose 
of self discovery and assertion, but it is essentially a type of national duty drawn 
from  the  practical  experience  of  free  associational  life,  something  not  unlike 
Christian Thomasius‟s process of public interaction and appreciation of the civil 
duty of decorum. Kim‟s idea is perhaps closer to Kant‟s principle of duty than to 
Weber‟s principle of ethical responsibility.  In his Political Writings (1991) Kant 
derived  his  concept of duty  from  his theory  of a universal  morality,  which he 
deduced from pure reason. He argued that,  
 
duty  is  nothing  more  than  a  limitation  of  the  will  within  a 
universal legislation which was made possible by an initially 
accepted maxim. The object or aim of the will can be of any  
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kind  whatsoever (even including happiness). But in this case 
we completely abstract from whatever end is adopted. Thus so 
far as the principle of morality is concerned, the doctrine of the 
highest good as the ultimate end of a will which is determined 
by  this  doctrine  and  which  conforms  to  its  laws  can  be  by-
passed  and  set  aside  as  incidental.  And  it  will  emerge  from 
what  follows  that  the  actual  controversy  is  not  in  fact 
concerned  with this at all,  but  only  with  morality  in general 
(Kant 1991: 65-66). 
 
Further:  
The  maxim  of  absolute  obedience  to  a  categorically  binding 
law  of  the  free  will  (i.e.  of  duty),  without  reference  to  any 
ulterior end, is essentially different (i.e. different in kind) from 
the maxim of pursuing, as a motive for a certain way of acting, 
the end which nature itself has imposed upon us and which is 
generally known as happiness. For the first maxim is good in 
itself, but the second is not. The second may, if it conflicts with 
duty, be thoroughly evil (Kant 1991: 67). 
 
As Hunter argues, Kant insisted that individuals treat duty as an „obscure feeling 
of  the  unconditional  laws  governing  individuals‟,  which  was  diametrically 
opposed to the propositions of civil philosophers like Pufendorf, who thought of  
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duty as the „imposition of obligations by the civil authority‟ (Hunter 2001: 292). 
The  contrast  between  Kant  and  Thomasius  is  even  starker:  as  Hochstrasser 
suggests, for Thomasius, „All ethical norms ultimately derive from a close study 
of  human  psychology  on  the  individual  and  social  planes  rather  than  from 
metaphysical  absolutes  and  scriptural  evidence‟  (Hochstrasser  2000: 134).  The 
most important difference between Kant and the civil philosophers is that the civil 
philosophers sought to ground their ethical norms on historical and positive-legal 
evidence rather than on appeals to metaphysical speculation. Weber is as one with 
the civil philosophers on this matter. 
 
There is a practical/experiential element to Weber‟s understanding of politics that 
is difficult to reconcile with any moral philosophy. Weber did not accede to the 
value of the nation through metaphysical speculation or discovery of the value of 
soul-craft. In  its  greatest  time of  need,  the German  nation  had  called upon its 
citizens  to  fulfil  their  civil  and  political  duties.  Ludendorff,  the  man  of  pure 
conviction, could not answer the call. For Weber, this was a matter of urgency; 
the nation required responsible leaders and he saw it as his duty to help provide 
them. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has highlighted certain elective affinities between Thomasius‟s ethic 
of decorum and Weber‟s ethics of responsibility. Thomasius thought that the civil 
sphere  was  ordered  in  an  extra-legal  and  extra-moral  fashion.  In  his  view,  it  
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originated in voluntary association and was ordered by an initial recognition of 
pluralism,  which led to restrained public interaction and mutual accountability. 
Through mutual accountability, politically mature citizens could offer an account 
of their intentions and  seek to understand the intentions and actions  of  others. 
Through this process of practical reason, politically mature citizens had the ability 
to  develop  a  sense  of  civil  duty  and  come  to  realise,  through  involvement  in 
specific political events, the pragmatic instrumentality of the sovereign state as a 
mechanism for achieving certain political ends. As mentioned earlier, the court 
official and  cameralist, Simon Peter Gasser,  was a  model  example of a public 
intellectual whose allegiance was with the secular state. From what we can gather 
from the political ethics of conviction and responsibility, Weber took a similar 
view, except that he began with what he considered to be the historically evident 
instrumentality of the nation-state, its use of force being its main distinguishing 
feature. Thus, Thomasius began with the problem of conceptualising the unique 
order of secular civil life whilst Weber began with the problem of the immaturity 
of conviction-politicians who developed moral guilt for their extra-moral conduct. 
Weber‟s  ethical  solution,  sobriety  of  judgment  and  political  responsibility, 
contained elements of Stoicism combined with rational accountability. 
 
This  chapter  has  drawn  attention  to  two  public  intellectuals  who  championed 
alternatives to the universally-authoritative public spheres of the kind championed 
by Kant and Levine. Through historical awareness and political engagement, both  
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Thomasius and Weber became supporters of the political interests of the Elector 
of Brandenburg and the German nation-state, respectively.   
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Chapter  2:  Towards  the  Political:  Parliamentary  Process  and 
Democracy in the work of Max Weber and Carl Schmitt 
 
Over the past two decades a number of Weber scholars have portrayed Weber as a 
liberal theorist with an ultimate interest in the emancipation of modern individuals 
from the disenchantment of rationalisation and bureaucracy. One of the first of 
these portrayals was Harvey Goldman‟s Politics, Death and the Devil: Self and 
Power  in  Max  Weber  and  Thomas  Mann  (1992),  which,  through  associating 
Weber with the German tradition of Bildung, or self-cultivation, twists Weber‟s 
conception  of  power into a liberal theory  of  politics as an aesthetic  pursuit  of 
meaning in everyday life. Since Goldman‟s work, a number of similar portrayals 
have  emerged  including:  Kari  Palonen‟s  Max  Weber’s  Reconceptualisation  of 
Freedom (1999) and Max Weber, Parliamentarism and the Rhetorical Culture of 
Politics (2004), and; Tamsen Shaw‟s Max Weber on Democracy: Can the People 
Have Political Power in Modern States? (2008). Palonen (1999 and 2004) and 
Shaw (2008) both argue that Weber attempted to provide a modern concept of 
liberty and the freedom from bureaucracy to act meaningfully in everyday life. 
The most striking feature of all three portrayals is the manner in which they each 
stress the  social  function of power in the  work  of  Weber; they  stress  that the 
political  institutions  that  Weber  promotes,  such  as  parliamentary  process  and 
democracy, are intended to deliver power to all citizens through the creation of 
meaning in everyday life and that for Weber, therefore, power is ultimately social. 
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In an alternative reading, with a discussion of the respective concepts of power in 
the work of Weber and Carl Schmitt, Stephen Turner (1989: 552-53) argues that 
for both thinkers the analysis of power was simply a jurisprudential question of 
the sources of legal authority. In Turner‟s reading, the fundamental question for 
both  Weber  and  Schmitt  was:  what  is  the  extra-legal  foundation  of  legal 
authority? Formulated as a legal argument, the problem related to the tracing of 
the  basis  of  laws  to  more  fundamental  laws,  the  basis  of  which  were  then 
ultimately traced to some extra-legal source. For Weber, this extra-legal source 
was the simple „sociological fact‟ that laws „were obeyed‟ (Turner 1989: 552). 
Turner argues that Weber  extended this reasoning into  his  concept of  political 
power, distinguishing between political and other forms of association by arguing 
that an association was political and had power over other associations, if it had a 
„territorial  monopoly  on  the  legitimate  use  of  violence‟  (Turner  1989:  553). 
Schmitt,  according  to  Turner,  took  Weber‟s  definition  of  power  to  its  logical 
conclusion  by  locating  legal  authority  in  one  specific  law  and  its  extra-legal 
foundations:  
 
the legal device of the exception, the declaration of a state of 
emergency  or  siege involving  suspension  of laws, rights and 
normal legal processes. The striking fact about declarations of 
this kind, for Schmitt, was that they could not themselves be 
subject  to  law:  the  law  presupposes  normal  conditions; 
sovereign  power  is  revealed  in  the  power  to  decide  what  is  
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normal and thus when the law is to be suspended. This power, 
Schmitt  stressed,  was  necessarily  personal:  some  individual 
had  to  be  designated  who  personally  made  these  decisions 
(Turner 1989: 552). 
 
This  chapter  compares  the  respective  arguments  of  Weber  and  Schmitt  on 
parliamentary  process,  democracy  and  political  authority.  By  comparing  their 
arguments, it reveals that they differed significantly in their respective judgments 
of democracy and parliamentary process. On the one hand, Weber seems at first 
sight to  have  been a  supporter  of  democracy and  was  certainly a  supporter  of 
parliamentarism. Schmitt, on the other hand, had no qualms in dismissing both 
mechanisms  as  irrelevant  and  impotent  facades.  However,  by  comparing  their 
respective  views on  democracy and  political authority, this  chapter argues that 
Weber, like Schmitt, strove to preserve political or sovereign power. This chapter 
argues  that  Weber‟s  promotion  of  democracy  and  parliamentary  process  was 
purely  pragmatic in the  sense that he  did not  see  these political institutions as 
inherently  ideal  or  capable  of  delivering  the  liberal  freedom  they  promised  to 
deliver.  Instead,  for  Weber,  these  political  institutions  were  techniques  for 
establishing sovereign power, promoting nationalism and protecting the future of 
the German nation. The comparison of Weber and Schmitt‟s implicit and explicit 
views on pluralism also allows this chapter to argue that the German nation was 
not the ultimate interest for Weber but rather that the nation was the main arena 
for genuine political action or sovereign power. Thus, the same can be said of  
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Weber  as  can  be  said  of  Schmitt:  he  remained  true  to  the  political  things 
themselves  such as  political action and  sovereign  power and not to  what they 
could protect or provide to the individual or the social world. 
 
Bureaucracy,  parliament,  democracy  and  political  authority  in 
the work of Weber 
 
Weber‟s sociology of bureaucracy was part of a general, pessimistic sociology of 
modernity.  In  this  sociology,  Weber  saw  modernity  as  a  process  of 
disenchantment  and  rationalisation  (Jenkins  2000:  12).  As  western  cultures 
became disenchanted with religious and mystical explanations of the world, and 
as  they  became  less  accepting  of  the  truth  and  guidance  of  natural  law,  they 
sought  rational  explanations  of  the  phenomena  they  encountered.  In  Weber‟s 
pessimistic sociology modernity delivered the popularity of science including the 
practicable  explanations  of  reality  that  it  offered  in  the  analysis  of  cause  and 
effect. Through the analysis of cause and effect, science offered something that 
religion could not: the ability to solve practical problems and get the job done – a 
much  more  appealing  knowledge  for  the  day-to-day  lives  of  a  farm  labourer, 
factory  worker  or businessman  than the  divine  wisdom of  scripture. However, 
when  the  moral  guidance  of  religion  and  natural  law  was  replaced  with  the 
practical  guidance  of  science,  the  hierarchy  of  values  offered  by  religion  and 
natural law  was lost. Science, in Weber‟s account, did not  claim the ability to 
determine which practical knowledge was more important; it may have provided 
the ability to save lives, but it did not judge whether or when the saving of lives  
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was  inappropriate  (Weber  1948:  144).  For  Weber,  this  predicament  was  the 
indicator  of the  onset  of  modernity‟s „value-polytheism‟ (Eliaeson 2006: 283), 
also known as value-pluralism, and its ramifications  could be  seen  throughout 
every sphere of life: economic, social and political. 
 
In his account of the impact of rationalisation and value-polytheism on political 
authority,  Weber  noted  that  rationalisation  undermined  political  authority.  For 
Weber, this was an unintended consequence of rationalisation. The replacement of 
universal  morals  with  value-polytheism  left  no  authority  to  order  associations 
hierarchically other than that of true political authority, but, ironically, the process 
of rationalisation and its attempts to maintain value-polytheism, especially that of 
bureaucracy, unintentionally limited the possibilities of true political authority by 
undermining the value-based legitimacy of that authority. 
 
Palonen  (2004)  would  have  us  believe  that  the  most  dismaying  aspect  of  this 
paradox for Weber was its reduction of liberty and personal freedom. According 
to  Palonen,  Weber  sought  a  solution  to  the  paradox  of  rationalisation  and 
bureaucratisation  in  the  parliamentary  process  of  arguing  for  and  against. 
Furthermore, Palonen argues that Weber‟s commitment to parliamentarism was 
the most important feature of  his  concept  of politics. Whilst many of Weber‟s 
German contemporaries  expressed  hostility to the idea of „politics  by talking‟, 
Weber actively embraced it: „It was precisely this rhetorical culture of speaking 
for and against... seen as the crux of the British parliamentary tradition, that was  
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so  commonly  despised  in  Wilhelmine  politics,  and  it  was  this  that  Weber 
defended‟ (Palonen 2004: 274-77). 
 
Palonen argues that in Weber‟s account the procedure of arguing for and against 
provides an avenue for individuals to create their own life-meaning in a world of 
bureaucratic  rationality.  But  this  argument  does  not  pay  sufficient  attention  to 
Weber‟s  analysis  of  politics.  Individual  liberty  was  not  a  major  concern  of 
Weber‟s. Weber was concerned instead, as this chapter argues, with the power of 
political leaders and the political and economic future of the nation. In Weber‟s 
account, only political charisma could produce the type of value-based authority 
required for free, meaningful action. In Weber‟s account, free, meaningful action 
was reserved for the minority of people with political charisma, and so his ideal of 
political action cannot be read as a liberal ideal of human freedom or as a solution 
to the paradox of rationalisation and bureaucracy. 
 
In Weber‟s sociological analysis, bureaucracy appeared as a purely rational form 
of administration  with no inherent  cultural value or  meaning, just a great self-
perpetuating  thirst  for  the  technical  improvement  of  administrative  procedure. 
This technical improvement was characterised by „precision, speed, unambiguity, 
knowledge of files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of 
friction  and  of  material  and  personal  costs‟  (Weber  1985:  214-15).  The 
mechanism  of  bureaucracy  was,  in  Weber‟s  account,  an  apparatus  of 
administration that could easily become a permanent feature of a society for two  
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reasons:  first,  its  constant  improvement  of  technical  procedures  was  self-
perpetuating,  and  second,  the  individuals  who  operated  in  bureaucratic 
administrations  were  merely  subordinate  contributors  to  the  self-perpetuating 
thirst  for  technical  improvement;  they  were  „single  cog(s)  in  an  ever-moving 
mechanism‟  (Weber  1948:  228).  This  mechanism  was  so  perfect  from  the 
perspective  of  rationality  that  it  led  Weber  to  conclude  that  „once  it  is  fully 
established, bureaucracy is among those social structures which are the hardest to 
destroy‟  (Weber  1948:  228-29).  Weber  armed  himself  with  this  sociological 
analysis  for  the  task  of  condemning  bureaucracy  for  its  depoliticising  effect, 
which he carried out in his political writings. 
 
In  his  political  writings,  Weber  revealed  that  he  did  not  wish  to  „destroy‟ 
bureaucracy so much as prevent it from neutralising the power of politics. In these 
writings,  Weber  referred  to  bureaucracy  as  a  „lifeless  machine‟  (Weber  1994: 
158).  He  stated  that  modern  politicians  „may  have  to  submit  powerlessly‟  to 
bureaucracy especially „if they consider that the ultimate and only value by which 
the conduct of affairs is to be decided is good administration and provision for 
their needs by officials (that is “good” in the purely technical sense of rational 
administration) (Weber 1994: 158). 
 
This emphasised statement from Weber need not be read as liberal guidance to 
emancipate all individuals from the pure rationality of bureaucracy. It can simply 
be read as advice to a select minority of politicians who possessed the qualities of  
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genuine  charisma.  This  reading  is  qualified  by  Weber‟s  sociological 
understanding of legitimacy. 
 
Weber provided a sociological analysis of legitimacy that contrasts the authority 
of  charisma  with  that  of  rationality.  Weber  was  particularly  interested  in  the 
authority of charisma. Its value-based legitimacy was distinct from the validity-
based legitimacy of modern rational structures of domination, such as positive law 
and  bureaucracy.  As is the  case  with  many  of Weber‟s  works, he  provided an 
historical-sociological explanation of the roles of value-based and validity-based 
legitimacy.  In  ancient  and  medieval  societies,  legal  systems  were  legitimated 
through the values of an external religious affiliation, as was  the case with the 
reinforcement of „juridical procedure‟ by the „special deities‟ of the „Eleusinian 
mysteries‟  (Weber  1948:  273-74).  Through  the  process  of  rationalisation, 
discussed earlier in this chapter, these legal systems lost ties with the values of 
religion  and  were  replaced  with  the  „validity  of  statute  and  functional 
“competence”  based  on  rationally  created  rules‟  (Weber  1948:  79).  The 
rationalisation of modern societies undermined the value-based legitimacy of all 
structures  of  authority  except  for  that  of  the  genuine  charisma  of  the  political 
leader. Weber argued that the survival of political charisma was attributable to the 
„extraordinary and personal gift of grace... the absolutely personal devotion and... 
confidence  in  revelation,  heroism,  or  other  qualities  of  individual  leadership‟ 
(Weber  1948:  79).  Seen  as  irrational  from  the  point  of  view  of  bureaucracy, 
charisma,  nevertheless,  through  its  ability  to  invoke  confidence,  retained  the  
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authority to create the necessary difference and opposition required for political 
action. 
 
Weber carried this insight into his political writings, where he argued that the role 
of the genuine political leader was different from that of the state administrator. 
He made this distinction because he felt that there were too many state officials 
and not enough charismatic leaders in positions of political leadership in Germany 
during his lifetime. The politician, Weber stated, „is not required to demonstrate 
any  qualification  based  on  training.  This  fact  indicates  that  the  meaning  and 
purpose (Sinn) of his position differs from that of other officials‟ (Weber 1994: 
160). But, if a politician „is incapable of saying to his master, whether this be a 
monarch or a demos, “Either you give me this instruction or I resign”, he is not a 
leader  but merely what Bismarck called a miserable “clinger” to office‟. „Ever 
since Bismarck‟s resignation, Germany‟, Weber  stated, „has been  governed  by 
men who were “officials” (in mentality)‟ (Weber 1994: 161). 
 
Weber‟s  challenge  to  political  leaders  to  stand  up  to  bureaucrats  and  mark 
themselves apart from mere clingers to office, was an attempt to reintroduce into 
the  art  of  political  leadership  in  Germany  what  Machiavelli  described  in  The 
Prince  (2005)  as  political  innovation  (Pocock  1975:  156-57).  In  The  Prince 
(2005), Machiavelli talked about the sovereign as an innovator „self-isolated from 
moral society‟ by his attempts to control the fortuna, or outcomes, of the political 
contingency in his midst (Pocock 1975: 157). Through pure political attempts to  
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control  fortuna,  such  as  taking  territories  by  force,  Machiavelli‟s  prince  freed 
himself  from  the  judgements  of  moral  society  and  relied  upon  his  own 
„exceptional and extraordinary qualities‟ (Pocock 1975: 161). Palonen argues that 
there are  no connections  between Weber‟s and  Machiavelli‟s ideas of  political 
contingency (Palonen 1999: 537). In Palonen‟s reading, Weber believed that the 
bureaucratisation  of  western  societies  rendered  fortuna  obsolete  because  all 
modern forms of contingency could develop only in opposition to bureaucracy. 
However, Palonen‟s argument fails to account for Weber‟s fundamental faith in 
the contingency of difference and opposition in national politics. The comparison 
of Weber and Schmitt at the end of this chapter reveals how much intellectual 
weight Weber placed on the contingency of national politics. 
 
As  mentioned  earlier,  Palonen‟s  work  is  part  of  a  growing  school  of  thought 
within the Weber scholarship that has tended to read Weber‟s political writings as 
contributions to the liberal tradition of emancipation ( other emancipative uses of 
Weber include Goldman 1992; Palonen 1999 and 2004; Kim 2004, and; Shaw 
2008). Shaw places her reading firmly in this school of thought when she argues 
that  Weber  attacked  democratisation  and  bureaucratisation  for  their  restrictive 
effects  on  human  freedom  and  meaningful  action  (Shaw  2008:  33-37).  Shaw 
insists  that,  in  Weber‟s  view,  the  democratisation  of  western  states  led  to 
„uncontrolled rule by officials‟ because the only way of administering large states 
without imposing domination of one group over another was through bureaucracy 
(Shaw 2008: 37). By setting her chess board up in this way, Shaw is forced to  
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make a false move and argue that the „Caesarist election of a charismatic leader‟ 
is  the  „best  compromise  that  Weber  can  envisage‟  for  „meaningful  action  by 
leaders on behalf of the people‟ (Shaw 2008: 38).  
 
Weber‟s  actual  compromise  was  much  more  nuanced  than  Shaw‟s  reading 
suggests. In a tribute to the swan song of German politics at the end of the Great 
War, Weber sought to grant exceptional powers to the president of the Reich to 
guarantee sovereign power in an  overly bureaucratised  state. However,  he also 
pragmatically  sought  an  avenue  for  democratic  input  into  the  decision-making 
process  through  parliamentarism.  He  had  four  reasons  for  doing  this:  one,  he 
wished  to  provide  legitimacy  to  the  president;  two,  he  wished  to  provide  a 
guarantee  of  security,  in  the  form  of  democratic  normativism,  against  outright 
dictatorship  and  ongoing  negligence  in  political  decision-making;  three,  he 
wished  to  spread  nationalism  through  democratic  access  to  education  for  the 
citizens of Germany, and; four, he wanted to secure an avenue for trained political 
economists to have significant influence on the political decision-making process. 
 
There is perhaps no better account of Weber‟s reasons for promoting plebiscitary 
leadership and parliamentary democracy than his own political writing during the 
constitutional  crisis  at  the  end  of  the  Great  War.  The  Great  War  ended  when 
Germany admitted defeat and committed itself to creating the infamous Weimar 
Republic. The task of drafting the constitution for the Republic was the ultimate 
test for jurists, economists and social theorists of the time because there was no  
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„broad  democratic  tradition‟  of  constitutional  theory  to  draw  upon  (Mommsen 
1984:  332).  Drafting  the  constitution  was  therefore  largely  a  process  of 
improvisation.  It  is  in  this  process  of  improvisation  that  Weber  developed  his 
arguments for combined parliamentarism and plebiscitary leadership. He argued 
for  a  „working  parliament…  one  which  continually  shares  in  the  work  of 
government and the control of the administration. This did not exist before the 
war.  After  the  war  is  over,  however,  parliament  must  be  transformed  into  a 
working parliament‟ (Weber 1994: 177). At the same time, he did not want the 
parliament to elect the nation‟s leader. Instead, he argued that the direct election 
of  the  president  would  endow  him  with  greater  authority  than  if  he  were 
nominated by the parliament and, further, greater authority for the president was 
the only basis for any possible countenance of the Reichstag if it should, again, 
become impotent in the hands of state officials (Mommsen 1984: 340-41).  
 
To  appreciate  Weber‟s  concept  of  power,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  his 
combination of parliamentarism and plebiscitary leadership was much more than 
an attack on bureaucracy. His  combination  of  parliamentarism and  plebiscitary 
leadership  also  struck  a  balance  between  the  institutional  normativism  of 
bureaucracy and the genuine charisma of a popularly-elected leader. To strike this 
balance, Weber used a working parliament as a kind of buffer. For Weber, the 
working parliament could control the bureaucracy of state administration and, at 
the  same  time,  safeguard  the  nation  against  the  detrimental  effects  of  a 
dictatorship. He did this not because he thought a popularly-elected leader could  
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act meaningfully on behalf of the people, but because a popularly-elected leader 
could make exceptional decisions resulting in genuine political action. 
  
Weber had at least three more arguments for adopting democratic processes in the 
Weimar Republic, which related to his interest in nationalism and the nation more 
generally.  First,  he  argued  that  democratic  education  was  responsible  for  the 
spread of nationalism in Germany: „It is only natural that nationalism should be 
spreading  amongst  the  masses  in  particular  in  an  age  that  is  becoming 
increasingly  democratic in the  way it  provides access  to  the  goods of  national 
culture, the bearer of which is, after all, the language of the nation‟ (Weber 1994: 
82). In fact, for Weber, as a consequence of democratic participation, the most 
unlikely constituents acceded to the aims of nationalism: „Even the truly modest 
measure of actual, and precarious, participation conceded to the representatives of 
radical democracy in Germany during the war was sufficient to persuade them to 
place themselves at the service of objective (sachlich) national politics‟ (Weber 
1994: 82). Democracy, in  Weber‟s account,  served to  spread  nationalism  both 
through equal access to language and national culture (meaning through access to 
education and knowledge, and through participation in domestic politics).  
 
Second,  Weber explained how democracy could  function  specifically to  secure 
the economic future of Germany: 
  
  61 
In the area of economic policy… the maximum rationalisation 
of  economic  work,  giving  economic  rewards  to  rational 
economies in production, in other words to “progress” in this 
technical-economic sense… is a question of vital importance, 
not only for the position of the nation in the world but simply 
to enable the nation to have any kind of tolerable existence at 
all. Thus it is a compelling political necessity for us to grant to 
those  who  are  the  bearers  of  this  rational  work  at  least  that 
minimum level of political influence which only equal voting 
rights can give them (Weber 1994: 87). 
 
Democratic participation,  for  Weber, could  guarantee that  economists  with  the 
skills  and  knowledge  required  to  create  rational  economic  policy  would  have 
enough  influence  on  bureaucratic  and  political  decision-making  to  improve 
Germany‟s  domestic  economic  management  and  international  economic 
competition. 
 
And third, Weber explained the importance of parliament as a democratic tool for 
promoting economic interests: 
 
First  and  foremost,  modern  parliaments  are  assemblies 
representing  the  people  who  are  ruled  by  the  means  of 
bureaucracy. It is, after all, a condition of the duration of any  
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rule,  even  the  best  organised,  that  it  should  enjoy  a  certain 
measure of inner assent from at least those sections of the ruled 
who carry weight in society. Today parliaments are the means 
whereby this minimum of assent is made manifest. For certain 
acts,  the  public  powers  are  obliged  to  use  the  form  of  an 
agreement in law after prior consultation with parliament; the 
most important of these is the budget… the right to control the 
budget, the power to determine the manner in which the state 
procures its finances, has been parliament‟s decisive instrument 
of power (Weber 1994: 165). 
 
A number of Weber scholars have acknowledged the prime value of the nation in 
Weber‟s work (see Scaff 1973; Mommsen 1984; and Hennis 2000), and the above 
quotes on nationalism, economic policy and parliament certainly do reinforce this 
reading. But these scholars, in my view, have not placed enough emphasis on the 
aspects of Weber‟s work that stress sovereign power as the fundamental basis for 
the  only  truly  meaningful  action  available  in  a  bureaucratic  world  –  the 
„confidence in revelation‟ and „heroism‟ of political charisma (Weber 1948: 79) 
and the contingency of politics, in the Machiavellian sense. Weber was under no 
illusions about the ability of democracy to provide freedom to individuals and the 
same can be said of his views of the nation; he did not see the preservation of the 
German  nation  as  a  means  of  guaranteeing  the  future  freedom  of  individuals. 
However, Weber must have had a reason to advocate the nation as a prime value  
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to be considered by constitutional theorists. Unfortunately, he did not clarify this 
reason and so, as scholars of his work, we must either extend his logic or search 
for intellectual context for a clarification.  
 
The advocacy of the nation as the most important political association is a legal 
philosophy that found its best representation in the work of Schmitt on the friend-
enemy dichotomy of politics. This work made some important points about the 
exclusively political role of the nation and these points have implications for the 
way we read Weber.  
 
The next section of this chapter provides a reading of Schmitt‟s rejection of the 
political institutions of parliamentary democracy and democratic normativism, his 
philosophy  of  politics  as  friend-enemy  dichotomy  and  his  stress  on  sovereign 
power. In summarising his views, this section shows how Schmitt diverged from 
Weber. At the same time, this section argues that Schmitt formulated a pragmatic 
role for the nation as a preserver of friend-enemy politics and sovereign power, 
and that his formulation merely clarifies a theme implicit in Weber‟s scientific 
and political writings.  
 
Parliament,  democracy,  politics  and  pluralism  in  the  work  of 
Schmitt 
 
Schmitt,  like  Weber,  was  wary  of  the  possibilities  for  genuine  democracy. 
However,  unlike  Weber,  who  found  a  pragmatic  use  for  democracy,  Schmitt  
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argued vehemently against it and against what he perceived to be its illusions. He 
argued that democracy had a great mythologising ability, which was detrimental 
to politics, and, in an intellectual engagement with parliamentary democracy, he 
developed  his  infamous  concept  of  politics  as  friend-enemy  relations  between 
nations. 
 
Schmitt‟s commitment to politics is unprecedented. He continuously revised his 
position  so  that  he  could  „remain  true  to  the  political  things  themselves‟ 
(Balakrishnan  in  Norris  2005:  892).  For  this  reason,  Schmitt  appeared  as  an 
unsystematic  thinker;  his  concepts  changed  and  were  not  entirely  consistent 
between  one  work  and  the  next.  Schmitt  himself  had  an  explanation  for  this 
inconsistency: “As the epoch of European statehood began its great ascendancy 
three  hundred  years  ago,  majestic  conceptual  systems  arose.  Today  it  is  not 
possible to build like that. . . . [the] other, alternative possibility would be to leap 
into  aphorism.  As  a  jurist,  this  is  impossible  for  me.  In  the  dilemma  between 
system and aphorism there remains only one way out: to keep the phenomenon in 
view and to probe the criteria of what are always novel questions thrown up by 
what are always novel, volatile situations” (cited in Balakrishsan 2000: 113-14). 
 
Schmitt believed in „the power of myth to mobilise the masses‟ (Kahn 2003: 72). 
The myth need not be reality. As Machiavelli suggested, the myth would „become 
true by virtue of mobilising the masses‟ (in Kahn 2003: 72). In his analysis of 
democracy, Schmitt argues that the great myth of democracy is its ability to hide  
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the  decisionism  of  particular  interests  behind  the  normativism  of  democratic 
ideals. 
 
According to Cristi (1984: 524), Schmitt drew a contrast between normativism 
and decisionism. In this distinction, normativism appears as „the rule of generality 
and pure rationality‟ whilst decisionism appears as „the rule of particular, concrete 
measures‟.  In  Schmitt‟s  distinction,  normativism  fails  to  take  into  account  the 
exceptional  nature  of  politics;  in  its  attempt  to  be  equal  and  its  inability  to 
incorporate the exceptional, it presents an indifference to consequences. In this 
respect,  capitalism  is  a  perfect  example  because  its  technological  production 
satisfies the market with indifference (capitalism follows the demand to produce 
both silk gown and poison gas). By contrast, in Schmitt‟s account, decisionism 
accepts that „behind the abstract definition of laws one always finds the concrete 
interests of a (particular) will‟. 
 
Schmitt  was  critical  of  the  mythologising  techniques  of  mass  democracy, 
especially  those  of  parliamentary  democracy.  To  launch  his  attack  on 
parliamentary democracy, Schmitt provided a history of parliamentarism with a 
summary of contemporary theory. Schmitt pointed out that „numerous brochures 
and newspaper articles‟ had demonstrated „the most prominent deficiencies and 
mistakes of the parliamentary enterprise‟ (Schmitt 1985: 19). These deficiencies, 
according to these media, included:  
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the  dominance  of  parties,  their  unprofessional  politics  of 
personalities,  “the  government  of  amateurs,”  continuing 
governmental  crises,  the  purposelessness  and  banality  of 
parliamentary debate, the declining standard of parliamentary 
customs, the destructive methods of parliamentary obstruction, 
the  misuse  of  parliamentary  immunities  and  privileges  by  a 
radical opposition  which is  contemptuous  of  parliamentarism 
itself, the undignified daily order of  business, [and] the poor 
attendance in the house (Schmitt 1985: 19). 
 
Schmitt  posed  a  serious  question  to  the  parliamentary  system:  with  so  many 
deficiencies, how could it continue to exist as a political system? In answering 
this question, he set out „to find the ultimate core of the institution of modern 
parliament‟ (Schmitt 1985: 19). He found „that the systematic basis from which 
modern parliamentarism developed‟ was „scarcely discernable in terms of current 
political  and  social  thought‟  (Schmitt  1985:  19-20).  He  also  found  that  „the 
institution  itself‟  had  „lost  its  moral  and  intellectual  foundation  and  only‟ 
remained  „standing  through  sheer  mechanical  perseverance  as  an  empty 
apparatus‟ (Schmitt 1985: 20). Finding that parliament was an empty apparatus, 
Schmitt argued that it was necessary to look to its „provisional characterisations‟ – 
„democracy, liberalism, individualism and rationalism‟ – to find its ultimate core 
(Schmitt 1985: 21). 
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Schmitt  selected  democracy  as  the  main  provisional  characteristic  of 
parliamentarism. He began his definition with a statement about the „history of 
political and state theory in the nineteenth century‟, which he summarised „with a 
single  phrase:  the  triumphal  march  of  democracy‟  (Schmitt  1985:  22).  In  his 
assessment, he drew three conclusions: 1) democracy had no political form of its 
own;  2)  democracy  failed  to  produce  equality,  and;  3)  democracy  made 
individuals conform to a fictitious general will of the people. 
 
In drawing the first of his three conclusions, Schmitt argued that democracy „was 
essentially  a  polemical  concept‟  that  developed  in  opposition  to  „established 
monarchy‟ (Schmitt 1985: 24). For this reason, „democratic convictions could be 
joined to and reconciled with various other political aspirations‟ and democracy 
could become a vehicle for various political aims. Ultimately, in Schmitt`s view 
democracy had ultimately always been realised in conjunction with other political 
orders and never on its own, as a clearly defined political principal. 
 
In the history of so-called democratic societies, „its most important opponent, the 
monarchical  principle,  disappeared,  [and]  democracy  itself  lost  its  substantive 
precision and shared the fate of every polemical concept‟; that is, it became the 
bastion  of  other  sometimes  conflicting  ideologies.  To  demonstrate  this  point 
Schmitt listed a number of alliances: „At first, democracy appeared in an entirely 
obvious alliance, even identity, with liberalism and freedom. In social democracy 
it joined  with  socialism. The  success  of Napoleon III and the Swiss referenda  
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demonstrate that it could actually be conservative and reactionary‟ (Schmitt 1985: 
24).  
 
It is from these arguments that Schmitt drew his first conclusion: „If all political 
tendencies could make use of democracy, then this proved that it had no political 
content and was only an organizational form‟ (Schmitt 1985: 24). Democracy, for 
Schmitt,  was  like  science  from  a  Weberian  perspective:  it  could  provide  a 
structural basis for organising life or a method for conducting life but it could not 
decide the ultimate aim of politics or life.  
 
In  the  second  of  his  conclusions,  Schmitt  argued  that  democracy,  despite  its 
universal claims, allowed for its subjects to be treated differently (Schmitt 1985: 
25). He stated: “The various nations or social and economic groups who organise 
themselves  “democratically”  have  the  same  subject,  „the  people‟,  only  in  the 
abstract.‟ Further, according to Schmitt, in reality „the masses are sociologically 
and  psychologically  heterogeneous.  A  democracy  can  be  militarist  or  pacifist, 
absolutist or liberal, centralized or decentralized, progressive or reactionary, and 
again different at different times without ceasing to be a democracy.‟ 
 
Schmitt drew the third of his conclusions about democracy based on its overall 
claim to equality and universal fairness. He stated, „It belongs to the essence of 
democracy that every and all decisions which are taken are only valid for those 
who themselves decide‟ (Schmitt 1985: 25). Further, according to Schmitt,   
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In democracy the citizen even agrees to the law that is against 
his own will, for the law is the General Will and, in turn, the 
will of  the  free citizen. Thus a citizen  never really gives his 
consent to a specific content but rather in abstracto to the result 
that evolves out of the general will, and he votes only so that 
the votes out of which one can know this general will can be 
calculated.  If the result  deviates  from  the intentions of  those 
individuals  voting,  then  the  outvoted  know  that  they  have 
mistaken the content of the general will (Schmitt 1985: 26). 
 
That  is,  in  Schmitt‟s  account  of  democracy,  if  the  will  of  a  citizen  does  not 
comply with the general will then he or she is not really free. In order to be free, 
he or she must be in compliance with the general will. 
 
In context, Schmitt used this distinction to analyse and define the problems of the 
Weimar  constitution  (Cristi  1984:  525).  The  constitution,  with  its  democratic 
form, required more power to be reserved for the Reichspräsident because, in its 
parliamentary-democratic  form,  the  Reichstag  was  incapable  of  making 
exceptional  decisions.  In  his  model  Weber  set  the  Reichspräsident  up  as  a 
replacement charismatic figure for the monarch. There were, however, a number 
of constraints in the actual constitution that prevented Weber‟s Reichspräsident  
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from  exercising  true  sovereign  power.  Schmitt  dedicated  himself  to  removing 
these constraints. 
 
In The Concept of the Political (1996), Schmitt attempted to rescue politics from 
aesthetic  and  democratic  ideals.  Schmitt  began  his  conceptualisation  of  „the 
political‟  with  a  history  of  the  modern  European  state,  politics  and  society. 
Turning to the history of the German state, politics and society, he pointed out 
that  during  the  eighteenth  century  it  was  acceptable  to  speak  of  the  state  and 
politics as one and the same, because the state had „the monopoly on politics‟ and 
„had  not  recognized  society  as  an  antithetical  force‟  (Schmitt  1996:  22).  This 
treatment became problematic in the nineteenth century, because, in this period, 
the state began to recognise the antithetical force of society and its administrators 
began to devise ways of controlling it.  However, „[t]he equation state = politics 
becomes erroneous and deceptive at exactly the moment when state and society 
penetrate each other‟. At this moment of entwine, the hitherto distinctly separate 
affairs of the  state and  society become indistinguishable and the  state loses its 
purely political character. Instead, it takes on the interests of non-political entities 
such as religion and education; that is to say, its administration is directed towards 
controlling religion and education. 
 
Schmitt suggested that just as there is a fundamental dichotomy in the „realm of 
morality… between good and evil‟, the realm of „political actions and motives 
can‟ always „be reduced‟ to the distinction „between friend and enemy‟ (Schmitt  
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1996: 26).  He insisted that this distinction is unique to politics and it cannot be 
identified with the other distinctions such as those of morality – good and evil, 
and aesthetics – beautiful and ugly; „The political enemy need not be morally evil 
or aesthetically ugly‟ (Schmitt 1996: 27).  For Schmitt it was thus impossible to 
settle  conflict  between  political  enemies  by  recourse  to  a  third  party  neutral 
umpire, or some predefined norm. Regardless of ideals, in reality the distinction 
between  friend  and  enemy  was  undeniable.  This  friend-enemy  distinction  was 
particularly evident in the conflict between different nations (Schmitt 1996: 28). 
 
For Schmitt, politics always occurred at a national level. Domestic party politics, 
in Schmitt‟s view, was only political when it threatened the well being of the state 
(Schmitt 1996: 32).  Only then did it involve the friend-enemy distinction.  In 
terms of the state, politics did not always eventuate in physical conflict between 
friend and enemy (Schmitt 1996: 33).  Instead, it might have involved preventing 
war, but the fact that there had always been war between nations, between friend 
and  enemy,  meant  for  Schmitt  that  international  relations  had  always  been 
political.  Schmitt firmly believed that a world free of war, and hence the friend-
enemy distinction, was a world free of politics (Schmitt 1996: 35). 
 
In the first few years of the Third Reich, Schmitt moved away from decisionism 
towards an „“institutional” conception of the state‟ (Bates 2006: 416). He drew 
upon religious concepts to describe „the new state of the twentieth century‟. Later, 
after  witnessing  Hitler‟s  erratic  exercise  of  power  and  his  reluctance  to  make  
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domestic  policy  decisions,  Schmitt  recognised  that  the  state  required  an 
institutional control to limit the extent of the Reichspräsident’s power. Schmitt 
united  decisionism  with  normativism  to  place  sovereign  power  into  an 
institutional context; he proposed the use of institutional constraints on sovereign 
power to provide a normative  context  for the making of  exceptional decisions 
(Bates 2006: 423). 
 
Even though he united decisionism and normativism, Schmitt did not relativise 
the state and other associations. In Rasch‟s account (2000: 3), Schmitt rejected 
Han‟s  Kelsen‟s  attempts  to  replace  state  sovereignty  with  the  rule  of  law  and 
„Gierke‟s… analysis of associations‟ because they each relativised the state and 
civil society, and neutralised the power of the state. Schmitt argued that the liberal 
relativisation of the state and neutralisation of its power was a problem because it 
reduced the state to a technological administration and left it open to manipulation 
by  an  overarching  international  order  (Rasch  2000:  4).  He  was  critical  of  the 
liberal idea of an international order because he was convinced that it promoted 
„sham pluralism‟ and actually prevented all possibilities of politics (Rasch 2000: 
15).  The  „sham  pluralism‟  of  liberalism,  Schmitt  argued,  served  to  unite  all 
differences in an ultimate „monism‟, but the problem as he saw it was that this 
unification  of  differences  prevented  the  development  of  multiple  unities  of 
associations,  or  states,  which  thus  prevented  the  development  of  political 
pluralism. If, as a service to humanity, liberalism was permitted to end all violent 
conflict,  it  would  have  to  end  all  possibilities  of  politics  –  of  difference  and  
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opposition  –  and  a  world  without  difference  and  opposition  would,  Schmitt 
stressed, serve the „unfolding  and global expansion of a new type of moral and 
economic imperialism‟ (Rasch 2000: 17). 
 
Summary 
 
Weber‟s concern with the nation was ultimately related to his desire to preserve 
the  function  of politics,  in  the  Schmittian  friend-enemy  sense. Before Schmitt, 
Weber  had  an  ultimate  interest  in  difference  and  opposition.  Weber  had  also 
already  recognised  the  impossibilities  of  liberal  pluralism  in  his  writings  on 
bureaucratisation and the paradox of modernity. However, his tendency to view 
the paradox of modernity as an unintended consequence of rationalisation, and not 
as  a  direct  result  of  the  shortcomings  of  liberalism,  explains  his  reluctance  to 
attack  liberalism‟s  „sham  pluralism‟.  Still,  by  virtue  of  his  sociologies  of 
bureaucracy and authority, and his unique view of parliamentary democracy and 
plebiscitary leadership, Weber‟s work is fundamentally at odds with the liberal 
ideals  of  an  international  consensus.  Weber  admitted  that  the  only  way  of 
administering large states (including international orders) was through impersonal 
rule and the division of intellectual labour. He argued that the rational division of 
intellectual labour and bureaucratic rule made states antagonistic towards political 
authority  because  of  the  irrational  nature  of  political  authority.  For  Weber 
political authority was the last bastion of difference and opposition, and Weber, 
before Schmitt,  was aware that if the  possibilities  of difference and  opposition  
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were to be maintained, then the German nation must be preserved as a separate 
political association in a world of political pluralism. 
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Chapter  3:  Three  Categories  of  Uses  of  Weber:  An 
Introduction to the Weber Scholarship 
 
This chapter sketches three categories of uses of Weber: theoretical, contextual, 
and emancipative. In an attempt to help readers differentiate between sociological 
readings of  Weber‟s  methodology,  the  Weber  scholar Sven Eliaeson  speaks of 
„three paradigmatic conceptions of Weber‟ (Eliaeson 2002: 55-96). This chapter, 
however,  differentiates  on  a  much  broader  level,  going  beyond  sociology  into 
historical  and  political-scientific  readings,  sometimes  aligning  the  readings  of 
authors  who  share  no  disciplinary  basis  but  instead  draw  on  common  themes 
within  Weber‟s  work.  The  theoretical  category  refers  to  those  sociological 
readings that deliberately construct Weber‟s work for the purpose of their own 
theoretical endeavours, such as Talcott Parsons‟s The Structure of Social Action 
(1968).  In  this  work,  Parsons  portrays  Weber  as  an  idealist  who  formulated  a 
sociological  theory  of  action.  The  contextual  category  refers  to  the  historical 
readings that have no particular disciplinary allegiance apart from the pursuit of 
historical accuracy, readings that reconstruct Weber‟s work in opposition to the 
theoretical  readings.  This  category  includes  Wilhelm  Hennis‟s  Max  Weber’s 
Central Question, which was first published in English in 1988 as Max Weber: 
Essays in Reconstruction. Here, Hennis masterfully situates Weber‟s work within 
political-economic,  jurisprudential,  religious-psychological  and  moral-
philosophical  studies  to  highlight  Weber‟s  concern  with  the  existence  and 
transformation of different spheres of life and their influence on the life-conduct 
of individuals. The emancipative category refers to the readings that again have  
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no disciplinary bias but reconstruct Weber‟s works for the purpose of recovering a 
degree  of  contemporary  applicability,  usually  in  the  form  of  its  emancipative 
rather  than  scientific  ability.  This  category  includes  Wolf  Lepenies‟s  Between 
Literature  and  Science:  The  Rise  of  Sociology  (1988).  In  this  book,  Lepenies 
argues that for Weber sociology protected the aesthetic spheres of life against the 
pervasive scientific worldview and its rationalisation of life-conduct (1988: 247). 
 
This  chapter argues that the theoretical uses of Weber contribute to a negative 
legacy  that  continues  to  plague  Weber  scholarship  and  its  recent  attempts  at 
historically-accurate portrayals of his work. The sterilisation of Weber‟s work into 
a  theory  of  society,  by  the  theoretical  uses,  is  refuted  by  the  authors  of  the 
contextual  uses  as  an  overly  one-sided  approach  that  misses  the  complex 
backdrop  to  Weber‟s  work  –  the  emergence  of  complicated  forms  and 
interrelations  between  democracy  and  nationalism,  the  changing  international 
economy and its influence on individual conduct. The contextual uses highlight 
themes  in  the  work  of  Weber  revolving  around  the  influence  of  ideas  on 
individual  conduct  and  the  creation  of  individual  power  in  economic  action. 
Following the contextual uses, some of the authors of the emancipative uses draw 
on the themes of power creation through economic action whilst simultaneously 
attempting to surmount or circumnavigate the complex backdrop of Weber‟s work 
by focusing on some key problems such as the absence of a tradition of liberal-
democratic social thought in Germany. Using this largely Anglophone viewpoint 
– a symptom of the Kehrite preoccupation with explaining the rise of National  
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Socialism  in terms  of the  failed German  bourgeois revolution  of 1848 and the 
consequential failure to establish a tradition of liberal and democratic thought in 
Germany (Blackbourn and Eley 1984: 154-55; Tribe 1989: 89) – the authors of 
the emancipative readings are able to formulate Weber‟s central concern simply 
as either the replacement of Bildung (see Goldman 1992) – the German equivalent 
of Anglo/French liberal social thought – or as the development of an ethics of 
voluntary associational life (see Kim 2004). By this reading, Weber was not so 
much  concerned  with  a  static  theory  of  society,  or  the  influence  of  economic 
ethics  on  individual  conduct,  as  he  was  with  the  actual  building  of  a  social-
emancipative tradition to match those of the English and French. 
 
Theory: the legacy of classical sociology 
 
Any  outline  of  English  Weber-scholarship  has  to  begin  with  a  history  of 
Anglophone  sociology  from  the  early-twentieth  century  and  this  history  is 
dominated by theory. Despite the  problems it has produced, theory remains an 
indispensable  part  of  both  methodological  thinking  (see  Turner  1996:  5)  and 
historical thinking about social science. Particularly in the historiography of social 
science, due to the work of Parsons and Giddens, theory is an inescapable part of 
the legacy of sociology. The theme of this inescapable legacy of theory forms one 
of the undercurrents of this chapter. 
 
Since the time of Parsons, histories of social theory and sociology have repeatedly 
portrayed  Durkheim,  Weber  and  Marx  as  „the  classics‟  or  the  „canon‟  of  
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„founding fathers‟ in the history of social theory and sociology (Turner 1996: 5; 
Connell  1997:  1512).  Pointing  out  the  deficiencies  of  these  histories,  Stephen 
Turner  (Turner  1996:  5)  argues  that  social  theorists  such  as  Parsons  have 
„plundered‟ the classics to the benefit of their own theoretical endeavours; through 
the  cunning  use  of  theory  they  have  set  the  agenda  for  social  change  and 
ideologies about social change (Turner 1996: 5). For his part in this appropriation, 
Parsons  is  responsible  for  the  „purposeful  misinterpretation  of  the  classics  to 
produce  his  own  best  results‟  (Wearne  in  Turner  1996:  5).  Following  Turner, 
Connell  questions  the  very  idea  of  a  „canon‟  of  „founding  fathers‟  revolving 
around the principal  three:  Marx, Durkheim and Weber (Connell 1997:  1512). 
Connell  argues  that  the  idea  of  a  canon  was  a  retrospective  construction: 
„Durkheim and Weber‟s academic contemporaries did not see them as giants and 
often disregarded Marx‟ (Connell 1997: 1513). The trouble with the retro-canon, 
according to Connell, is that whilst Marx, Weber and,  mainly, Durkheim were 
undoubtedly contributing to sociology on some level or another, the contemporary 
texts from the likes of Franklin H. Giddings, Robert E. Park, Howard Becker and 
Harry E. Barnes listed no particular leading figures but rather included a multitude 
of  authors  all  contributing  in  a  „broad…  impersonal‟  manner  to  an 
encyclopaedically defined discipline; that is, a discipline where all contributions 
were included with no favouritism (Connell 1997: 1514).  
 
Whilst  Frank  Knight  provided  the  first  English  translation  of  a  Weber  text  in 
1927, with General Economic History (Emmet 2006: 107), the first translation to  
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bring Weber to a wide English-reading audience  was Parsons‟s version of  The 
Protestant  Ethic  and  the  Spirit  of  Capitalism  (PESC),  first  published  in  1930 
(Tribe 1988: 7). After PESC, Parsons went on to interpret Weber‟s sociology and 
present  its  theoretical  meaning  and  purpose  to  American  sociologists  in  The 
Structure of Social Action (1968), first published in 1937. This chapter argues that 
subsequent readings of the work of Weber are frequently forced to contend with 
the legacy of the theoretical reading instigated by Parsons.  
 
The theoretical uses of Weber 
 
This section introduces three major theoretical uses of the work of Weber. The 
first use is Talcott Parsons‟s The Structure of Social Action (1968). In this work, 
Parsons  emphasises  the  similarities  between  the  theoretical  aims  of  Vilfredo 
Pareto,  Alfred  Marshall,  Emile  Durkheim  and  Weber,  towards  a  sociological 
theory of action, in which Pareto and Durkheim represented a positivist approach 
and  Weber  an  idealist  approach  (Parsons  1968).  The  second  use  is  Reinhard 
Bendix‟s Max Weber: an Intellectual Biography (1966), first published in 1959. 
Here Bendix treats Weber as an idealist – and individualist – theorist of society. 
The  third  and  final  use  introduced  here  is  Anthony  Giddens‟s  Capitalism  and 
Modern Social Theory (1971). Giddens emphasises both the foundational roles of 
Marx, Durkheim and Weber in the creation of the field of sociology, with Weber 
as a theorist of rational society. 
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In  the  „Preface‟  to  The  Structure  of  Social  Action  (1968),  Parsons  states  his 
intention  to  trace  the  development  of  a  „single  body  of  systematic  theoretical 
reasoning‟  through  the  writings  of  Marshall,  Pareto,  Durkheim  and  Weber 
(Parsons  1968:  xxi).  Parsons  boldly  states  that  his  „convergent  theoretical 
development‟  is  „a  major  revolution  in  the  scientific  analysis  of  social 
phenomena‟ (Parsons 1968: xvi). Indeed, there is a sense of irony to Parsons‟s 
project. In order to reveal the coherence between the work of these four authors – 
itself  a  questionable  endeavour  –  Parsons  has  to  undertake  a  great  deal  of 
„laborious  critical  interpretation‟  especially  where  the  „actual  differentiations 
[between their  work]  had already  become  overlain  with a  welter  of  secondary 
interpretations and misinterpretations‟ (Parsons 1968: xvii). The point here is that 
Parsons has to work extremely hard to reveal his theory and the separate works of 
the canonical theorists. 
 
The version of Weber that emerges from this difficult excavation is empirical on 
one level, but ultimately theoretical. Parsons begins the recovery by informing us 
that Weber was „an encyclopedic mind‟ with „an omnivorous appetite for detail‟ 
encouraged  by  his  training  in  the  historical  traditions  of  jurisprudence  and 
economics (Parsons 1968: 500-02). However, Parsons continues, „Weber‟s was 
too  actively  theoretical  a  mind  to  remain  indefinitely  immersed  in  detailed 
historical research for its own sake. His own theorizing started… from the basis of 
the historical tradition, though it was eventually to transcend it‟ (Parsons 1968: 
502).  When  this  transcending  occurred,  Weber‟s  ultimate  concern  became  the  
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creation of a theory „of the modern economic order… as a socioeconomic system‟ 
(Parsons, 1968: 504). This process, according to Parsons, began with the thesis on 
the Protestant work ethic, which was of course contained in Parsons‟s translation 
of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (PESC) (1930). Through the 
PESC thesis, Weber was determined to demonstrate, contra Marx, that the genesis 
of modern capitalism depended on more than such materialistic factors as means 
of production; that it also depended upon the „ultimate values and value attitudes‟ 
of a „definite metaphysical system of ideas‟ in the Protestant work ethic (Parsons, 
1968: 510). Weber extended his preoccupation with the genesis of the capitalist 
order, so Parsons argues, to a series of comparative studies of world religions, 
designed  to  demonstrate  why  the  development  of  „modern  rational  bourgeois 
capitalism‟  was  peculiar  to  the  West  (Parsons  1968:  512).  For  Parsons,  the 
comparative studies, along with PESC, together prove that the economic ethics of, 
for example, Taoism and Hinduism, were not as favourable to the rational type of 
conduct associated  with  capitalism as  was the economic  ethic of  Protestantism 
(Parsons 1968: 513). Through an excavation process, Parsons manages to uncover 
the „general system of religious typology‟ essential to Weber‟s primary concern of 
the capitalist order (Parsons 1968: 563). Parsons‟s excavation seems to imply two 
categories of typologies within Weber‟s comparative sociology. The first category 
includes  developmental  historical  types,  such  as  „primitive‟  and  „developed‟ 
religion,  which  serve the  scholarly  purpose of delineating time (Parsons 1968: 
564). The second includes value types, such as tradition and rationality, which 
serve the structural function of guiding human actions. The second category is  
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crucial to Parsons‟s own sociological project, and he claims that for Weber these 
types formed an actual „structure of ideas‟ encompassing all „possible attitudes‟ 
from which actors had to choose in order to form their own worldviews (Parsons 
1968:  567). In other words, these types were not only functional for Weber in his 
study of the genesis of the capitalist order, but they were also functional for the 
actors whom he was studying. 
 
The Swedish scholar Sven Eliaeson, who has pursued affinities between Weber 
and the value-nihilist Gunnar Myrdal in their shared belief in value-pluralism (see 
for instance, Eliaeson, 1990; 2006), argues that Parsons‟s reading of Weber was 
rooted in „an American middle-class conception of stratification‟ (Eliaeson 2002: 
64).  In  response  to  the  North  American  social  and  economic  problems  of  the 
1930s,  and  as  an  alternative  to  Marxism,  Parsons  „watered  down‟  Weber‟s 
concepts of „Stände (classes)‟ to „status group‟, and „Herrschaft (rule, power)‟ to 
„authority‟, to fit his own „system of value-integration‟ (Eliaeson 2002: 64-65). 
He developed this system into the theory of structural functionalism, which placed 
more  emphasis  on  the  study  of  a  hierarchy  of  general  concepts  than  on 
explanations of  empirical  facts (Eliaeson 2002: 73). The  most  obvious trait of 
Parsons‟s hierarchy of concepts is its „top-down‟ structure whereby actions are 
guided by the shared goals of status groups and societies, and whilst some aspects 
of Weber‟s work do contain some hierarchical properties, such as his typology of 
value-based action, Parsons‟s emphasis on these aspects means that „the Weberian 
anguish of polytheism is lost‟ (Eliaeson 2002: 74).   
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Reinhard Bendix makes some progress towards remedying Parsons‟s fragmented 
reading by carefully avoiding imputing any structural functionalism to Weber‟s 
work.  But,  although  he  acknowledges  pluralism,  Bendix‟s  emphasis  on  theory 
leads ultimately to a reading of Weber as a theorist of society. Bendix reconstructs 
Weber‟s  „sociological  work‟  with  the  explicit  intention  of  making  it  „more 
accessible and more thematically coherent than it is either in the original or in 
translation‟ (Bendix, 1966: xv). In Bendix‟s reading, the major theme of Weber‟s 
sociological  work  is  contained  within  a  few  key  research  problems.  Weber 
developed these problems to a basic form in his early works and he continued to 
develop  them  throughout  his  later  works  in  a  more  elaborate  application  of 
conceptual  frameworks.  In  Weber‟s  early  works  on  rural  labour  and  the  stock 
exchange, both published in the mid 1890s, Bendix finds „the basic concepts and 
central problems  which occupied  him [Weber] for the rest  of his life‟ (Bendix 
1966: xix). The main aim of Weber‟s study of rural labourers in East Prussia was, 
according  to  Bendix,  „to  indicate  the  process  by  which  day  laborers  were 
gradually replacing the half-servile peasantry on the large landed estates of the 
east‟ (Bendix 1966: 17). Weber‟s study of stock exchanges revealed his interest in 
traditional forms of action and comparative approaches to societies (Bendix 1966: 
25-27).  It  was  not,  however,  until  PESC  that  Weber  explicitly  formulated  the 
„major theme of [his] …lifework, a specification of the interrelation of religious 
ideas and economic behaviour as the focus for further research‟ (Bendix 1966: 49-
50).  
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According to Bendix, Weber tackled this research program by addressing three 
problems: first, he studied „the effect of major religious ideas on the secular ethic 
and economic behaviour of the average believer‟; second, he studied „the effect of 
group formation on religious ideas‟; and third, he studied „the determination of 
what  was  distinctive  for  the  West  by  a  comparison  of  the  causes  and 
consequences  of religious  beliefs in  different civilizations‟ (Bendix, 1966: 84). 
With  these  problems  in  mind,  Weber  developed  a  series  of  conceptual 
frameworks  to  carry  out  each  substantive  study.  Thus,  addressing  the  first 
problem,  for  example,  he  developed  his  notion  of  the  „influence  of  ideas  on 
behaviour‟ and  the  „phenomenon  of  power‟ into a typology  of „authority‟ and 
„legitimacy‟  (Bendix  1966:  285-86).  Addressing  the  second  problem,  he 
redeveloped the concept of „Stand‟ or „status group‟, from its earliest incarnation 
in  his  studies  of  rural  labour  to  its  mature  form  in  his  „sociology  of  religion‟ 
(Bendix 1966: 87).   
 
In  Bendix‟s  reading,  Weber  failed  to  explicitly  unite  his  concepts  to  form  a 
general theory or worldview, but, if we search hard enough, according to Bendix, 
we  can  discover  the  implicit  theory  of  society  lurking  in  the  shadows  of  his 
corpus:  we  find  the  theory  that,  „Each  society  is  a  composite  of  positively  or 
negatively  privileged  status  groups  that  are  engaged  in  efforts  to  preserve  or 
enhance their present “style of life” by means of social distance and exclusiveness 
and by the monopolization of economic opportunities‟ (Bendix 1966: 259). And  
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further, „The view of society as a balance between opposing forces is the reason 
why Weber quite explicitly rejected the attempt to interpret social structures as 
wholes‟  (Bendix  1966:  261).  Bendix  continues  to  stress  that  Weber  was  only 
interested  in  the  ways  in  which  various  status  groups,  their  ideas  and  their 
struggles with one-another, had influenced the lifestyles of individuals; Weber did 
not conceive of structures such as the „state‟ and „nation‟ as „entities‟ in the real 
sense (Bendix 1966: 262).  
 
Under scrutiny, Bendix‟s reading does not bring us any nearer to the „true‟ theme 
of Weber‟s  work. If no  social  structures  existed in an  empirical  sense and  the 
state,  as  well  as  society,  was  merely  an  idea  that  influenced  the  conduct  of 
individuals, then Weber‟s ultimate theoretical concern with society turns out to be 
nothing more than a concern with a hierarchy of concepts of ideas, or a method of 
ordering ideas in a conceptual hierarchy of cultural values. Bendix‟s reading of 
Weber as a theorist of ideas offers little for those of us who want to understand 
the context of Weber‟s argument that political associations, due to their monopoly 
of the legitimate use of force, have real power over voluntary associations and 
individuals.  The  monopoly  of  legitimate  force  was  a  tangible  political 
phenomenon  for  Weber  and  this  has  implications  for  the  way  we  read  his 
hierarchy of political and social associations. 
 
Giddens,  like  Bendix,  makes  an  attempt  at  a  reading  of  the  peculiar  German 
influences on Weber‟s work by acknowledging the importance of early writings  
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and  the German  disciplines of legal  history and  historical  economics. Giddens 
portrays  these themes as central  factors in  the  formulation of Weber‟s oeuvre. 
Giddens begins his reading by informing us that the „main intellectual influences 
in which Weber‟s work is steeped are as predominantly German as those which 
shaped Durkheim‟s writings are French‟ (Giddens 1971: 119). Having made this 
statement, it is surprising to find that Giddens deals with these influences in such 
a swift manner. For example, he suggests that Weber‟s early works, such as his 
1889  doctoral  dissertation  on  „the  legal  provisions  governing  medieval  trading 
enterprise‟  and  his  1891  Habilitationschrift  on  „Roman  land-tenure‟  and  its 
connections „with legal and political changes…, are perhaps less important  for 
their substantive content than for what they indicate of the nascent line of Weber‟s 
intellectual development‟ (Giddens 1971: 120-21). They are of concern to us as 
sociologists, he suggests, only because they contain the „principal focus of‟ his 
„later work: the nature of capitalist enterprise, and the specific characteristics of 
western European capitalism‟ (Giddens 1971: 121). In other words, we should not 
be  concerned  with  the  manner  in  which  Weber‟s  early  career  and  intellectual 
context shaped his later writings and we should not be concerned with how we 
might  learn  to  read  Weber‟s  later  works  through  the  combined  lens  of  these 
influences.  Rather,  we  should  be  concerned  only  with  how  his  early  works 
complement his later writings.  
 
With this approach in mind, Giddens summarises another of Weber‟s early works 
– the 1892 published version of a survey of rural labourers east of the Elbe – as,  
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fundamentally,  an  analysis  of  „the  effects  of  the  spread  of  market  relations‟ 
(Giddens 1971: 122). Through the  survey, Weber  demonstrated the „increasing 
commercialisation  of  agriculture‟,  „use  of  wage-labour‟  and  consequent 
„accentuation  of  economic  conflict  between  the  workers  and  their  employers‟ 
(Giddens 1971: 123). The theoretical „breakthrough‟, according to Giddens, came 
in 1904 and 1905 when Weber made „his first attempt to confront certain of these 
issues on a general  plane‟, in the  twin essays of  The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism (PESC) (Giddens 1971: 124). Here Weber  formulated the 
theoretical  distinction  between  traditional  and  modern  forms  of  capitalism, 
introducing  the  theory  of  rationalisation  to  explain  the  development  „towards 
maximising  productive  efficiency‟  characteristic  of  modern  western  societies 
(Giddens 1971: 125-27). Giddens then argues that  Weber  made  his theoretical 
swansong  in  Economy  and  Society  (E&S),  where  he  „moves  towards  a  direct 
concern  with  the  establishment  of  uniformities  of  social  and  economic 
organisation: that is, towards sociology‟ (Giddens 1971: 145). Through the studies 
of  world  religions,  Weber  conceptualised  two  types  of  rational  action:  formal, 
whereby  action  is  organised  according  to  the  principles  of  calculability  and 
efficiency, and substantive, whereby action is made calculable and efficient for 
the  purpose  of  a  predefined  goal  (Giddens  1971:  183).  With  these  concepts, 
Giddens argues, Weber developed his theory that „western society‟ is „founded 
upon  an  intrinsic  antinomy  between  formal  and  substantive  rationality  which, 
according to Weber‟s analysis, cannot be resolved‟ (Giddens 1971: 184). 
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The portrayal that Giddens provides sterilises Weber‟s works into conceptual and 
theoretical studies. Giddens fails to mention the substantive account that Weber 
provided  in  his  study  of  rural  farm  workers,  of  the  influx  of  Polish  migrant 
workers, the effects on nationalist sentiments and the change in social dynamics 
east of the Elbe River. Whilst Giddens‟s reading of the PESC is fairly accurate – 
it is, after all, partially a study of the form of economic conduct peculiar to the 
West – it nevertheless overemphasises the theoretical process of rationalisation 
that Weber employs. It is necessary for Giddens to overemphasise the importance 
of the theory of rationalisation so as to connect the red thread of theory in PESC 
to Weber‟s concepts of formal and substantive rationality outlined in E&S. The 
trouble with this reading is that Weber did not speak of western society or even of 
a theory of western society, and so if we follow Giddens‟s account, we are led 
down the same path as Bendix – to the garden of a conflict theory of ideas with no 
empirical soil. 
 
If there is one thing that these different readings have in common it is this: they 
suggest that Weber began his career with a general interest in Western capitalism 
but that this interest only served as a general guide to substantive work, which 
ultimately,  towards  the  end  of  his  life,  led  him  to  some  major  theoretical 
conclusions about society. If we are to believe Parsons, Weber‟s theory serves the 
purpose of a sociological interpretational system, through which we can, by taking 
it to its typological conclusion, create a total system of interpretative categories 
giving  us  access  to  all  motives  for  human  action  throughout  the  world.  If  we  
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follow  Bendix‟s  reading  we  might  understand  Weber‟s  explanation  of  the 
influence of ideas on human action as almost working towards a conflict theory of 
society. For Giddens, the case is much the same as it is for Bendix, except in his 
account the conflict is portrayed as a conflict between modes of action, rather than 
between social groups.  
 
The  next  section  of  this  chapter  introduces  an  altogether  different  set  of  uses, 
which  make  a  concerted  effort  to  understand  Weber‟s  work  in  a  historical-
contextual  approach  rather  than  from  the  perspective  of  reconstructing  it 
according to its usefulness for developing a particular sociological theory some 
ten to fifty years post hoc. 
 
The contextual uses of Weber 
 
This section introduces two major contextual uses of the work of Weber. The first 
is Wolfgang Mommsen‟s Max Weber and German Politics, 1890-1920 (1984), 
first  published  in  German  in  1959  and  translated  into  English  in  1974.  Here 
Mommsen emphasises the interrelation between Weber‟s politics and his science, 
providing  key  biographical  information  about  Weber‟s  political  life  and  his 
political contemporaries and structures, and their influence on his thought. The 
second  is  Wilhelm  Hennis‟s  Max  Weber’s  Central  Question  (2000),  first 
published in English in 1988 as Max Weber: Essays in Reconstruction. In this 
book, Hennis emphasises the intellectual politics of Weber‟s writings, providing  
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key biographical information about Weber‟s intellectual contemporaries and their 
influence. 
 
Mommsen delivers two main theses in his political and intellectual biography. In 
the first of his two theses, he argues that Weber was both a nationalist and an 
imperialist,  in  a  particular  sense,  which  can  only  be  understood  against  the 
backdrop of the peculiar situation of Germany in the developing world economy, 
Bismarck‟s  world  policy,  the  peace  negotiations  of  World  War  I,  and  the 
subsequent  hasty  formation  of  parliamentary  democracy  (Mommsen  1984:  37-
138). Second, Mommsen argues that Weber‟s political views and his sociological 
theory  were  interrelated  in  the  sense  that  his  scientific  work  served  as  both  a 
clarifier and an outlet for his political thought (Mommsen 1984: 93-419). 
 
Mommsen  argues  that  early  in  his  career  Weber  identified  himself  as  an 
„economic  nationalist‟  (Mommsen  1984:  37).  Weber‟s  economic  nationalism, 
Mommsen stresses, boils down to his fundamental understanding of the role of 
power  in  the  production  of  culture  (Mommsen  1984:  47-48).  For  Weber,  all 
cultural life depended on the struggle for power, which, during his time, meant the 
struggle for a prominent position in the world economy. During the early 1890s, 
Weber‟s involvement in the study of the agricultural economics of East Prussia 
led him to believe that, for the „foreseeable future‟, Germany would be dependent 
upon  international  markets  for  its  „food  supplies‟  (Mommsen  1984:  68).  In 
Weber‟s  opinion, the Reich Chancellor Bismarck‟s  world  policy,  which  was a  
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policy of appeasement designed to prevent conflict with the imperial powers of 
England,  Russia  and  the  Unites  States,  would  fail  to  meet  this  basic  need 
(Mommsen  1984:  138).  In  response,  Weber  adopted  an  imperialist  stance  that 
Germany  would  have  to  become  a  bigger  player  on  the  colonial  stage  by 
expanding  its  territories.  This,  according  to  Mommsen,  was  his  basic  political 
viewpoint from which all other considerations would follow. 
 
One  of  Weber‟s  great  intellectual  abilities,  in  Mommsen‟s  reading,  was  his 
understanding  of  the  „salience  of  intellectual  and  psychological  motives  in 
economic  life‟  (Mommsen  1984:  93).  In  line  with  his  economic  nationalism, 
Weber  wished that the German people had  developed a  much  stronger  ascetic 
drive for economic activity; that they had embraced the puritan ethic in order that 
they might have developed the type of conduct required for strong competition in 
the  world  economy  (Mommsen  1984:  94).  According  to  Mommsen,  Weber 
affirms  this  view  in  his  comparative  study  of  forms  of  German  and  North 
American voluntary associational life. In this study, Weber suggests that the form 
of social selection in North American church-like sects is more conducive to the 
basic ethic of puritan asceticism than the German form of social selection. This 
comparative  work,  in  Mommsen‟s  reading,  reaffirms  Weber‟s  political 
nationalism. 
 
One of the themes to emerge in Weber‟s political writings is that of leadership 
and charisma. Some key events prompted Weber‟s preoccupation with what he  
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perceived to be a leadership crisis in Germany. First of all, Bismarck left office 
during a crucial moment in German political development, having failed to ensure 
a suitable successor (Mommsen 1984: 163). This was in part due to Germany‟s 
failure to cultivate statesmen capable of true leadership. The crisis of leadership, 
as perceived by Weber, came to a head when the two Generals, Ludendorff and 
Hindenberg, hastily introduced a new system of parliamentary democracy during 
the  peace  negotiations  with  the  allies,  which  „thereby  burdened  the  new 
democratic government with the terrible odium of defeat‟ (Mommsen 1984: 283). 
 
It would be a mistake, in Mommsen‟s eyes, to separate Weber‟s sociological work 
from his political views in an attempt to distil the central theoretical tenants of his 
sociology or of his political thought. Reading Weber according to his own method 
of value-freedom and  objectivity „ought  not to lead to the  digging of a trench 
between [his] political  views and  his theoretical sociological works. They both 
spring from a common root, the postulate of the self-assertion and self-realization 
of  the  personality  in  an  administered  world,  according  to  the  principles  of  a 
rational  ethic  of  responsibility‟  (Mommsen  1984:  419).  Weber‟s  notion  of 
objectivity and value-freedom can only be fully appreciated in the context of his 
desire to cultivate charismatic leadership and political responsibility.  
 
Mommsen  begins  the  process  of  reintroducing  value-orientations  and  personal 
convictions into  the  scholarly  work  of  Weber after they  were removed  by the 
theoretical  readings  (outlined  above).  In  this  way,  Mommsen  does  much  to  
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recover  Weber‟s  political-economic  thought,  providing  us  with  a  portrayal  of 
Weber‟s  economic  nationalism,  parliamentarism  and  democratic  thought.  But 
there is one negative consequence to Mommsen‟s contextual reading: he focuses 
too heavily on the economic analysis of conduct in Weber‟s work and, thus, when 
he comes to analyse Weber‟s concepts of charisma and power, he ends up with an 
economic  reading  of  those  concepts.  Instead  of  contextualising  the  uniquely 
political  elements  of  power  in  the  work  of  Weber,  Mommsen  concludes  that 
power  is  „the  self-assertion  and  self-realization  of  the  personality  in  an 
administered world‟ (Mommsen 1984: 419). 
 
Following  Mommsen,  Hennis  begins  his  reading  of  Weber  by  questioning 
whether it is possible, in the absence of a proper understanding and interpretation 
of  the  „Weltanschauung  and…  scientific  problems‟  of  his  time,  to  impute  to 
Weber  the  status  of  „an  intellectual  leader  of  modern  social  science‟  (Hennis 
2000: 3-4). To achieve this understanding and interpretation, according to Hennis, 
„we  must  be  familiar  with  the  contemporary  questions  of‟  disciplines  such  as 
„Nationalökonomie,  Staatswissenschaft,  law,  history,  philosophy,  and… 
“sociology”‟ (Tenbruck in Hennis 2000: 5). By following this approach, Hennis 
aims to ultimately recover the „central preoccupation‟ and „red thread that runs‟ 
through Weber‟s entire  body  of  work (Hennis 2000: 9). To begin this project, 
Hennis turns to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (PE) and to the 
Anticritical Last Word on the Spirit of Capitalism, because here, Hennis argues, 
Weber reiterated his central theme quite consistently (Hennis 2000: 10-11).  
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The central theme in these essays is not the genesis of modern capitalism but the 
„rational‟ or „methodical‟ conduct of everyday life (Weber in Hennis 2000: 12-
13). Weber was not concerned with the historical forces that may have generated 
the economic structures of capitalism – an ongoing misunderstanding within the 
secondary literature. Instead, he was concerned with the influence of particular 
„Protestant ascetic tendencies‟ on the conduct of „everyday life‟ (Weber in Hennis 
2000: 14).  Hennis‟s  work  makes  this  point  clearer  by  comparing  the  PE  with 
another study of modern capitalism by one of Weber‟s contemporaries, Werner 
Sombart.  Sombart‟s  famous  study,  Modern  Capitalism  (1902),  had  already 
established the influence of Protestantism as a historical force in the genesis of the 
modern  Western  capitalistic  order.  Weber  was  not  concerned  with  replicating 
Sombart‟s study by focusing on Protestantism and its historical causation of the 
rise of capitalism, as an economic phenomenon in the macro sense but, rather, 
with  „“the  development  of  that  human  type…  which  was  created  by  the 
conjunction of religious and economic components”‟ (Weber in Hennis 2000: 20). 
 
The „conjunction of religious and economic components‟ is perhaps the key for 
Hennis‟s reading of Weber‟s work. The components Weber had in mind were, 
Hennis argues, „life orders‟; they were essentially different socio-economic modes 
of organising and influencing  conduct (Hennis 2000: 65). The aim of Weber‟s 
sociology was not to study these phenomena as a subject in their own right – these 
were the orders that figures such as Sombart had already studied. The aim, rather,  
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was to study  these life orders as they conflicted with one another in historical 
developments, such as the decline of Protestantism and rise of capitalism, insofar 
as  this  conflict  produced  a  particular  type  of  life-conduct  and  „personality‟ 
(Hennis 2000: 99). 
 
The  development  of  Weber‟s  central  theme  –  the  clash  of  life  orders  and  the 
shaping  of  personality  –  is,  according  to  Hennis,  best  understood  within  the 
conjunction  of  German  academic  traditions  during  the  nineteenth  century;  the 
decline of political thought on the one hand and the emergence of alternatives on 
the other hand (Hennis 2000: 107). The emergence of an alternative to political 
thought is not, however, the emergence of a theory of society. It is the emergence 
of  „cosmopolitical‟  thought  (Hennis  2000:  117).  The  discipline  that  Weber 
became involved with – the political economy of the historical school – developed 
particular objections to the cosmopolitanism of Adam Smith and David Ricardo 
for its a-historical application of general laws and concepts, and its ignorance of 
the  historical  peculiarities  of  time  and  context  (Hennis  2000:  118).  Weber 
provided  a  methodological  solution  to  this  clash  between  political  and 
cosmopolitical  economics  through  his  use  of  ideal  types,  which  he  said 
incorporate – a  „mathematical ideal  model‟ as a  means  of conceptualising life 
orders  for  the  purpose  of  understanding  their  effect  on  the  human  condition 
(Hennis 2000: 121). Ultimately, it was not Weber‟s intention to develop a science 
of cosmopolitical society or a theory of society but rather it was his intention to 
use these concepts as aids to his political economy, which served the purpose of  
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clarifying the  particular  problems  of his day  – problems  that  centred upon  the 
„personality‟ of modern man and his „life-conduct‟.  
 
In portraying Weber as a political economist concerned with the influence of life 
orders on personality and conduct, Hennis works hard with the theme developed 
by Mommsen – the influence of ideas on economic conduct – to reveal its method 
and  methodological  context.    However,  where  Mommsen  has  concluded  that 
power in the work of Weber was an economic-individual phenomenon, Hennis 
stops  short  of  making  any  such  conclusions,  instead  limiting  himself  to 
connections between Weber‟s project of personality and its role as a clarifier of 
problems contemporary to Weber. 
  
Unlike the theoretical readings, the contextual readings are multisided. They have 
replaced  the  theories  of  modern  society  with  political  agendas  and  economic 
characterisations of personality and life-conduct. In doing so, they have provided 
a  clarification  of  the  meaning  of  Weber‟s  concepts  and  their  hierarchical 
framework.  For  instance,  power  in  an  economic  sense  seems  to  be  a  central 
theme, according to Mommsen, which may offer us a better appreciation of the 
role  of  Herrschaft  in  Weber‟s  sociological  work.  If  we  follow  Mommsen‟s 
advice, we might start to read Weber‟s concept of domination in economic rather 
than  social terms. This at least  brings us  one  step  closer to  Weber‟s  political-
economic  reasoning.  Further,  following  Hennis,  if  we  appreciate  that 
cosmopolitical theory is a sham for Weber then we might also begin to understand  
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the importance of life-orders – those social and economic ideas that shape life-
conduct – as opposed to social structures. There is a common element, then, to 
both the theoretical and contextual readings, which is the role of ideas rather than 
social  structures  in  the  shaping  of  action  and  life-conduct,  but  the  contextual 
readings prevail in the sense that they offer more historically accurate disciplinary 
reconstructions  of  Weber‟s  work  and  resist  temptations  to  formulate  Weber‟s 
pragmatic  concepts into a theory  of  modern  society. Nevertheless, they  do  not 
work hard enough to deliver an appreciation of Weber‟s political logic in its own 
right for they either stress the economic role of power (as does Mommsen) or, in 
making  Weber  relevant  to  the  individual,  focus  on  the  role  of  science  in 
illuminating the problems peculiar to modern man (as does Hennis). 
 
The next section outlines the third alternative offered by what this thesis calls the 
emancipative  readings,  which  define  Weber‟s  work  according  to  its  supposed 
emancipative aims. Like the contextual readings, these works are also forced to 
contend with the legacy of theory and in many instances they exploit this legacy 
to  emphasise  the  social  aspects  of  Weber‟s  solution  to  the  problem  of 
rationalisation. 
 
The emancipative uses of Weber 
 
The  first  emancipative  reading  introduced  in  this  section  is  that  of  Between 
Literature and Science: the Rise of Sociology (1988) by Wolf Lepenies, which 
was first published in German in 1985. Through a wide-ranging interpretation of  
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intellectual  history  and  context,  Lepenies  emphasises  Weber‟s  relation  to  the 
philosophers,  sociologists,  poets  and  writers  of  his  time,  to  conclude  that 
sociology for Weber was nothing more than a pedagogy of modern life, protecting 
the  intuitive  and  aesthetic  psyche  of  modern  man  against  natural-science‟s 
rationalisation of life-conduct. The second emancipative reading discussed in this 
section is Harvey Goldman‟s Politics, Death and the Devil: Self and Power in 
Max  Weber and Thomas Mann (1992). In this  work, Goldman  emphasises the 
affinities between Weber and the German tradition of Bildung or self-cultivation, 
particularly as it  manifested  in the  work of Thomas  Mann and his  struggle to 
come  to  terms  with  an  aesthetic  for  politics.  The  third  emancipative  reading 
summarised  in  this  section  is  Sung  Ho  Kim‟s  Max  Weber’s  Politics  of  Civil 
Society (2004). Kim emphasises the emancipative-pedagogical aspects of Weber‟s 
comparative  studies  of  voluntary  associational  life,  particularly  the  studies  of 
North American church sects and their divergence from German religious life and 
its  implication  for  the  conduct  of  social  and  political  life.  This  section  also 
discusses the theme  of individual autonomy as  it  has  emerged  in a  number of 
articles,  most  of  which  have  been  published  in  Sam  Whimster  and  David 
Chalcraft‟s journal, Max Weber Studies (see Jenkins 2000; Nafissi 2000; Palonen 
1999 and 2004, and; Schroeder 2001). 
 
For  Lepenies,  the  history  of  sociology  in  Germany  is  analogous  to  the 
industrialisation of German society and economy (Lepenies 1988: 234). The late 
shift  from  agrarian  to  industrial  society  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century  was  
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accompanied by a fierce competition between early market players and, similarly, 
the general intellectual history was marked by a competition between history and 
sociology  to  provide  a  much  needed  „science  of  society‟.  Figures  such  as 
Treitschke perceived „a drifting apart of state and society‟ (Lepenies 1988: 235). 
Sociology,  however,  did  not  hold  much  appeal  for  the  Germans.  Its  „Anglo-
French‟ roots meant that it tended to treat society from a bourgeois perspective 
and therefore  had little to  offer  them  by  way  of insight into the  peculiar new 
German problems of state and society. The downfall of Western social science, 
according to Dilthey, was its premature attempts at theoretical generalisation. In 
their hastiness to create a systematic science of society, Auguste Comte and John 
Stuart Mill  overstepped  the  mark,  which resulted in  nothing  but „metaphysical 
mist‟  (Lepenies  1988:  236).  This  formal  theory  worked  well  in  England  and 
France where bureaucratic administrators were substituted for political rulers and 
society  was  gradually  subsuming  the  state.  In  Germany,  however,  religious 
organisations  began  to  provide  solutions  to  the  problems  of  state  and  society 
where science could find none, and the threat of another Thirty Years War loomed 
large (Lepenies 1988: 237). Another German criticism of sociology, coming from 
Nietzsche, was that the very idea of revealing the social was itself a sign of decay 
and, further, that sociology was nothing but a product of the „herd-instincts‟ of the 
bourgeoisie;  „an  obstruction  to  culture‟  (Lepenies  1988:  238).  In  many  ways, 
Georg Simmel used his sociology to reflect these German political and intellectual 
problems. He claimed sociology to be concerned with neither the individual nor 
„monolithic structures‟ such as the state but rather to be concerned with the effects  
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of interaction between individuals and, further, that sociology was not concerned 
with society as an object but rather with society as an ongoing process constituted 
by the effects of interaction (Lepenies 1988: 239-40). 
 
According to Lepenies, Weber was not so much concerned with the separation of 
state and  society as  he  was  with „the reverse and debit  side of the process  of 
civilization‟ (Lepenies 1988: 244). It was not that society was encroaching on the 
state but more that science and technology – the harbingers of industrialisation – 
had instigated the irreversible process  of „rationalization and bureaucratization‟ 
that  would inevitably  encroach on the ascetic  elements  of life (Lepenies 1988: 
245). Like Simmel, who mirrored the contradictions of the social process through 
disjointed and fragmentary prose in his Philosophy of Money, Weber parodied the 
inner tension of science – the conflict between objectivity and values – in the rigid 
prose of his scientific works (Lepenies 1988: 246). In Lepenies‟s eyes, sociology 
was,  for Weber, a means of protecting the aesthetic  spheres of life against the 
encroaching scientific worldview and its rationalisation of everything (1988: 247). 
In this sense, it was positioned somewhere „between literature and science‟, as the 
title of Lepenies work implies, instructing modern individuals on how to conduct 
their lives in an increasingly disenchanted, rationalised world. 
 
Lepenies‟s  work  provides  compelling  evidence  for  reading  Weber  as  an 
emancipative  thinker,  but  it  repeats  the  sometimes-deliberate  mistakes  of  the 
theoretical readings by neglecting the political debates that provide the context of  
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Weber‟s sociological analysis of rationalisation and its effect on power. Where it 
does consider the political concepts in Weber‟s work, such as charisma, it restricts 
its contextual analysis to literary figures such as the poet Stefan George (1868-
1933) and therefore circumnavigates the contexts of debates about constitutional 
theory, democracy and plebiscitary leadership highlighted by Mommsen (1984). 
Once  again,  we  are  left  with  another  vague  reading  of  Weber,  this  time  as 
sociological protector of asceticism as a way of life. 
 
In the „Preface‟ to Politics, Death and the Devil: Self and Power in Max Weber 
and Thomas Mann (1992), Goldman states his central thesis on Weber and Mann. 
He  states  that  they  shared  a  primary  interest  in  „the  issues  of  “calling”  and 
“personality”‟, and they  „sought an antidote to  personal and  cultural  weakness 
through practices for generating strength, mastery, and power‟ (Goldman 1992: 
ix).  Their  concern  with  strengthening  the  personality  of  the  individual  was, 
according to Goldman, in part a reflection of the Nietzschean will to power and 
also with the century old German tradition of „Bildung, or self-cultivation through 
scholarship‟ (Goldman 1992: 1-3). Bildung developed during the late eighteenth 
century as an inner-ascetic – an inward cultivation of the self and retreat from the 
world – but both Weber and Mann saw the tradition of Bildung as having failed in 
its attempt to create meaning for the individual because of its inability to cope 
with  the  increasing  demands  of  the  technological  economy  of  capitalism 
(Goldman 1992: 4, 25-27). Weber was particularly wary of Bildung because of its 
likeness  to  the  ideals  of  Pietism,  which  prevented  the  bourgeoisie  from  
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developing the  capacity  for leadership.  Mann,  on the  other  hand,  was initially 
supportive of the tradition, but after World War I he began to perceive the need 
for a more active involvement in politics. 
 
Bildung  is  central  to  Goldman‟s  reading  of  the  oeuvres  of  Weber  and  Mann. 
Wilhelm von Humboldt, one of the leading exponents of early Bildung in the late 
eighteenth  to  early  nineteenth  century,  promoted  the  reform  of  university 
education to provide two types of knowledge and training: the traditional, pre-
Bildung form of technical and  professional  training, and the new  formation of 
personality  –  the  complete  ethical  perfection  required  for  „self-becoming‟ 
(Goldman 1992: 25-27). Whilst Kant saw Bildung as ethical perfection according 
to universal „moral laws‟, Humboldt saw it as ethical perfection according to the 
individual‟s  inner  sense  of  personality  (Goldman  1992:  27-29).  The  sense  of 
personality that Humboldt speaks of is separate from the social or moral world 
and can only be perfected through complete inward reflection on the self. There 
was,  however,  a  social  and  political  context  and  consequence  to  Humboldt‟s 
Bildung. He was mindful of the weakening influence that increasing educational 
and  vocational „specialization‟ had  on  culture and  personality  (Goldman 1992: 
29). He believed that the individual who could develop personality through self-
mastery  would  influence  other  individuals,  not  through  any  intentionality  but 
through leading by example.  
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Towards  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  the  ideas  of  Bildung  engendered  a 
significant change in the culture of class identity, as the merits of an individual 
were no longer judged by class, that is, by aristocratic status, but were becoming 
more frequently assessed according to „intellectual and artistic efforts and creative 
attainments‟  (Goldman  1992:  30-31).  The  ongoing  debate  within  Bildung, 
between Humboldt,  Kant, Goethe and the Romantics, revolved to  some  degree 
around the positions maintained by Humboldt and Kant. Goethe, for instance, was 
ambivalent  about  the  possibility  of  attaining  community  benefit  from  the 
perfection  of  individual  personality,  whilst  the  Romantics,  „Schlegel  and 
Schleiermacher‟  promoted  total  individualism  in  opposition  to  the 
Enlightenment‟s  moral  laws  (Goldman,  1992:  33).  The  influence  of  Bildung 
began to wane during the middle of the nineteenth century as a result of the failed 
bourgeois  revolution  of  1848  and  the  establishment  of  the  German  Empire  in 
1871 (Goldman 1992: 36, 40). The establishment of the Empire coincided with 
the development of the „völkisch movement‟, which sought to meld nationalism 
with the self-mastery of personality as a means of promoting the ideal of the state 
(Hinton Thomas in Goldman 1992: 36).  
 
In Goldman‟s view, the general position of Weber on Bildung revolved around his 
typology  of  education.  The  goal  of  the  first  type  of  education  is  to  shape  the 
opinions  of  individuals  to  support  and  promote  particular  „political,  ethical, 
artistic,  cultural  or  other  conviction[s]‟  and  the  goal  of  the  second  type  is  to 
provide specialised training for specialised vocations (Weber in Goldman, 1992:  
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53). Weber‟s preference, according to Goldman, was towards the second type of 
specialised  training  because  this  type  provided  little  room  for  influencing 
students‟ worldviews. Seen in terms of the history of Bildung, Weber‟s famous 
postulate of value freedom is an attempt to preserve or empower the individual‟s 
capacity for self-mastery against the rationalisation of modern science. In Weber‟s 
view, the increasing rationalisation of the world meant that man could no longer 
believe in one God or in ethical standards for a particular process of unification. 
For  Weber, the explanation  of the  world in  scientific terms  makes  the  idea  of 
metaphysics and of religious belief impossible. So, without these principles and 
beliefs, the only place man could gain enough power to master the rationalised 
world was from within (Goldman, 1992: 54). 
 
Goldman works very hard indeed to both reveal Weber‟s so-called „antidote to 
personal and cultural weakness through practices for generating strength, mastery, 
and power‟ and to remove the economic, social and political aspects to Weber‟s 
analysis  of  power.  What  we  are  left  with  is  a  purely  individualistic  notion  of 
power  in  the  work  of  Weber  and  an  impression  that  Weber  was,  after  all,  a 
philosopher in the existential sense.  
 
Following the general emancipative theme, Kim draws heavily on Weber's essay 
“Churches”  and  “Sects”  in  North  America  (1985)  to  construct  a  liberal-
democratic  reading  of  the  ethics  of  conviction  and  responsibility.    The  essay, 
according to Kim, outlines the sociological contrast between the separations of  
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church and state in Germany on the one hand and in North America on the other 
(Kim  2004:  70-72).    In  early  modern  Germany,  Pufendorf,  following  Hobbes, 
promoted the separation of church and state as a solution to the „national crises‟ of 
the Thirty Years War.  The Thirty Years War produced some of the worst pre-
state  violence  in  the  name  of  religious  confessions  that  Europe  had  ever 
witnessed. This violence in the name of religion left the German people with a 
deep  suspicion  towards  the  ability  of  religious  groups  to  promote  social 
integration,  and  it  is  in  this  light  that  the  „absolutist  vision‟  of  Hobbes  and 
Pufendorf  was  considered.  Their  absolutism  ushered  in  a  type  of  German 
Lutheranism,  which  promoted  complete  subservience  to the  state  through total 
ethical  indifference  to  politics.  During  Weber‟s  time,  the  Kulturkampf  –  the 
struggle  for  the  return  to  a  religious  state  –  re-awoke  this  deep-felt  suspicion 
among the German people.  In North America, however, the „Calvinist doctrine 
and Puritan sects gave birth to the modern doctrine of separation of church and 
state‟, providing a „Janus-like face‟ of „apathy‟ towards „mundane politics‟ on the 
one hand, and, on the other, „fanatic zeal‟ during „crucial moments‟ when political 
challenges were presented to the basic human right of „freedom of consciousness‟ 
(Kim  2004:  72).    In  terms  of  rules  for  the  conduct  of  life,  the  Puritan  sects 
continued to exert influence over the ethics of the American people, despite the 
separation of  church and  state, because the voluntary  nature  of its associations 
was in no way compromised; „Puritan sectarianism‟ was not „suspected as being a 
disintegrating force‟ (Kim 2004: 74).  On the contrary, as sect-like associations 
developed outside the church, such as business associations, the main criteria used  
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by these associations to judge an individual was his „ethical quality‟, determined 
by his „religious affiliation‟ (Kim 2004: 75).   
 
Kim draws a number of conclusions from Weber‟s comparative sociology.  First, 
he argues that for Weber the sect-like ethic of life-conduct was the „cornerstone of 
sociability‟  in  North  America  that  preserved  the  individual‟s  freedom  of 
conscience and therefore liberal democracy itself.  Turning to Weber‟s Politics as 
a  Vocation  essay,  Kim  suggests  that  it  presented  the  combined  ethics  of 
conviction and responsibility as a solution to the general modern problem of the 
conflict between value pluralism and the iron cage of bureaucracy; the two ethics, 
according  to  Kim,  produced  a  “total  personality”  that  had  the  ability  to 
„(re)empower  our  agency‟  –  our  freedom  of  conscience  –  in  the  face  of  the 
increasing rationalisation and calculability of the  modern western world (2004: 
176-8). From this assessment, Kim concludes that Weber‟s ethics of conviction 
and  responsibility  promoted  the  North  American  voluntary  types  of  sect-like 
association as universal „soulcraft‟ for modern times (Kim 2004: 189). 
 
Whilst Kim‟s reading of Weber‟s comparative historical-sociological analysis of 
churches and sects in North-America and Germany may be accurate, his use of 
Weber‟s Politics as a Vocation to inject an ideological element into the essays on 
churches and sects is not consistent with Weber‟s intentions for the essay. In a 
different  reading,  Lawrence  Scaff  argues  that  Weber  presented  Politics  as  a  
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Vocation to educate politicians in the art of responsible leadership (Scaff 1973). 
Chapter one (of this thesis) expands on this argument. 
 
The promotion of individual autonomy is also a recurring theme in a number of 
recent  articles,  most  of  which  were  published  in  Sam  Whimster  and  David 
Chalcraft‟s  journal,  Max  Weber  Studies.  In  Disenchantment,  Enchantment  and 
Re-Enchantment: Max Weber at the Millennium (2000), Richard Jenkins stresses 
that  „When  Max  Weber  borrowed  the  expression  “the  disenchantment  of  the 
world” from Schiller, he was offering a sociological – perhaps even an ethical or 
moral – provocation‟ to preserve the „expressive dimensions of human social life‟ 
(Jenkins 2000: 11-13). In On the Foundations of Athenian Democracy: Marx’s 
Paradox and Weber’s Solution (2000), Mohammad Nafissi stresses that Weber‟s 
ideal interest referred „to individual autonomy and creativity which he feared was 
caged  by  bureaucratic  rationalization‟  (Nafissi  2000:  57).  Nafissi  argues  that 
Weber  studied  ancient  civilisations  to  learn  something  about  maintaining 
individual autonomy in the face of increasing bureaucratisation: „What sustained 
Weber‟s  interest  in  the  ancient  world  was  the  contrasting  roles  and  fates  of 
bureaucratic  kingdoms  and  the  non-bureaucratic  city-states  in  ancient 
developments and the evidence they provided for advancing the struggle against 
the rising tide of statism and socialism‟ (Nafissi 2000: 57).  
 
In Max Weber’s Reconceptualisation of Freedom (1999), Kari Palonen argues that 
Weber  was  a  promoter  of  a  „modern  concept  of  liberty‟  (Palonen  1999:523).  
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Instead of opposing individual freedom and politics, Weber upheld an intimate 
relationship  between  them.  Weber‟s  analysis  of  the  „operative  of  contingency‟ 
was, Palonen stresses, an analysis of chance and freedom (Palonen 1999: 524). 
Like Goldman (see above), Palonen equates Weber‟s analysis of contingency and 
individual  choices  with  the  contingency  and  exceptional  choices  of  political 
action:  „For  Weber,  the  chances  of  individual  life  and  the  control  of  these 
chances… refers… to the  political  character  of…  individual  choices‟ (Palonen 
1999:  525).  In  Max  Weber,  Parliamentarianism  and  the  Rhetorical  Culture  of 
Politics (published in Max Weber Studies, 2004), Palonen pursues the theme of 
individual  freedom  in  Weber‟s  arguments  for  parliamentarism,  arguing  that 
Weber idealised the parliamentary process of arguing „for and against‟ as a model 
for  pursuing  individual  meaning  in  both  political  and  scientific  endeavours 
(Palonen 2004: 274-80).  
 
The  last  of  the  emancipative  readings  considered  in  this  chapter  is  Ralph 
Schroeder‟s  Weber,  Pynchon  and  the  American  Prospect  (2001).  Schroeder 
argues that American democracy, for Weber, provided a political solution to the 
social  problem  of  the  „atomization‟  of  individuals  because  „American  “civil 
society” ordered political interests by means of its associationalism‟ (Schroeder 
2001:  165).  This  argument  alone  is  not  problematic  for  those  wishing  to 
understand Weber‟s unique ideas about the political sphere of life, but Schroeder 
has  also  suggested  that  there  was  a  „more  general  problem  in  Weber‟s  social 
thought‟ – the problem of „“personality” or how to preserve “individuality” in‟ an  
  109 
„ossifying modern culture‟. This problem, Schroeder states, was one „for which 
Weber  sought  to  enhance  the  role  of  charisma  and  inner  distance‟.  Thus, 
following the  other  emancipative uses,  Schroeder  portrays Weber‟s  concept  of 
charisma as providing a political solution to the social problem of how to preserve 
individuality in modernity. But this reading does not fit with Weber‟s own ideal 
interests for the concept of charisma. As Baehr argues, in his sociology Weber 
used the  political ideas  of Caesarism as a „sub-type‟ of his „master concept of 
charisma‟ (Baehr 2008: 90). In Weber‟s  sociology,  charisma could  function as 
both a tool of political power and as a tool of social order. But, as Baehr suggests, 
Weber‟s own ideal interests for using charisma were always political and, where 
he did speak of the social role of charisma – in discussions of prophets and sages 
–  he  always  did  so  in  terms  of  ancient  cultures  and  not  in  terms  of  present 
ideologies (Baehr 2008: 89-94). 
 
These  emancipative  readings  all  share  a  degree  of  consent  that  individual 
autonomy was one of Weber‟s central interests. But these readings tend to draw 
upon an  inadequate understanding of Weber‟s political thought; these readings 
tend to use Weber‟s economic and sociological logic, sometimes twisted into a 
social theory, to explain the logic of his political thought. Sometimes, as is the 
case  with  Goldman  (1992),  the  political  work  of  Weber  is  purified  of  all 
economic,  social  and  political  elements  until  it  is  simply  an  existentialist 
philosophy masquerading as an education reform policy. 
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Summary 
 
This chapter has categorised some uses of Weber. This categorisation is by no 
means exhaustive. It serves the purpose, however, of providing a basic typology 
through  which  the  Weber  scholarship  can  be  understood.  Of  course  other 
categories  might  have been  employed,  such as  the  category  of  methodological 
readings,  but  these  readings  are  found  in  such  plentiful  supply  within  the 
theoretical,  contextual  and  emancipative  categories  that  any  consideration  of  a 
category on this basis alone seems ambiguous. In any event, as mentioned above, 
Eliaeson has already completed sufficient work in this area. 
 
This  chapter  has  argued  that  the  contextual  readings  provide  much  needed 
corrections  to  oversights  within  the  theoretical  uses,  but,  for  all  their 
improvements,  the  contextual  readings,  through  sometimes  overzealous 
application  of  the  contextual  method,  force  themselves  down  paths  that  allow 
subsequent authors, with vested interests, to use Weber for ideological purposes. 
This  argument  contains  three  main  thrusts:  firstly,  the  theoretical  uses  portray 
Weber as a social theorist and thus neglect important nuanced arguments within 
his political writings. A prime example of this is Talcott Parsons‟s theoretical use 
of Weber. Parsons argues that Weber‟s early-career interest in empirical research 
eventually gave way to a theoretical interest in the modern economic order, its 
social-structural  ordering  and  its  influence  on  human  behaviour.  Parsons, 
unfortunately, des not account for the role of politics in Weber‟s later scientific 
writings and thus is forced to reconstruct Weber‟s structural hierarchy from the  
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pieces of social theorising that he could find in Weber‟s conceptual-sociological 
work.  Secondly,  the  contextual  uses  of  Weber  set  a  precedent  for  Weber 
scholarship. They promote the contextual method of reading Weber‟s arguments, 
concepts,  idioms  and  quotes  in  relation  to  particular  debates  and  political 
developments  that  Weber  was  involved  in.  For  example,  Wilhelm  Hennis 
masterfully  situates  Weber‟s  work  within  contemporary  scholarly  disputes  to 
highlight Weber‟s concern with the influence of spheres of life on the life-conduct 
of individuals.  By setting this precedent, Hennis, and others, do much to prevent 
Weber-scholars  from  masking  their  own  interests  behind  new  readings  of  the 
work of Weber. Hennis, for instance, stops short of drawing conclusions about 
Weber‟s vision for an ideal, liberal democratic Germany. Thirdly, this chapter has 
argued that whilst the contextual method is now standard in Weber scholarship, 
the readings it provides have led to debates about specific concepts and arguments 
that  have,  at  times,  masked  the  ideal  interests  of  participating  authors.  For 
instance,  Kari  Palonen  pursues  the  theme  of  voluntarism  and  the  pluralism  of 
different  spheres  of  life  in  the  work  of  Weber,  concluding  that  Weber  was 
ultimately concerned with maintaining individual liberty and the freedom to act 
meaningfully.  In  doing  so,  Palonen  nudges  the  theme  of  spheres  of  life  and 
individual  life-conduct  in  the  work  of  Weber  –  a  theme  developed  in  the 
contextual readings – one step further, forming it into the main ideological pursuit 
of Weber‟s political writings. 
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This  chapter  concludes  that  none  of  these  readings  bring  us  any  closer  to  an 
adequate understanding of  Weber‟s  concepts  of the  political  sphere  of life and 
political life-conduct. This is largely due to the legacy of the theoretical uses of 
Weber. These uses  bequeath Weber  scholarship the  eternal  struggle  to emerge 
from social theory and form a non-social understanding of Weber‟s political logic. 
Until  Weber  scholars  rid  themselves  of  the  theoretical-individualist  Weber 
portrayed by the theoretical uses – a job that perhaps only Hennis has contributed 
to,  albeit  marginally  –  then  Weber‟s  political  logic  may  remain  the  topic  of 
endless debate and provide for endless appropriations depending on the flavour of 
the moment.  
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Chapter  4:  Max  Weber  and  the  ‘Social  Question’:  the 
social as a sphere of scholarly enquiry and its limitations 
as a source of political authority 
 
The  establishment  of  the  Second  Reich  in  1871  marked  the  development  of 
significant  nation-wide  economic  and  political  changes  in  Germany,  including 
„the  triumph  of  the  constitutional  nation-state‟  (Mommsen  1995:  58);  the 
immigration of large numbers of Polish agricultural workers (Tribe 1989: 92-93); 
a period of rapid industrialisation during the 1880s (Mommsen 1995: 57); and 
some major periods of economic downturn during the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s 
(Lestition  2000:  289).  In  academic  debates,  especially  within  the  discipline  of 
political economy, these developments became increasingly expressed in terms of 
„social problems‟ (Holborn 1969: 289). The Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association 
for  Social  Policy),  established  in  1872,  became  the  leading  forum  for  the 
discussion and political lobbying of social issues (Demm 1987: 88). „The social 
question‟ became the bastion of the working classes and scholarly interests moved 
towards  the  role  of  social  legislation,  social  welfare  and  social  policy,  in 
ameliorating  the  poor  living  standards  of  agricultural  and  industrial  workers 
(Krüger 1987: 71; Demm 1987: 88). Max Weber contributed to these public and 
academic  debates  on  social  problems  through  a  number  of  scholarly  writings, 
including:  the  published  section  of  his  dissertation  on  commercial  law  and 
medieval trading companies; his survey of rural labourers; his study of stock and 
commodity exchanges; his writings on religious and economic ethics; his writings 
on  churches  and  sects;  and  his  two-part  speech  at  the  German  Sociological  
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Society (GSS). He also contributed to the promotion of the ongoing relevance of 
the  social  question  when  he  established  the  Archiv  für  Sozialwissenschaft  und 
Sozialpolitk  (Archive  of  Social  Science  and  Social  Policy)  with  Edgar  Jaffé 
(1866-1921) and Werner Sombart (1863-1941) in 1904 (Factor 1988: 1-9). 
 
It  is  not  difficult  to  determine  a  general  standpoint  on  the  social  question  for 
contemporaries of Weber. Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936) and Otto von Gierke 
(1841-1921) perceived the social question as the emergence of, or battle for, new 
sources  of  political  authority.  Tönnies,  for  instance,  argued  that  during  the 
nineteenth century the era of traditional patriarchal life had transformed into that 
of capitalist association, which would, in the future, progress into a more ideal 
period  of  community  (Krüger  1987:  76).  Similarly,  through  a  history  of  legal 
conceptions of  societies and associations, Gierke argued that  states and private 
associations must become equal in the eyes of the law to reflect the natural status 
of the German  people (Runciman 1997: 47). These  two  scholars  were  explicit 
about their theoretical ideology and they argued that giving greater political and 
legal authority to communities and associations would solve many of the social 
issues. Weber, by contrast, was reluctant to discuss his standpoint. This creates 
difficulties for those who wish to understand his portrayal of the social as a topic 
of  scholarly  enquiry,  which  further  creates  difficulties  for  those  wanting  to 
understand his solution to the problem of political authority – just one of the many 
problems raised by the social question. The more theoretical readings that have 
emphasised  Weber‟s individualist method  of  studying social action, and drawn  
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connections between this method and his political views, have tended to portray 
Weber as a  progressive liberal; these readings  have  suggested  that the  modern 
state  was,  for Weber,  subservient to  society (see  for instance, Gerth and Mills 
1948:  18,  33,  40;  Shils  1987:  549).  On  the  other  hand,  the  more  contextual 
readings have tended to suggest that society was, for Weber, always subservient 
to national politics (see Mommsen 1984: 63-63; Hennis 2000: 206-207).  
 
Through a contextual summary of Weber‟s writings that contribute to the „social 
question‟, this chapter aims to provide a better appreciation of Weber‟s portrayal 
of the social as a topic of scholarly enquiry. This chapter argues that Weber saw 
the social question as a discussion of the limitations of society. Weber stressed 
these limitations in a number of ways: first, he limited his own concept of the 
social to set himself apart from contemporary academics; second, he was always 
particular to limit his analysis of the social to specific intentions, ideal interests or 
moral ideas; third, he restricted the concept of, and the real possibilities for, civil 
society  –  a  democratic  society  united  by  the  general  will  of  the  people  and 
governed by a state that was subordinate to the general will – to North America 
and  England.  Both  civil  society  and  liberal-democracy  were  alien  to  Weber‟s 
analysis of the social in Germany; and fourth, Weber‟s initial limitation of the 
social re-emerged in his later proposal to study the press. In this proposal, Weber 
argued that there were certain ideal interests controlling the newspaper media in 
Germany  and  these  interests  were  promoting  certain  ideas  about  society  and 
influencing  public  opinion.  It  was,  according  to  Weber,  the  duty  of  social  
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scientists to reveal these interests and expose the manner in which they exercised 
this influence because their ability to influence public opinion had consequences 
for political authority. By acknowledging  Weber‟s intentional delimitation, and 
his exclusion of any possibilities of civil society and substantive democracy in 
Germany, and his proposal to reveal the particular interests behind public opinion, 
we  can  begin  to  acknowledge  the  unique  logic  of  the  political  in  Weber‟s 
arguments about political authority. 
  
Studying the social using legal and economic concepts 
 
Very much in line with the contextual readings of Weber – outlined in chapter 
three of this thesis – Martin Riesebrodt‟s From Patriarchalism to Capitalism: The 
Theoretical Context of Max Weber’s Agrarian Studies (1892-93) (1989) points 
out the dangers of pursuing a central theme in the work of Weber (Riesebrodt 
1989: 134). Riesebrodt states that the reduction of Weber‟s work to one theme has 
proven problematic when particular works were seen to deviate from that theme; 
that is, works that have been seen as problematic have also often been forced to fit 
so-called central themes. As an alternative to these readings, Riesebrodt proposes 
that we identify the scholarly debates of Weber‟s contemporaries and focus on the 
individual textual level for our interpretation of Weber‟s reformulation and usage 
of the methods, concepts and historical understandings of those debates. In this 
respect, each text could then be situated within a particular debate. 
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It is, then, no surprise to find that in line with Riesebrodt‟s argument for thematic 
restriction to the individual textual level, the concepts and historical developments 
Weber used in his survey of rural labourers east of the Elbe from 1894 differed 
significantly from the concepts and theories he employed in his outlines of the 
stock and commodity exchanges from 1894 and 1896. For instance, in the study 
of  rural  labour  Weber  used  „seigneurial  structure  (Herrschaftsstruktur)‟, 
„patriarchally organized cooperative (Gennosenschaft)‟ and „the struggle between 
landed capital and labour‟ to delineate the shift from patriarchalism to capitalism 
(in Riesebrodt, 1989: 136, 139), whereas, in the study of stock exchanges, he used 
the  concepts  of  „Gemeinschaft‟  (community),    „alten  Gemeinschaften‟  (old 
communities)  and  „Austauschgemeinschaft‟  (community  of  exchange)  to 
conceptualise the shift from household to commercial economies (Weber 1924a: 
261-262). It is difficult to find fault with Riesebrodt‟s argument when talking at 
the specific conceptual level about ideal types such as seigneurial rule. For this 
reason there is perhaps no need to go beyond Weber‟s contemporary context. But 
if we want to understand Weber‟s use of more abstract concepts, such as society 
and his portrayal of the social, Riesebrodt‟s approach has its limitations. 
 
The  translator  of  Weber‟s  Stock  and  Commodity  Exchanges  (2000),  Steven 
Lestition, offers an introduction to the political and social context of the works. 
Lestition points to various debates between agrarian and capitalist interest groups 
about the social effects of Germany‟s rapid industrialisation and entrance into the 
world  economy.  During  the  period  1873-1879,  following  an  initial  economic  
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boom, Germany suffered a major economic downturn (Lestition 2000: 289). After 
two  more  major  slumps  –  1882-86  and  1890-94  –  conservative  and  socialist 
voices  began  pointing  the  finger  at  Bismarck,  the  stock  and  commodity 
exchanges,  and  the  developing  world  economy.  In  1892,  two  years  after 
Bismarck‟s expulsion, the government commissioned a report into the operation 
of  the  stock  market.  This  report  concluded  with  the  assessment  that  trading 
speculation  was  contributing  to  the  social  problems  of  the  working  classes 
(Lestition  2000:  290).  Subsequently,  between  1893  and  1894,  the  government 
implemented  the  recommendations  of  the  commission  through  legislation  to 
support and compensate agrarian landowners against the economic effects of the 
stock and commodity exchanges (Lestition 2000: 291). Weber was appointed to 
work on the „Exchange Commission‟ in the 1890s, which had the express purpose 
of reporting directly to the Chancellor, but he wrote his two articles on the stock 
and commodity markets for Friedrich Naumann‟s „Worker‟s Library‟, as Lestition 
has  suggested,  to  provide  the  wider  public  with  an  objective  overview  of  the 
exchanges  and  a  balanced  introduction  to  the  contemporary  debate  (Lestition 
2000: 292-95). 
 
In Stock and Commodity Exchanges (2000), Weber begins his analysis with an 
„initial  orientation‟  aimed  at  those  readers  with  little  prior  knowledge  of  the 
markets  (Weber  2000:  305).  He  starts  his  overview  with  a  description  of  two 
major  economic  patterns  within  the  history  of  economic  endeavour:  first,  „the 
economy of the household‟ – the form of social existence from the „earliest ages‟  
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or „the oldest economic community‟; and second, the modern form of economic 
„trade‟ that „seeks to expand to include the totality of all civilized peoples‟ (Weber 
2000: 306-07). The decisive shift occurred, according to Weber, somewhere along 
the  path  of  „historical  development‟  of  the  dissolution  of  the  old  forms  of 
„communities‟ and the emergence of the new forms of „cities‟ (Weber 2000: 307-
08). In the German version, Die Börse (1924a), he uses the terms „Gemeinschaft‟,  
„alten Gemeinschaften‟ and „Austauschgemeinschaft‟ to alternate between these 
two  major  economic  patterns  (Weber  1924a:  261-262).  Although  Lestition 
translates Gemeinschaft as „society‟ (in Weber 2000: 306-307), it seems odd that 
Weber  would  use  a  term  like  Gemeinschaft  to  mean  society  when  he  was 
simultaneously  using  the  term  alten  Gemeinschaft  to  refer  to  primitive  old-
community forms of economic association. This chapter argues that, here, in the 
early stages of his analysis, Weber was careful not to use the term Gesellschaft 
(society), because, given the late industrialisation of Germany and the ongoing 
debates  surrounding  agrarian  protectionism  and  capitalism,  Gesellschaft  was  a 
highly contested word. It could also be that, despite the economic terminological 
suitability,  Weber‟s  preference  for  the  term  „community  of  exchange‟ 
(Austauschgemeinschaft) was a reflection of his legal training. 
 
In 1889, Weber published a section of his legal-historical dissertation entitled The 
History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages (2003) (Kaelber 2003: 1). 
The  dissertation  itself  was  written  under  the  guidance  of  Levin  Goldschmidt 
(1829-1897), the historian and „expert on commercial law‟ (Kaelber 2003: 6-7). In  
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a small passage of the published section, Weber argues that whilst the „family 
household community‟ appeared to be the same as the „community of labour‟ or 
„commercial  company‟,  the  „foundation‟  of  the  family  household  „existed  a 
priori‟, whereas the foundation of the „community of labour‟ had „to be intended 
and created‟ (Weber 2003: 93). With this passage, Weber enunciated for the first 
time a line of thought that occupied his conceptual approach to the social world 
for the rest of his scholarly life; that there was always an intentional (in this case 
positive-legal) foundation to mid and large-scale associations (associations larger 
than  the  family  household  community).  Riesebrodt,  in  restricting  themes  to 
individual texts, is critical of this type of search for trends in the work of Weber 
(Riesebrodt  1989:  133).  However,  the  differentiation  Weber  made  between 
household communities and communities of labour, in the published section of his 
dissertation,  was  strikingly  similar to the  differentiation  he  made  between old-
community and community of exchange in his analysis of stock and commodity 
exchanges. Also, in the studies of rural labour, Weber definitely broadened his 
conceptual lexicon to encapsulate larger-scale economic and social associational 
life. As we shall see, this broadening of conceptualisation was a developmental 
tendency that continued throughout Weber‟s work. 
 
Delineating the social as a moral idea 
 
After  writing  the  dissertation and  studies of rural labour and  stock exchanges, 
which limited the conceptualisation of the  social to intentional  communities of 
exchange, Weber expanded his concept of the social to include society as a moral  
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idea. He used his new concept of society to offer his perspective on the legal-
historical and sociological debate about democratic sources of political authority.  
 
Hennis and Riesebrodt each argue  that  Weber‟s  move away  from  purely legal 
concepts  towards  economic  and  social  concepts  of  forms  of  association  was 
mainly due to the influence of the economists Karl Knies (1821-1898) and Gustav 
Schmoller  (1838-1917)  (Hennis  2000a:  118-19;  Riesebrodt  1989:  143-44). 
According  to  Hennis,  Knies  encouraged  Weber  away  from  the  abstract 
cosmopolitan  theories  of  Smith  and  Ricardo,  which  were  based  upon 
metaphysical  conceptions  of  economies.  In  Riesebrodt‟s  view,  Schmoller 
encouraged Weber to  focus on the „psychical and ethical  motives  for  conduct‟ 
(Riesebrodt 1989: 143). Riesebrodt is adamant that sociology and the sociological 
literature of the time, such as Tönnies‟s Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (originally 
published in 1887), played no part in Weber‟s shift towards economic and social 
concerns (Riesebrodt 1989: 151). 
 
We know  that  Weber  was  well acquainted  with  the  work of Tönnies; the  pair 
shared accommodation during the International Congress of Philosophers in 1908, 
and Tönnies was leader of the German Sociological Society (GSS) from 1909 to 
1933  –  an  institution  partly  founded  by  Weber  (Weber  1988:  393,  420;  Zohn 
1988: 393). The parallels between the work of Tönnies and that of Weber were 
limited  to  their  respective  conceptualisations  of  the  long  term  historical 
development  from  Gemeinschaft  to  Gesellschaft,  or  from  patriarchalism  to  
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capitalism, respectively. Tönnies argued, for example, that „Gemeinschaft is old; 
Gesellschaft is  new as a  name as  well as a  phenomenon‟ (Tönnies 1963: 34). 
Also,  where  Weber  talked  of  a  historical  development  from  patriarchalism  to 
capitalism, and from community of labour to community of exchange, Tönnies 
suggested  a  „development  from  Gemeinschaft  toward  Gesellschaft‟  (Tönnies 
1963:  162).  Beyond  this  superficial  level  there  was  only  one  similarity:  both 
thinkers constructed  concepts as true representations  of reality and as  fictional 
characterisations.  Tönnies,  for  instance,  argued  that  „…the  existence  of  a 
Gesellschaft… is real at a given time. It is something in the process of becoming, 
something which should be perceived here as personality of the general will or the 
general reason, and at the same time (as we know) it is fictitious and nominal‟ 
(Tönnies  1963:  76).  Weber  also  stressed  that  „[g]enetic  ideal-types  have  the 
logical form of objective possibility-adequate cause accounts, and can be assessed 
for their intelligibility and factual adequacy accordingly‟, but at the same time, 
„Genetic ideal-types are also ideal-types stricto sensu – consciously constructed 
idealizations to which nothing may actually correspond‟ (Turner 1986: 200). Both 
thinkers, then, used  concepts to accentuate  particular aspects  of reality  for the 
purpose of historical-sociological scholarship. However, they drew quite different 
conclusions  about  the  meaning  of  their  concepts  and  historical  analyses.  For 
instance, Weber did not share Tönnies‟s democratic enthusiasm that society was 
the  „personality  of  the  general  will  of  the  people‟  (Tönnies  1963:  76;  Krüger 
1987: 76). This is not to  say that  Weber  disagreed  with  moral  conceptions of 
society; Weber, in fact, constructed his own preliminary concept of society as a  
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moral idea, but he did so only in a direct polemical engagement with the legal and 
social theory of Otto von Gierke. 
 
With his essay on „Roscher‟s Historical Method‟, originally published in 1903, 
Weber,  in  characteristically  fierce  mood,  attacked  Gierke  for  suggesting  that 
„society‟  („Gesellschaft‟)  is  a  „superindividual‟  entity  elusive  of  scientific 
explanation (Weber 1924b: 35, n; 1975: 231, n. 83). Weber argued that there is 
nothing  to  prevent  science  from  explaining  the  causal  development  of  society 
because society is, he argued, simply „a moral idea which dominates the desires 
and feelings of men‟ (Weber 1975: 232, n. 83). 
 
In the „Translator‟s Introduction‟ to Gierke‟s Political Theories of the Middle Age 
(1900),  Frederic  W.  Maitland  summarised  Gierke‟s  position  in  the  history  of 
legal, political and social thought. Maitland argued that since Friedrich Savigny 
(1779-1861) and Georg Beseler (1809-1888), there  was a struggle between the 
exponents  of  Roman  and  German  law  to  provide  the  most  adequate  legal 
formulation of the relationship between states and corporations (Maitland 1900: 
xviii).  The  Roman  legislators,  including  Savigny,  sought  to  incorporate  all 
associations into the state so that they were mere extensions or property thereof 
(Maitland 1900: xx-xxi). The exponents of Germanic law, such as Beseler, sought 
to  free „German  fellowships‟ („Genossenschaften‟)  from the jurisdiction  of the 
state (Maitland 1900: xviii). The emergence of the „joint-stock company‟ at the 
time of Savigny and Beseler presented a conundrum for Roman law (Maitland  
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1900: xxi-xxii). The „joint-stock company‟  presented as an anomaly to Roman 
law because  it  defied the  Roman law logic of  defining  private associations as 
individual  personalities  capable  of  being  governed  under  state  law.  Gierke 
weighed in on the debate by favouring the concept of Genossenschaft over that of 
Gesellschaft. Genossenschaft „is  no  fiction, no symbol,  no  piece  of  the  state‟s 
machinery, no collective name for individuals, but a living organism and a real 
person, with body and members and a will of its own‟ (Maitland 1900: xxvi). In 
other  words,  Genossenschaft,  in  Gierke‟s  view,  was  something  susceptible  to 
scientific  explanation,  something  demonstrable,  whereas  society  was  beyond 
explanation. 
 
According to David Runciman, Gierke adopted the Hegelian dialectical approach 
to the history of associations, whereby „models of political thought are seen to 
react upon each other, and these  models not only  shape but are  shaped  by the 
language in which they are expressed‟ (Runciman 1997: 35). In particular, Gierke 
concentrated  on the  struggle  between Romanism and Germanism, and between 
their  respective  „conceptions  of  order‟  (Runciman  1997:  36).  Gierke,  in 
Runciman‟s reading, quite plainly championed Germanist organic conceptions of 
order over Romanist ones. However, according to Runciman, Gierke‟s history of 
political  ideas  must  be  understood  not  only  within  the  context  of  the  struggle 
between Romanism and Germanism, but also within the context of the internal 
struggle of the Germanist models of thought, „Herrschaft and Gennosenschaft‟. 
Gierke‟s argument is best understood in terms of  his basic distinction between  
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two types of „group unity‟: “unity in plurality”, where individuals exist prior to 
the group and are thus creators of the group; and “plurality in unity”, where the 
group exists prior to individuals and is thus creator of its individuals (Runciman 
1997:  37).  A  unity  in  plurality,  in  Gierke‟s  view,  could  not  have  a  real 
„personality‟,  which  is  why  he  favoured  the  plurality  in  unity  of 
Gennosenschaften. 
 
Gierke argued that Roman law, natural law and public law depended upon juristic 
and  mechanical theories of  corporate and individual rights, which limited their 
conceptualisation  of  sovereignty  to  single  individuals  and  rendered  them 
incapable  of  acknowledging  the  sovereignty  of  plurality-in-unity  (Runciman 
1997:  38-39).  Consequently,  these  legal  viewpoints  could  only  formulate  the 
sovereignty of absolute states and were, in Gierke‟s view, deficient in providing 
the legal framework required by modern states, which were built upon plurality in 
unity. 
 
Gierke was also critical of Hobbes and Rousseau, for whilst they acknowledged 
the existence of group personality, they conceived of that personality in such a 
way as to deny its potential plurality (Runciman 1997: 41-43). Both Hobbes and 
Rousseau,  according  to  Gierke,  developed  theories  of  „artificial  personality‟, 
sharing „a mutual antipathy for unregulated group activity‟ (Runciman 1997: 43). 
Publishing  some  thirty  years  before  Hobbes,  Johannes  Althusius  (1557-1638) 
embraced the „Teutonic idea of the freedom of corporate bodies‟ – of unregulated  
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group activity (Gierke in Runciman 1997: 46). In this account, each group, from 
the  family  to  the  state,  was  „the  product  of  a  contractual  arrangement  among 
lesser  associations‟  (Runciman  1997:  44).  By  Althusius‟s  theory,  the  smaller 
associations  produced  the  state  and  were  marked  off  from  it  as  distinct  pre-
existing  entities.  But  Gierke  ultimately  rejected  Althusius‟s  theory,  along  with 
those of Hobbes and Rousseau, for whilst he agreed with the medieval Teutonic 
conception of unregulated fellowships, Gierke stressed that true plurality in unity 
must  develop  from  within  a  source  equal  to  both  the  state  and  fellowships 
(Runciman  1997:  47).  According  to  Runciman,  Gierke‟s  solution  came  in  the 
form of „reciprocity between the personality of the group and the personality of its 
members‟ (Runciman 1997: 52). For this theory, Gierke travelled back in time to 
recall the earliest forms of Germanic fellowships, much like Tönnies who talked 
of the cyclical re-emergence of traditional forms of community superseding the 
inevitable  societies  of  modern  capitalism  (Runciman  1997:  58).  But  where 
Tönnies  envisaged  a  necessary  epoch  of  societies,  Gierke  championed  the 
immediate return to Genossenschaften.  
 
The Romanists and  public law  theorists  only acknowledged the existence  of a 
group entity where a number of individuals were engaged in corporate economic 
action.  In  contrast,  the  organicists  and  Gierke  were  ready  to  acknowledge  the 
existence  of  groups  beyond  the  legal-economic  sphere  and  were  indeed  the 
pedagogues  of a moral philosophy designed to instigate or hasten a process of 
reform to  bring about the  general legal acknowledgement of plurality in unity.  
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Enter Weber, with his sober conceptualisation of society and the state as nothing 
more that a moral idea driving the actions of individuals. At a closer look, Weber 
was critical of Gierke for making mountains out of molehills when it came to the 
conceptualisation of the „essence‟ of large-scale associations like society and the 
state: 
 
Consider the claim that in the domain of the social sciences we 
are in the fortunate position of being able to penetrate the inner 
structure  of  the  “smallest  elements”  that  constitute  society, 
elements  which  must  run  through  every  thread  of  social 
relations…  Gierke  …claims  that  the  essence  of  the  total 
personality of the state is a “mystery.” From the point of view 
of  science,  he  thinks,  it  must  remain  “concealed”…  It  is 
susceptible  to  an  exclusively  metaphysical  interpretation 
(through  “imagination”  and  “belief”,  as  Gierke  puts  it).  The 
fact that Gierke retains the notion of the “supraindividual unity 
of the life” of the community is not surprising. From a heuristic 
point of view, the idea has served him – and also science – very 
well indeed. However, when Gierke is forced to see the content 
of a moral idea or even… the content of patriotic feelings as 
entities in order to give credence to the power and importance 
of these feelings then this is curious indeed… Neither (1) the 
universe  of  norms  which  regulate  a  community,  nor  (2)  the  
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(objectively  viewed)  totality  of  the  relations  between  the 
individual members that are regulated by these norms, nor (3) 
the influences upon  the  conduct (conceived as a  complex  of 
events) of the individuals guided by these norms and relations 
constitute, in Gierke‟s sense, a total essence… However, there 
is nothing at all mysterious about this relation. No mysterious 
essence stands behind that universe of norms and relations, but 
rather a moral idea which dominates the desires and feelings of 
men.  It  is  hard  to  believe  that  an  idealist  like  Gierke  could 
seriously  conceive  the  struggle  for  ideas  as  a  struggle  for 
“empty words” (Weber 1975: 231-32, n. 83). 
 
With  his  criticism  of  Gierke‟s  metaphysical  legal  history,  Weber  argued  that 
society  was  nothing  more  than  a  moral  idea  or  a  feeling  of  patriotism.  But 
Weber‟s criticism of Gierke also betrayed his own idea that despite attempts to 
construct entities or mask moral ideas or feelings of patriotism behind societies 
and  states,  ultimately  sovereignty  must  be  reduced  to  one  individual.  As  Arie 
Brand  has  argued,  Weber  solely  studied  Herrschaft  and  refused  to  study 
Gennosenschaft,  believing  Herrschaft  to  be  the  only  form  of  association  that 
existed  in  reality  (Brand  1982:  96-97).  Attempts  to  suggest  otherwise  and 
transform moral ideas into Gennosenschaften were, after all, furtive attempts to 
mask the interests of Herrschaft associations behind society or the state and lead 
citizens into believing in a false sense of democracy. Ultimately, Weber‟s analysis  
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was more than a polemic with the discipline of legal history, for he wished that 
German science in general would accept the realities of Herrschaft.  
 
Studying  the  social  comparatively:  revealing  the  false  sense  of 
democracy in Germany 
 
In  the  period  1904  to  1906,  Weber  published  a  number  of  works  on  the 
comparative  sociology  of  religion  in  Germany,  America  and  England,  with 
particular reference to Lutheranism, Protestantism and their ethical influence on 
economic life-conduct, economic and associational life, the relationship between 
church and sect, political leadership, the constitutional separation of church and 
state, and constitutional democracy. These  publications include:  The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (originally published in two parts between 1904 
and 1905); and “Churches” and “Sects” in North America: An Ecclesiastical and 
Socio-political Sketch (originally published in 1906). These comparative studies 
reinforced Weber‟s view that society was nothing but a moral idea that had, in 
some instances, led German citizens into a false sense of democracy.  
 
Guenther  Roth  (1993)  explains  the  context  of  Weber‟s  Protestant  Ethic  with 
relation to the „social question‟ in Germany. According to Roth, during the years 
preceding unification, German scholarship developed a preoccupation with, and 
even  idealisation  of,  English  politics  (Roth  1993:  87-91).  However,  after  the 
establishment of the Reich, „serious scholarly research on England seems to have 
declined  as  national  competition  and  antagonism  [between  imperial  nations]  
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increased‟  (Roth  1993:  91).  Roth  claims  that  this  was  due  to  the  widespread 
perception that „Archival research about English institutions no longer promised 
to  be  of  any  relevance  for  the  constitution  of  the  Reich.‟  General  scholarly 
research shifted, „due to the Spanish-American War of 1898‟, towards an interest 
in the United States and its potential role as „enemy or ally‟ in the international 
struggle between imperial powers. 
 
According to Roth, Weber had strong familial ties and ideological connections to 
the English and the Americans, and The Protestant Ethic was a testament to his 
Anglophilia and Puritanism. With regards The Protestant Ethic, Weber claimed 
that the English and the Americans „went through the school of hard asceticism‟, 
developed  sectarian  social  systems,  and  „behead[ed]  the  traditionalist  powers‟, 
which enabled them to develop both „freedom of conscience and the most basic 
rights of man‟, as well as superior democratic governance (Weber in Roth 1993: 
85-86). Ultimately, by Roth‟s reading, Weber believed that the English and the 
Americans  had  developed  a  „kind  of  political  voluntarism‟  thanks  to  the 
continuing  influence  of  sectarianism  on  economic  and  political  life;  Weber‟s 
Protestant Ethic, as a study of the influence of Puritan voluntarism on economic 
rationalism,  „reflected  his  wishful  political  thinking‟  that  Germany  „had  had  a 
Puritan legacy to make them great like the English‟ (Roth 1993: 121). 
 
In “Churches” and “Sects” in North America (1985), Weber continued to pursue 
his interest in sectarianism and democratic politics. The context that Roth speaks  
  131 
of, with relation to the Protestant Ethic, is equally pertinent for our understanding 
of “Churches” and “Sects” (1985) because, in the latter, Weber contrasted the 
development of the dynamics between North American associational life, its state, 
and society, with that of the post-enlightenment German state and its associational 
life. He presented the dynamics of North American society in a manner analogous 
to Althusius‟s socio-political theory.  
 
Weber argued that American democracy developed out of religious interests and 
was completely different from German ideals of democracy. The traditional forms 
of  communal  life  of  Puritan  sects  in  North  America  imparted  something  of  a 
„residuum‟ – a spirit – to all modern forms of associational life (Weber 1985: 7-
8). This residuum, according to Weber, was best summarised by its process of 
exclusivity:  „[m]embership  in  a  “reputable”  (in  the  American  sense)  church 
community guarantee[s] not  only the social reputableness of the individual but 
also, and above all, his reputableness in business‟ (Weber 1985: 7). According to 
Weber,  this  residuum  of  exclusivity  was  at  the  core  of  North  American 
democracy. 
  
Whilst the rejection of confessionalisation in North America, for Weber, was a 
product  of  European  ideas  about  autonomy,  the  constitutional  separation  of 
church and state was a product of „religious claims‟ for „freedom of conscience‟ 
against the state (Weber 1985: 9-10). Due to the enduring spirit of the Puritan 
sects, „genuine American society… was and is permeated with “exclusivities” of  
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every kind‟ (Weber 1985: 10). In American democracy, the „individual seeks to 
maintain his own position by becoming a member of the social group. Missing is 
that undifferentiated  peasant-vegetative “geneality” without  which (as Germans 
are accustomed to believe) there can be no community‟ (Weber 1985: 11). 
 
The situation for democracy in Germany, as Weber saw it, could not be made to 
mimic  that  of  American  democracy.  His  sobriety  is  evident  in  the  following 
quote: „It is and remains the fate of us Germans that, due to numerous historical 
causes, the religious revolution at that time meant a development that favored not 
the energy of the individual but the prestige of the “office”‟ (Weber 1985: 11). 
 
In reading  Weber‟s  works  from this  period,  Paul Münch (1993)  takes a much 
broader historical look at the origins of Weber‟s interests in religious, economic 
and  political  life.  In  seeking  to  „reconstruct  the  prehistory  of  The  Protestant 
Ethic‟,  Münch  situates  Weber‟s  interest  in  the  influence  of  Puritanism  on 
economic and political life within a long German tradition of theoretical discourse 
on religion and economy  beginning in  early modern times  (Münch 1993: 53). 
Münch  distinguishes  three  major  movements  within  „the  whole  early  modern 
discourse on religion and economy‟: theological; mercantilistic/cameralistic; and 
enlightened public (Münch 1993: 54).  
 
Within the theological movement, Lutherans, Calvinists and Catholics shared the 
belief  that  all  economic  prosperity  was  determined  by  God.  However,  this  
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religious ideal did not always translate well into economic practice; the pursuit of 
wealth as a material  sign of God‟s blessing led to the  secularisation of  church 
property and activities, which resulted in divisions between the confessions, as 
exemplified by the Protestants‟ stereotype of „the lazy Catholic‟ (Münch 1993: 
53-54). The power of the churches over states and economic life was diminished 
most  significantly  during  the  early  modern  period  when  the  latter  „established 
themselves as autonomous exponents of a new, confessionally neutral discourse‟ 
(Münch  1993:  59).  Protestant  rulers  began  to  appropriate  the  resources  of  the 
churches  for  the  economic  profit  of  their  states  (Münch  1993:  60).  They  also 
began tolerating co-existent religious confessions as a means of attracting „new 
subjects‟, increasing populations, and building the wealth of their states (Münch 
1993:  61).  As  contributors  to  these  developments,  the  mercantilists  and 
cameralists subordinated the churches to the role of assisting the state in bringing 
about „civil order‟ (Münch 1993: 63). Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717-
1771)  was  a  cameralist  exponent  of  the  church  as  both  a  censor  of  religious 
opinions, with respect to maintaining civil order, and a contributor to the state‟s 
wealth (Münch 1993: 64). According to  Münch, „Justi  calculated that a  single 
holy day in a nation of 8 to 10 million inhabitants caused a monetary loss of over 
1  million  florins‟  (Münch  1993:  64).  The  flourishing  of  mercantilistic  and 
cameralistic discourse in the eighteenth century contributed to the „development 
of national and confessional stereotypes‟, portraying Protestants as economically 
„productive‟ and Catholics as economically „retarding‟ (Münch 1993: 67).  
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The  most  serious  challenge  to  confessional  toleration  since  the  seventeenth 
century and  the  height of cameralism, arose  in  the  form  of a  public debate in 
Wilhemine Germany, called the Kulturkampf, between Catholics and Protestants. 
Weber,  according  to  Münch,  composed  the  Protestant  Ethic  with  the  political 
intention of supporting the Protestants in this debate (Münch 1993: 71). Münch‟s 
argument  has  significant  implications  for  our  understanding  of  Weber‟s 
subsequent comments on the social. In many ways, Weber saw the Kuturkampf as 
a battle of ideas in the social world and he turned his scientific attentions towards 
studies of the role of the media in promoting public opinion about these ideas and 
controlling public perceptions of society and the so-called general will. 
  
  135 
Studying the moral ideas behind society 
 
In 1910, Weber delivered a two-part speech to the German Sociological Society 
(GSS) outlining what he saw as its most immediate tasks. The tasks, according to 
Weber, were twofold: first, it should begin a substantive study into the sociology 
of the German press; and, second, this study should form a part of a more general 
research project into the nature of the „German public sphere‟ of life (Kim 2002: 
199). The speech has been fragmentarily translated into English: the first half was 
translated by Hanno Hardt as Speech to German Sociological Association (1979) 
and the second half was translated by Sung Ho Kim as Voluntary Associational 
Life (2002). Prior  to the  speech, in a  written  proposal  to the GSS  dated April 
1909,  Weber  presented  his  ideas  for  a  sociological  investigation  of  the  press 
(Hennis 1998: 109). 
 
In  the  written  proposal  –  Preliminary  Report  on  a  Proposed  Survey  for  a 
Sociology of the Press (1998) – Weber argued that a sociological  study  of the 
press,  beginning  with  a  survey  of  the  newspaper  business,  would  provide  an 
insight into „the great cultural problems of the present‟ (Weber 1998: 111). These 
great cultural problems included „the mode of constitution of the psychic means 
of suggestion through which modern society continually strives to assimilate and 
adapt  individuals‟  and  the  „conditions  created  by  public  opinion…  for  the 
development,  maintenance,  undermining,  and  reforming  of  artistic,  scientific, 
ethical,  religious,  political,  social  and  economic  cultural  components‟  (Weber 
1998: 111). Weber used the term, „mode of constitution of the psychic means of  
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suggestion‟,  to  refer  to  the  organisation,  influence  on,  and  distribution  of,  the 
press,  including  factors  such  as  the  selection  of  newsworthy  stories,  and  the 
distribution  of  news  from  „telegraphic  services‟  to  newspapers  and  from 
newspapers to news agencies (Weber 1998: 113). All of these factors, in Weber‟s 
account, contributed to the „production of public opinion by the press‟ (Weber 
1998:  118).  For  Weber,  the  press  contributed  to  the  „Urbanization  of  the 
countryside‟ by displacing traditional forms of communication. At the linguistic 
level,  the  press  changed  „forms  of  thought  and  expression‟  by  encouraging 
particular „reading matter‟, and contributing, ultimately, to the shaping of „written 
and literary language‟. Ultimately, Weber argued that the press had an influence 
on „the  state of  feelings and accustomed  ways  of thinking of  modern  man, on 
political, literary and artistic activity, [and] on the constitution and displacement 
of mass judgments and mass beliefs‟ (Weber 1998: 119). 
 
This preliminary report offers some insights into Weber‟s understanding of the 
social and of society in particular. We have already seen how Weber spoke of 
society  as  nothing  more  than  a  moral  idea  guiding  the  conduct  of  life.  He 
reiterated this point in his preliminary report when he wrote of „modern society‟ 
as  assimilating  and  adapting  individuals  through  its  „psychic  means  of 
suggestion‟.  In  the  preliminary  report,  Weber  was  very  clear  to  point  out  that 
society  was a  moral  idea gripped tightly by the  hands  of the  media. From the 
shaping  of  language  to  the  displacement  of  ideas  and  determination  of 
newsworthiness,  the  press  was  one  of  the  major  driving  forces  behind  public  
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opinion. Thus, in many ways, for Weber the press formed a major constituent of 
modern society. Or, at the very least, the media presented a significant portion of 
the  objective  manifestation  of  modern  society;  as  he  stated:  „the  Press  as  a 
component of the objective individuality of modern culture‟ (Weber 1998: 111). 
 
In the first part of his speech reiterating the preliminary report, Weber argued the 
need  for  an  investigation  of  the  sociology  of  the  press.  He  used  the  term 
„sociology‟ in reference to the „sociological position of the press‟ – its ability to 
influence „public opinion‟ and shape the conduct of modern man (Weber 1979: 
178). For the investigation, he outlined a research program with a number of key 
questions:  what  did  contemporary  publicity  look  like?;  what  world  views 
determined the censorship of news?; how has the development of the press as a 
modern capitalist enterprise determined its influence on public opinion?; whether 
the press used journalistic anonymity to present an institutional, supra-individual, 
objective news, or whether it presented its news as representative of the views of 
particular  individual  journalists;  what  were  the  demographics  of  the  average 
journalist,  where  did they  come  from,  what education  did they have and what 
outside  prospects  did  they  have,  especially  in  politics?;  what  effect  did  the 
condensed presentation of life, as news, have on modern man and the manner in 
which he perceived the modern world?; and, finally, how did the press contribute 
to cultural values and the desires and viewpoints of modern man? 
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For  Weber,  an  investigation  of  the  sociological  role  of  the  press  would  have 
potentially been able to reveal its role in regulating social life. More than this, it 
would  have  also  been  able  to  reveal  the  particular  philosophies  guiding  the 
sociological role of the press. There were two philosophies, according to Weber, 
vying for control of the sociological function of the press: the first was a rejection 
of the reporting of „private affairs‟ in favour of the reporting of public events as 
the constitution of news; and, the second was the emphasis on the role of the press 
as a „censor‟ and summariser of those social issues deemed to be outside the reach 
of the law (Weber 1979: 176). 
 
The influence of the press was a key issue for Weber. Through an investigation of 
both  the  character  of  the  contemporary  journalist  and  his  extra-journalistic 
endeavours – including his ability to permeate politics and influence the direction 
of the state (Weber 1979: 180) – Weber hoped to ascertain whether the press was 
perceived by the German people as a metaphysical all-knowing force from which 
all reality was presented in its truthful form and he hoped to determine how this 
perception  had  changed  the  values  of  the  average  contemporary  German 
individual. In short, he hoped to determine the moral capacities of the press. 
 
Voluntary  Associational  Life  (2002)  constituted  the  second  half  of  Weber‟s 
speech to the GSS in 1910. In this half, he proposed an extension of the research 
project  that  he  developed  in  his  study  of  “Churches”  and  “Sects”  in  North 
America (1985) and Preliminary Report on a Proposed Survey for a Sociology of  
  139 
the Press (1998). He suggested that the overall task of the GSS should have been 
„a sociology of voluntary associational life‟ in Germany (Weber 2002: 200). In 
Weber‟s  speech,  a  voluntary  association,  such  as  „the  bowling  club‟  or  „the 
political party‟, had two ideal typical traits reminiscent of „the sect‟: first, it was „a 
combination (Einigung) of specifically qualified people and not an “institution” 
(Anstalt)‟;  and  second,  „its  socio-structural  principle  involve[d]  a  rejection  of 
those sanctions typical of an authoritarian organization (Zwangverbände) such as 
the  state  or the church‟ (Weber 2002: 200-201). The  second task  of the GSS, 
according  to  Weber‟s  speech,  was  to  investigate  the  manner  in  which  an 
individual‟s participation in a voluntary association influenced his or her general 
life conduct (Weber 2002: 202). Weber‟s interest, here, was with the manner in 
which an individual might alter his or her „personality‟ through adopting the sense 
of ideals and dignity of a particular association in order that he or she might be 
accepted by the other members of that association. 
 
In his speech, Weber went on to explain why the study of voluntary associations 
might  have  also  been  relevant  to  the  process  of  leadership  selection  and  the 
formation  of  public  opinion.  He  stated  that  all  voluntary  associations  had  a 
hierarchy of „domination by the minority (Minoritätsherrschaft)‟. An investigation 
of the process by which this minority was selected, according to Weber, would 
have shed light on the general social process of leadership selection and the types 
of  personality  that  came  to  dominate  (Weber  2002:  203-204).  The  process  of 
leadership selection and the types of personality that came to dominate voluntary  
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associations were, for Weber, factors that directly influenced public opinion. In 
expressing  this  view,  Weber  made  some  salient  points  about  the  formation  of 
cultural values. He stated that the dominant personalities of voluntary associations 
inevitably  sought  to  „secure  loyalty‟  through  „propagandistically‟  promoting 
„grand ideas about the nature of the world (Weltanschauungsideen)‟ (Weber 2002: 
204). However, because of „a universal “Tragedy”… that doom[ed] every attempt 
to realise ideas in reality‟, these associations became „objectified and occupied by 
careerists‟  (Weber  2002:  204).  The  result,  according  to  Weber,  was  an 
„unconscious  influence‟  of  ideas  on  the  conduct  of  life;  when  careerists 
appropriated  voluntary  associations,  they  transformed  the  ideals  of  those 
associations  into  „public  values  (überindividuellen  Kulturgüter)‟,  without 
acknowledging their original intentions (Weber 2002: 205, 207). 
 
Weber  was adamant that it  was not the role  of the  sociologist, of the GSS, to 
praise, condemn, or offer any judgment on the sociological position of the press or 
any other voluntary association. So what purpose did the study of the media and 
voluntary associations serve? It could not have been a simple exercise in value-
freedom  or  research  for  the  purpose  of  satisfying  scholarly  inquisitiveness. 
Weber‟s  earlier  studies  of  the  conditions  of  rural  labourers  and  the  stock  and 
commodity exchanges – read in this thesis as responses to the social question – 
served the purposes of determining the influence of agrarian protective legislation 
and Polish immigration on the development and change of German culture and of 
determining  the  effects  of  futures  trading,  and  arguing  against  the  need  for  
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agrarian protection, respectively. Similarly, his studies of the press and voluntary 
associational life served to clarify the interests behind certain so-called societies 
and their solutions to the social question. 
 
Summary 
 
This chapter has argued that Weber limited his concept of the social to intentional, 
small-scale  communities  of  exchange,  associations  of  Herrschaft,  voluntary 
associations and societies as moral ideas. When Weber formulated his concepts of 
communities of exchange in his early writings on legal-history, stock exchanges 
and rural labour, he argued that social groups were defined by their intentional 
nature. Later, consistent with this formulation, in an encounter with the Germanist 
legal-historian, Otto von Gierke, and under the influence of historical economists, 
Weber  rejected  any  economic  and  legal  concepts  that  portrayed  society  as  a 
personality of the general will or an entity sui generis; he favoured a conception 
of society as an intentional moral idea or Weltanschauung. Although he did not 
publish  an  explicit  solution  to  the  social  question,  Weber  favoured  individual 
sovereignty over democracy and this preference influenced his subsequent studies 
of the social. In subsequent sociological work, from the period 1904-1910, Weber 
developed an Althusian approach to the social, becoming increasingly concerned 
with the manner in which small voluntary associations had the power to shape 
public  opinion and  propagate  particular moral ideas about what society was or 
what society should look like. In his later career, Weber became concerned that 
voluntary associations controlling the press were increasingly determining public  
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ideas about  society and  consequently controlling the leadership composition of 
the government through their ability to shape the so-called general will. He was 
concerned that these associations were promoting a false sense of democracy in 
Germany. Political views aside, throughout his career the most consistent aspects 
of Weber‟s approach to the social question were his continual call for clarity in 
the various uses of social terms such as association and society, and his insistence 
that  scholars,  politicians  and  private  entrepreneurs  be  forthcoming  about  their 
reasons for using those terms.  
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Conclusion 
 
This  thesis  has  discussed  three  contexts  in  which  the  peculiarity  of  Weber‟s 
political logic emerged. The first of these is the public debates about academic 
freedom and leadership at the end of the Great War. In these debates, Weber put 
forward a unique view of academic freedom, and unique ethics of leadership and 
nationalism. Weber‟s idea of academic freedom and the ability to think clearly 
was not just a scholarly ethic but also a major component of his ethics of political 
leadership.  Weber  stressed  that  political  leaders  during  his  time  did  not  think 
clearly,  which  prevented  them  from  grasping  the  true  function  of  politics  and 
taking responsibility for their political decisions.  
 
The  thesis  has  established  strong  similarities  between  Weber‟s  ethics  of 
leadership and the ethics of civil philosophy. Civil philosophy developed as a way 
of  separating  the  moral  and  civil  domains  as  distinct  spheres  of  life,  each 
requiring its own form of conduct. Seeking a uniquely civil domain and way of 
life, civil philosophy rejected Aristotelian political philosophy and metaphysics in 
general  for  relativising  morality  and  politics,  and  treating  them  as  equal 
contributors  to  the  moral  project  of  self-perfection.  The  civil  philosophers  – 
Pufendorf and Thomasius – argued that Aristotelian philosophy and metaphysics 
did  not  have  the  capacity  to  distinguish  between  moral  and  civil  spheres  and 
conduct.  Forging  his  own  civil  sphere,  Thomasius  in  particular  used  historical 
evidence to argue the need for a type of secular, amoral, civil conduct, and he 
used  historical  awareness  and  practical  experience  to  instruct  students  of  
  144 
jurisprudence  in  the  art  of  this  conduct.  Weber‟s  approach  to  the  political, 
exemplified here in his view of academic freedom and in his ethics of leadership 
and nationalism, bares an uncanny resemblance to Thomasius‟s approach to the 
civil. The main difference is that, where Thomasius only separated the civil from 
the moral, Weber sought a further separation of the political from the civil and the 
moral. Weber did not attempt to reintroduce Aristotelian politics, or indeed any 
other form of Athenian politics. Rather, he employed a logic uncannily like that 
developed by Thomasius and in true  historicist  fashion, used it to redefine the 
political domain according to its own contemporary function and requirements. 
 
The  second context  for the  emergence  of  Weber‟s  political logic, discussed in 
chapter two, was his writing on democracy, nationalism and parliament. Weber 
did  not  explicitly  write  of  his  political  logic,  but  he  did  portray  the  peculiar 
function and requirements of politics as an either-or dichotomy conceptualising 
difference,  opposition  and  sovereign  power.  Today,  it  is  easy  to  view  the 
reduction of politics to either-or dichotomies as a Schmittian phenomenon. For 
instance, a number of discussions in online forums and think-tank articles of the 
foreign policies of the Bush-led U.S. administration involve comparisons of these 
policies  with  Schmittian  ideals  (see  for  instance 
http://opiniojuris.org/2008/09/21/carl-schmitt-and-emergencies-a-really-fast-
comment/; http://www.robertamsterdam.com/2008/09/carl_schmitt_and_the_ 
top_ten_s.htm;  and  http://www.counterpunch.org/versluis08102006.html).  The 
likeness of Bush‟s democratic foreign policy with Schmitt‟s friend-enemy concept  
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has the unfortunate effect of tarnishing all either-or dichotomies of politics with 
the  same  National  Socialist  brush.  Had  Schmitt  not  associated  with  National 
Socialism, and  had  he not  subsequently  been associated  with Bush, then more 
Weber scholars may have been willing to read Weber and Schmitt in the same 
light: as thinkers committed to a distinction of all things political. The comparison 
of these two political thinkers provided in chapter two has shown that Weber was 
willing  to  use  the  mechanisms  of  democracy,  nationalism  and  parliament 
pragmatically, as a means of achieving politics, whereas Schmitt simply rejected 
these mechanisms altogether. Whilst they had conflicting recommendations about 
the use of these mechanisms, Weber and Schmitt were as one with their respective 
acknowledgements that the nation was the best exemplifier of politics because it 
housed the exceptional power of sovereignty. Schmitt took this view, drawn from 
historical  evidence  and  contemporary  experience,  and  formulated  it  into  his 
philosophy  of  law.  He  turned  Weber‟s  implicit  political  logic  into  a  political 
theory whose central focus was the nation and its capacity as the last bastion of 
political pluralism. 
 
There are a number of reasons why Weber resisted the temptation to turn his own 
political views into a political theory or philosophy. He rejected the contemporary 
project of theory and its teleological generalising. This did not, however, prevent 
him  from  turning  theory  into  a  conceptual  model  for  conducting  sociological 
studies and for drawing conclusions about those studies. Chapter three outlined 
three  uses  of  Weber:  theoretical,  contextual  and  emancipative.  The  theoretical  
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uses reduce Weber‟s sociology and politics to a central concern with a theory of 
society.  The  contextual  uses  reduce  it  to  a  science  of  economic  action  and 
personality.  The  emancipative  uses  attempt  to  make  them  fit  a  general  social 
movement of liberal freedom and individual autonomy. Chapter three argued that 
the commonality of these uses is their conflation of the social with the political in 
the works of Weber. The problem for Weber, and especially for the theoretical 
and  emancipative  uses  of  Weber,  was  that  political  reality  was  simply  too 
historically contingent to justify its conceptual analysis. Indeed, there was a sense 
of urgency to Weber‟s political arguments and so politics, in his view, was outside 
the  conceptual  realm  of  his  scholarship.  Nevertheless,  our  appreciation  of 
Weber‟s arguments, as presented in this thesis, is improved by comparing it with 
the work of specific thinkers who followed similar passions to Weber but were 
more  inclined  to  conceptualise  and  theorise  their  insights.  Following  this 
approach,  chapter  one  and  chapter  two  placed  Weber  somewhere  between  the 
civil  philosophy  of  Thomasius  and  the  legal  philosophy  of  Schmitt.  These 
chapters essentially drew upon the two thinkers as ideal-types to compare with the 
substantial  material  of  Weber‟s  political  arguments.  By  locating  Weber 
somewhere between the historical approach of Thomasius and the political theory 
of Schmitt, these two chapters explained Weber‟s political logic without reducing 
it to a theory or philosophy. In comparing Weber with Schmitt, chapter two posed 
an important question to the emancipative uses of Weber: was Weber a liberal 
democrat or a liberal user of democracy? Via historical awareness and experience 
of the  political realities of  his time,  Weber  made a decision to use democracy  
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pragmatically. As far as he could see, there was no way around this; there was no 
way, or indeed no desire, to circumvent sovereign power. Weber did not attempt 
to promote his political ideas by reducing them to general laws or theories. He 
argued that the citizens of Germany would come to similar conclusions if they 
were simply given the opportunity to see things clearly. 
 
Weber‟s abhorrence of consensus is unmistakeable. This was not a condemnation 
that he reserved for the political world. Even in his engagement with the social 
question in Germany he was scathing of attempts to portray society as embodying 
particular universal values. But, even though he acknowledged that the social was 
fraught with both value conflict and the struggle for ideas, Weber did not see it as 
having the same ordering capacity as politics. Chapter four of the thesis argued 
that Weber placed restrictions on the social, as a source of political authority, in 
his substantive studies of the social question in Germany. This is the third context 
in  which  the  peculiarity  of  Weber‟s  political  logic  emerged.  Weber  began  his 
commitment to portraying the social as a domain of voluntary associations early 
in  his  career  when  he  constructed  the  ideal-type  of  communities  of  exchange. 
With this ideal-type, Weber accentuated the idea that all voluntary associations 
were groups of individuals who shared similar values and intentions. From this 
point on, throughout his engagements with the social question, Weber consistently 
portrayed the social as a domain of values and intentions. When confronted with 
the macro idea of society, he simply argued that it was nothing more than a facade 
created by particular associations to promote consensus about their intentions. The  
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problem  for  Weber  were  the  two  reasons  he  believed  made  it  impossible  to 
establish a civil  society  for Germany like the one that had  been  established in 
North America and England: first, particular private interests in Germany were 
promoting a false sense of democracy and manipulating public opinion or general 
will  to  benefit  their  own  economic  interests;  and  second,  the  voluntary 
associations required for a successful democracy such as that of North America 
were, in Germany, frequently appropriated by minorities who masked their own 
interests behind the rhetoric of group personalities and cultural values. In other 
words, group personalities, the general will and in some instances cultural values, 
were mere ideologies that masked the  private interests of particular minorities. 
The pursuit of these interests under the rubric of society or even the state had the 
potential  to  damage  the  political  interests  of  the  nation.  Weber  favoured  an 
identifiable sovereign power and he stressed that it was necessary to reveal the 
intentions  of  private interests operating  behind the scenes  of „the general will‟ 
through  persistent  sociological  studies  of  the  media‟s  manipulation  of  public 
opinion.  
 
The uniqueness of Weber’s political logic summarised 
 
The three contexts described in chapter one, two and four of the thesis each reveal 
a different aspect of Weber‟s peculiar political logic. First, the political domain, 
for  Weber,  was  a  practical  domain  requiring  practical  knowledge.  Calling  for 
practical  knowledge,  Weber  asked  political  leaders  to  treat  the  political  as  a 
distinct domain requiring its own form of  conduct, which could  only be learnt  
  149 
through experience and historical awareness. This was an argument similar to that 
of Christian Thomasius some two hundred years earlier in his successful attempt 
to separate the civil domain from the moral domain. Weber‟s separation of the 
political from the civil and the moral suggests that the political functioned in a 
way that was alien to rational administration and universal morality. The second 
aspect of Weber‟s political logic revealed in this thesis is the specific peculiarity 
of  his  political  domain.  Chapter  two  argued  that  the  specific  peculiarity  of 
Weber‟s political is its contingency upon difference and opposition, which is an 
exceptional phenomenon not only in the legal sense but also in the sense that it is 
extra-civil  and  extra-moral.  For  Weber,  sovereign  power  was  the  guarantor  of 
difference and opposition and the nation, as the vehicle of sovereign power, was 
the primary sphere of politics. The third aspect of Weber‟s political logic revealed 
in this thesis is the manner in which he restricted the social as a source of political 
authority. Weber argued that the  social  was unable to deliver  sovereign power 
because  it  too  frequently  masked  unidentifiable  interests;  the  social,  in  other 
words, was incapable of providing politics. 
 
Weber‟s political logic is thus summarised as a treatment of the political domain 
on  its  own  terms  through  the  practical-experiential  understanding  of  the 
requirements  of  difference  and  opposition.  These  requirements,  for  Weber, 
included nationalism, sovereign power, pragmatic use of social mechanisms and 
restriction of the social as a source of authority. Weber‟s political world was after  
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all  relentlessly  changing  and  it  comprised  the  original  human  endeavour  of 
conflict to which all other endeavours would succumb.   
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